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This material is the appendix part of my book collaborated with Professor
Jianhui Wang at Southern Methodist University:
Wei Wei, Jianhui Wang. Modeling and Optimization of Interdependent
Energy Infrastructures. Springer Nature Switzerland, 2020.
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-030-25958-7
This material provides thorough tutorials on some optimization techniques
frequently used in various engineering disciplines, including
♣ Convex optimization
♣ Linearization technique and mixed-integer linear programming
♣ Robust optimization
♣ Equilibrium/game problems
It discusses how to reformulate a difficult (non-convex, multi-agent, min-
max) problem to a solver-compatible form (semidefinite program, mixed-
integer linear program) via convexification, linearization, and decomposition,
so the original problem can be reliably solved by commercial/open-source
software. Fundamental algorithms (simplex algorithm, interior-point algo-
rithm) are not the main focus.
This material is a good reference for self-learners who have basic knowledge
in linear algebra and linear programming. It is one of the main references for
an optimization course taught at Tsinghua University. If you need teaching
slides, please contact wei-wei04@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn or find the up-to-date
contact information at https://sites.google.com/view/weiweipes/
1

Contents
A Basics of Linear and Conic Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A.1 Basic Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.1.1 Convex Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.1.2 Generalized Inequalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.1.3 Dual Cones and Dual Generalized Inequalities . . . . . . . 14
A.1.4 Convex Function and Epigraph. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.2 From Linear to Conic Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.2.1 Linear Program and its Duality Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.2.2 General Conic Linear Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.2.3 Second-order Cone Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A.2.4 Semidefinite Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A.3 Convex Relaxation Methods for Non-convex QCQPs . . . . . . . . 39
A.3.1 SDP Relaxation and Valid Inequalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A.3.2 Successively Tightening the Relaxation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A.3.3 Completely Positive Program Relaxation . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
A.3.4 MILP Approximation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
A.4 MILP Formulation of Nonconvex QPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A.4.1 Nonconvex QPs over polyhedra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A.4.2 Standard Nonconvex QPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.5 Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
B Formulation Recipes in Integer Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
B.1 Piecewise Linear Approximation of Nonlinear Functions . . . . . 62
B.1.1 Univariate Continuous Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
B.1.2 Bivariate Continuous Nonlinear Function . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
B.1.3 Approximation Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
B.2 Linear Formulation of Product Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
B.2.1 Product of Two Binary Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
B.2.2 Product of Integer and Continuous Variables . . . . . . . . . 73
B.2.3 Product of Two Continuous Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3
4 Contents
B.2.4 Monomial of Binary Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
B.2.5 Product of Functions in Integer Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
B.2.6 Log-sum Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
B.3 Other Frequently used Formulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
B.3.1 Minimum Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
B.3.2 Maximum Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
B.3.3 Absolute Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
B.3.4 Linear Fractional of Binary Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
B.3.5 Disjunctive Inequalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
B.3.6 Logical Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
B.4 Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
C Basics of Robust Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
C.1 Static Robust Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
C.1.1 Basic Assumptions and Formulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
C.1.2 Tractable Reformulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
C.1.3 Formulation Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
C.2 Adjustable Robust Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
C.2.1 Basic Assumptions and Formulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
C.2.2 Affine Policy Based Approximation Model . . . . . . . . . . . 108
C.2.3 Algorithms for Fully Adjustable Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
C.3 Distributionally Robust Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
C.3.1 Static Distributionally Robust Optimization . . . . . . . . . 120
C.3.2 Adjustable Distributionally Robust Optimization . . . . . 129
C.4 Data-driven Robust Stochastic Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
C.4.1 Robust Chance Constrained Stochastic Program . . . . . 134
C.4.2 Stochastic Program with Discrete Distributions . . . . . . 148
C.4.3 Formulations based on Wasserstein Metric . . . . . . . . . . . 153
C.5 Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
D Equilibrium Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
D.1 Standard Nash Equilibrium Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
D.1.1 Formulation and Optimality Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
D.1.2 Variational Inequality Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
D.1.3 Best Response Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
D.1.4 Nash Equilibrium of Matrix Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
D.1.5 Potential Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
D.2 Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
D.2.1 Formulation and Optimality Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
D.2.2 Best-Response Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
D.3 Bilevel Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
D.3.1 Bilevel Programs with a Convex Lower Level . . . . . . . . 198
D.3.2 Special Bilevel Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Contents 5
D.3.3 Bilevel Mixed-integer Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
D.4 Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints . . . . . . 217
D.4.1 Mathematical Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
D.4.2 Linear Complementarity Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
D.4.3 Linear Programs with Complementarity Constraints . . 222
D.5 Equilibrium Programs with Equilibrium Constraints . . . . . . . . 222
D.5.1 Mathematical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
D.5.2 Methods for Solving an EPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
D.6 Conclusions and Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230

Appendix A
Basics of Linear and Conic Programs
The great watershed in optimization isn’t between
linearity and nonlinearity, but convexity and
non-convexity.
−Ralph Tyrrell Rockafellar
The mathematical programming theory has been thoroughly developed in
width and depth since its birth in 1940s, when George Dantzig invented
simplex algorithm for linear programming. The most influential findings in
the field of optimization theory can be summarized as [1]:
1) Recognition of the fact that under mild conditions, a convex optimiza-
tion program is computationally tractable: the computational effort under a
given accuracy grows moderately with the problem size even in the worst case.
In contrast, a non-convex program is generally computationally intractable:
the computational effort of the best known methods grows prohibitively fast
with respect to the problem size, and it is reasonable to believe that this
is an intrinsic feature of such problems rather than a limitation of existing
optimization techniques.
2) The discovery of interior-point methods, which was originally developed
in 1980s to solve LPs and could be generalized to solve convex optimization
problems as well. Moreover, between these two extremes (LPs and general
convex programs), there are many important and useful convex programs.
Although nonlinear, they still possess nice structured properties, which can
be utilized to develop more dedicated algorithms. These polynomial-time
interior-point algorithms turn out to be considerably more efficient than those
exploiting only the convex property.
The superiority of formulating a problem as a convex optimization prob-
lem is apparent. The most appealing advantage is that the problem can be
solved reliably and efficiently. It is also convenient to build the associated
dual problem, which gives insights on sensitivity information and may help
develop distributed algorithm for solving the problem. Convex optimization
has been applied in a number of energy system operational issues, and well
acknowledged for its computational superiority. We believe that it is imper-
ative for researchers and engineers to develop certain understanding on this
important topic.
As we have already learnt in previous chapters, many optimization prob-
lems in energy system engineering can be formulated as or converted to con-
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vex programs. The goal of this chapter is to help readers develop necessary
background knowledge and skills to apply several well-structured convex op-
timization models, including LPs, SOCPs, and SDPs, i.e., to formulate or
transform their problems as these specific convex programs. Certainly, con-
vex transformation (or convexification) may be rather tricky and require
special knowledge and skills. Nevertheless, the attempt often turns out to
be worthwhile. We also pay special attention to nonconvex QCQPs, which
can model various decision-making problems in engineering, such as optimal
power flow and optimal gas flow. We discuss convex relaxation technique
based on SDP,which is shown to be very useful to get a high-quality objec-
tive lower bound. We also present MILP formulations for some special QPs;
because of the special problem structure, these MILP models can tackle prac-
tically sized problems in reasonable time.
Most materials regarding convex sets and functions come from [2] and its
solution manual [3]; extensions of duality theory from linear programming to
conic programming follows from [1]. We consolidate necessary contents in a
convenient way to make this book self-contained and easy to follow.
A.1 Basic Notations
A.1.1 Convex Sets
A set C ∈ Rn is convex if the line segment connecting any two points in C
is contained in C, i.e., for any x1, x2 ∈ C, we have θx1 + (1 − θ)x2 ∈ C,
∀θ ∈ [0, 1]. Roughly speaking, standing at anywhere in a convex set, you can
see every other point in the set. Fig. A.1 illustrates a simple convex set and
a non-convex set in R2.
Fig. A.1 Left: the circle is convex; right: the ring is non-convex.
The convex combination of k points x1, · · · , xk is defined as θ1x1 + · · · +
θkxk, where θ1, · · · , θk ≥ 0, and θ1 + · · · + θk = 1. A convex combination
of points can be regarded as a weighted average of the points, with θi the
weight of xi in the mixture.
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The convex hull of set C, denoted conv(C), is the smallest convex set that
contains C. Particularly, if C has finite elements, then
conv(C) = {θ1x1+· · ·+θkxk | xi ∈ C, θi ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · , k, θ1+· · ·+θk = 1}
Fig. A.2 illustrates the convex hulls of two sets in R2.
Some useful convex sets are briefly introduced.
Fig. A.2 Left: The convex hull of eighteen points. Right: The convex hull of a kidney
shaped set.
1. Cones
A set C is called a cone, or nonnegative homogeneous, if for any x ∈ C,
we have θx ∈ C, ∀θ ≥ 0. A set C is a convex cone if it is convex and a cone:
for any x1, x2 ∈ C and θ1, θ2 ≥ 0, we have θ1x2 + θ2x2 ∈ C.
The conic combination (or nonnegative linear combination) of k points
x1, · · · , xk is defined as θ1x1 + · · · + θkxk, where θ1, · · · , θk ≥ 0. If a set of
finite points {xi}, i = 1, 2 · · · resides in a convex cone C, then every conic
combination of {xi} remains in C. Conversely, a set C is a convex cone if
and only if it contains all conic combinations of its elements. The conic hull
of set C is the smallest convex cone that contains C. Fig. A.3 illustrates the
conic hulls of two sets in R2.
00
Fig. A.3 The conic hulls of the two sets [2].
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Some widely used cones are introduced.
a. The nonnegative orthant
The nonnegative orthant is defined as
Rn+ = {x ∈ Rn | x ≥ 0} (A.1)
It is the set of vectors composed of non-negative entries. It is clearly a convex
cone.
b. Second-order cone
The unit second-order cone is defined as
Ln+1C = {(x, t) ∈ Rn+1 | ‖x‖2 ≤ t} (A.2)
It is also called the Lorentz cone or ice-cream cone. Fig. A.4 exhibits L3C .
x1
x2
t
−1
0
1
−1
0
1
0
0.5
1
Fig. A.4 L3C =
{
(x1, x2, t)
∣∣∣ √x21 + x22 ≤ t} in R3 [2].
For any (x, t) ∈ Ln+1C and (y, z) ∈ Ln+1C , we have
‖θ1x+ θ2y‖2 ≤ θ1‖x‖2 + θ2‖y‖2 ≤ θ1t+ θ2z ⇒ θ1
[
x
t
]
+ θ2
[
y
z
]
∈ Ln+1C
which means that the unit second-order cone is a convex cone.
Sometimes, it is convenient to use the following inequality to represent a
second-order cone in optimization problems
‖Ax+ b‖2 ≤ cTx+ d (A.3)
where A ∈ Rm×n, b ∈ Rm, c ∈ Rn, d ∈ R. It is the inverse image of the
unit second-order cone under the affine mapping f(x) = (Ax + b, cTx + d),
and hence is convex. Second-order cones in forms of (A.2) and (A.3) are
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interchangeable.
‖Ax+ b‖2 ≤ cTx+ d⇔
[
A
cT
]
x+
[
b
d
]
∈ Lm+1C
and hence is convex.
c. Positive semidefinite cone
The set of symmetric m×m matrices is denoted by
Sm = {X ∈ Rm×m | X = XT }
which is a vector space with dimension m(m+ 1)/2.
The set of symmetric positive semidefinite matrices is denoted by
Sm+ = {X ∈ Sm | X  0}
The set of symmetric positive definite matrices is denoted by
Sm++ = {X ∈ Sm | X  0}
Clearly, Sm+ is a convex cone: if A,B ∈ Sm+ , then for any x ∈ Rm and
positive scalars θ1, θ2 ≥ 0, we have
xT (θ1A+ θ2B)x = θ1x
TAx+ θ2x
TBx ≥ 0
implying θ1A+ θ2B ∈ Sm+ .
A positive semidefinite cone in R2 can be expressed via three variables
x, y, z as [
x y
y z
]
 0⇔ x ≥ 0, xz ≥ y2
which is plotted in Fig. A.5. In fact, L3C and S2+ are equivalent to each other.
To see this, the hyperbolic inequality xz ≥ y2 with x ≥ 0, z ≥ 0 defines the
same feasible region in R3 as the following second-order cone∥∥∥∥∥ 2yx− z
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ x+ z, x ≥ 0, z ≥ 0
In higher-order dimensions, every second-order cone can be written as an
LMI via Schur complement as
‖Ax+ b‖2 ≤ cTx+ d⇒
[
(cTx+ d)I
(Ax+ b)T
Ax+ b
cTx+ d
]
 0 (A.4)
In this sense of representability, positive semidefinite cones are more gen-
eral than second-order cones. However, the transformation in (A.4) may not
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xy
z
0
0.5
1
−1
0
1
0
0.5
1
Fig. A.5 Positive semidefinite cone in S2 (or in R3) [2].
be superior from the computational perspective, because SOCPs are more
tractable than SDPs.
d. Copositive cone
A copositive cone Cn+ consists of symmetric matrices whose quadratic form
is nonnegative over the nonnegative orthant Rn+:
Cn+ = {A | A ∈ Sn, xTAx ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Rn+} (A.5)
The copositive cone Cn+ is closed, pointed, and convex [4]. Clearly, Sn+ ⊆
Cn+, and every entry-wise nonnegative symmetric matrix A belongs to Cn+.
Actually, Cn+ is significantly larger than the positive semidefinite cone and
the nonnegative symmetric matrix cone.
2. Polyhedra
A polyhedron is defined as the solution set of a finite number of linear
inequalities:
P = {x | Ax ≤ b} (A.6)
(A.6) is also called a hyperplane representation for a polyhedron. It is easy to
show that polyhedra are convex sets. Sometimes, a polyhedron is also called
a polytope. The two concepts are often used interchangeably in this book.
Because of physical bounds of decision variables, the polyhedral feasible re-
gions in practical energy system optimization problems are usually bounded,
which means that there is no extreme ray.
Polyhedra can be expressed via the convex combination as well. The convex
hull of a finite number of points
conv{v1, · · · , vk} = {θ1v1 + · · ·+ θkvk | θ ≥ 0, 1T θ = 1} (A.7)
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defines a polyhedron. (A.7) is called a convex hull representation. If the poly-
hedron is unbounded, a generalization of this convex hull representation is
{θ1v1 + · · ·+ θkvk | θ ≥ 0, θ1 + · · ·+ θm = 1,m ≤ k} (A.8)
which considers nonnegative linear combinations of vi, but only the first
m coefficients whose summation is 1 are bounded, and the remaining ones
can take arbitrarily large values. In view of this, the convex hull of points
v1, · · · , vm plus the conic hull of points vm+1, · · · , vk is a polyhedron. The
reverse is also correct: any polyhedron can be represented by convex hull and
conic hull.
How to represent a polyhedron depends on what information is available:
if its boundaries are expressed via linear inequalities, the hyperplane repre-
sentation is straightforward; if its extreme points and extreme rays are known
in advance, the convex-conic hull representation is more convenient. With the
growth in dimension, it is becoming more difficult to switch (derive one from
the other) between the hyperplane representation and the hull representation.
A.1.2 Generalized Inequalities
A cone K ⊆ Rn is called a proper cone if it satisfies:
1) K is convex and closed.
2) K is solid, i.e., it has non-empty interior.
3) K is pointed, i.e., x ∈ K, −x ∈ K ⇒ x = 0.
A proper cone K can be used to define a generalized inequality, a partial
ordering on Rn, as follows
x K y ⇐⇒ y − x ∈ K (A.9)
We denote x K y for y K x. Similarly, a strict partial ordering can be
defined by
x ≺K y ⇐⇒ y − x ∈ int(K) (A.10)
where int(K) stands for the interior of K, and write x K y for y ≺K x.
The nonnegative orthant Rn+ is a proper cone. When K = Rn+, the partial
ordering K comes down to the element-wise comparison between vectors:
for x, y ∈ Rn, x Rn+ y means xi ≤ yi, i = 1, · · ·n, or the traditional notation
x ≤ y.
The positive semidefinite cone Sn+ is a proper cone in Sn. When K = Sn+,
the partial ordering K comes down to a linear matrix inequality between
symmetric matrices: for X,Y ∈ Sn, X Sn+ Y means Y − X is positive
semidefinite. Because it arises so frequently, we can drop the subscript Sn+
when we write a linear matrix inequality Y  X or X  Y . It is understood
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that such a generalized inequality corresponds to the positive semidefinite
cone without particular mention.
A generalized inequality is equivalent to linear constraints with K = Rn+;
for other cones, such as the second-order cone Ln+1C or the positive semidefi-
nite cone Sn+, the feasible region is nonlinear but remains convex.
A.1.3 Dual Cones and Dual Generalized Inequalities
Let K be a cone in Rn. Its dual is defined as the following set
K∗ = {y | xT y ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K} (A.11)
Because K∗ is the intersection of homogeneous half spaces (half spaces pass-
ing through the origin). It is a closed convex cone.
The interior of K∗ is given by
int(K∗) = {y | xT y > 0, ∀x ∈ K, x 6= 0} (A.12)
To see this, if yTx > 0, ∀x ∈ K, then (y + u)Tx > 0, ∀x ∈ K holds for
all u that is sufficiently small; hence y ∈ int(K∗). Conversely, if y ∈ K∗ and
∃x ∈ K : yTx = 0, x 6= 0, then (y−tx)Tx < 0, ∀t > 0, indicating y /∈ int(K∗).
If int(K) 6= ∅, then K∗ is pointed. If this is not true, suppose ∃y 6= 0:
y ∈ K∗, −y ∈ K∗, i.e., yTx ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K and −yTx ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K, so we have
xT y = 0, ∀x ∈ K, which is in contradiction with int(K) 6= ∅.
In conclusion, K∗ is a proper cone, if the original cone K is so; K∗ is closed
and convex, regardless of the original cone K. Fig. A.6 shows a cone K (the
region between L2 and L3) and its dual cone K
∗ (the region between L1 and
L4) in R2.
K
*
K
1
L
2
L
3
L
4
L
1 3
L LA
2 4
L LA
Halfspace
containingK
l
Fig. A.6 Illustration of a cone and its dual cone in R2.
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In light of the definition of K∗, a non-zero vector y is the normal of a
homogeneous half space which contains K if and only if y ∈ K∗. The inter-
section of all such half spaces containing K constitutes the cone K (if K is
closed), in view of this
K =
⋂
y∈K∗
{
x | yTx ≥ 0} = {x | yTx ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ K∗} = K∗∗ (A.13)
This fact can be also understood in R2 from Fig. A.6. The extreme cases
for the normal vector y such that the corresponding half space contains K
are L1 and L4, and the intersection of these half spaces for all y ∈ K∗ turns
out to be the original cone K.
Next, we investigate the dual cones of three special proper cones, i.e., Rn+,
Ln+1C , and Sn+, respectively.
1. The nonnegative orthant
By observing the fact
xT y ≥ 0, ∀x ≥ 0⇐⇒ y ≥ 0
we naturally have (Rn+)∗ = Rn+; in other words, the nonnegative orthant is
self-dual.
2. The second-order cone
Now, we show that the second-order cone is also self-dual: (Ln+1C )∗ = L
n+1
C .
To this end, we need to demonstrate
xTu+ tv ≥ 0, ∀(x, t) ∈ Ln+1C ⇐⇒ ‖u‖2 ≤ v
⇒: Suppose the right-hand condition is false, and ∃(u, v) : ‖u‖2 > v, by
recalling Cauchy-Schwarz inequality |aT b| ≤ ‖a‖2‖b‖2, we have
min
x
{
xTu
∣∣ s.t. ‖x‖2 ≤ t} = −t‖u‖2
In such circumstance, xTu + tv = t(v − ‖u‖2) < 0, ∀t > 0, which is in
contradiction with the left-hand condition.
⇐: Again, according to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
xTu+ tv ≥ −‖x‖2‖u‖2 + tv ≥ −‖x‖2‖u‖2 + ‖x‖2v = ‖x‖2 (v − ‖u‖2) ≥ 0
3. The positive semidefinite cone
We investigate the dual cone of Sn+. The inner product of X,Y ∈ Sn is
defined by the element-wise summation
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〈X,Y 〉 =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
XijYij = tr(XY
T )
We establish this fact: (Sn+)∗ = Sn+, which boils down to
tr(XY T ) ≥ 0, ∀X  0⇐⇒ Y  0
⇒: Suppose Y /∈ Sn+, then ∃q ∈ Rn such that
qTY q = tr(qqTY T ) < 0
which is in contradiction with the left-hand condition because X = qqT ∈ Sn+.
⇐: Now suppose X,Y ∈ Sn+. X can be expressed via its eigenvalues λi ≥ 0
and eigenvectors qi as X =
∑n
i=1 λiqiq
T
i , then we arrive at
tr(XY T ) = tr
(
Y
n∑
i=1
λiqiq
T
i
)
=
n∑
i=1
λiq
T
i Y qi ≥ 0
In summary, it follows that the positive semidefinite cone is self-dual.
4. The completely positive cone
Following the same concept of matrix inner product, it is shown that (Cn+)∗
is the cone of so-called completely positive matrices and can be expressed as
[5]
(Cn+)∗ = conv{xxT | x ∈ Rn+} (A.14)
In contrast to previous three cones, the copositive cone Cn+ is not self-dual.
When the dual cone K∗ is proper, it induces a generalized inequality K∗ ,
which is called the dual generalized inequality of the one induced by cone K
(if K is proper). According to the definition of dual cone, an important fact
relating a generalized inequality and its dual is
1) x K y if and only if λTx ≤ λT y, ∀λ ∈ K∗.
2) x ≺K y if and only if λTx < λT y, ∀λ ∈ K∗, λ 6= 0.
When K = K∗∗, the dual generalized inequality of K∗ is K , and the
above property holds if the positions of K and K∗ are swapped.
A.1.4 Convex Function and Epigraph
A function f : Rn → R is convex if its feasible region X is a convex set, and
for all x1, x2 ∈ X, the following condition holds
f(θx1 + (1− θ)x2) ≤ θf(x1) + (1− θ)f(x2), ∀θ ∈ [0, 1] (A.15)
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The geometrical interpretation of inequality (A.15) is that the chord con-
necting points (x1, f(x1)) and (x2, f(x2)) always lies above the curve of f
between x1 and x2 (see Fig. A.7). Function f is strictly convex if strict in-
equality holds in (A.15) when x1 6= x2 and 0 < θ < 1. Function f is called
(strictly) concave if −f is (strictly) convex. An affine function is both convex
and concave.
The graph of a function f : Rn → R is defined as
graph f = {(x, f(x)) | x ∈ X} (A.16)
which is a subset of Rn+1.
The epigraph of a function f : Rn → R is defined as
epi f = {(x, t) | x ∈ X, f(x) ≤ t} (A.17)
which is a subset of Rn+1. These definitions are illustrated through Fig. A.7.
1 1, ( )x f x
2 2, ( )x f x
graph f
epi f
Fig. A.7 Illustration of the graph of a convex function f(x) (the solid line) and its
epigraph (the shaded area) in R2.
Epigraph bridges the concepts of convex sets and convex functions: A
function is convex if and only if its epigraph is a convex set. Epigraph is
frequently used in formulating optimization problems. A nonlinear objective
function can be replaced by a linear objective and an additional constraint in
epigraph form. In this sense, we can assume that any optimization problem
has a linear objective function. Nonetheless, this does not facilitate solving the
problem, as non-convexity moves to the constraints, if the objective function
is not convex. Nonetheless, the solution to an optimization problem with a
linear objective can always be found at the boundary of the convex hull of
its feasible region, implying that if we can characterize the convex hull, a
problem in epigraph form admits an exact convex hull relaxation. However,
in general, it is difficult to express convex hull in an analytical form.
Analyzing convex functions is a well developed field. Broadening the knowl-
edge in convex analysis could be mathematically demanding, especially for
readers who are primarily interested in applications. We will not pursue in so-
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phisticated theories in depth any more. Readers are referred to the literature
suggested at the end of this chapter for further information.
A.2 From Linear to Conic Program
Linear programming is one of the most mature and tractable mathemati-
cal programming problems. In this section, we first investigate and explain
the motivation of linear programming duality theory, then provide a unified
model for conic programming problems. LPs, SOCPs, and SDPs are special
cases of conic programs associated with generalized inequalities K where
K = Rn, Ln+1C , and Sn+, respectively. Our aim is to help readers who are not
familiar with conic programs build their decision-making problems in these
formats with structured convexity, and write out their dual problems more
conveniently. The presentation logic is consistent with [1], and most of the
presented materials in this section also come from [1].
A.2.1 Linear Program and its Duality Theory
A linear program is an optimization program with the form
min{cTx | Ax ≥ b} (A.18)
where x is the vector of decision variables, A, b, c are constant coefficient ma-
trices with compatible dimensions. We assume LP (A.18) is feasible, i.e., its
feasible set X = {x | Ax ≥ b} is a non-empty polyhedron; moreover, because
of the limited ranges of decision variables representing physical quantities,
we assume X is bounded. In such circumstance, LP (A.18) always has a fi-
nite optimum. LPs can be solved by mature algorithms, such as the simplex
algorithm and the interior-point algorithm, which are not the main focus of
this book.
A question which is important both in theory and practice is: how to find
a systematic way to bound the optimal value of (A.18)? Clearly, if x is a
feasible solution, an instant upper bound is given by cTx. Lower bounding is
to find a value a, such that cTx ≥ a holds for all x ∈ X.
A trivial answer is to solve the problem and retrieve its optimal value,
which is the tightest lower bound. However, there may be a smarter way to
retrieve a valid lower bound with much cheaper computational expense. To
outline the basic motivation, let us consider the following example
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min

6∑
i=1
xi
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2x1 + 1x2 + 3x3 + 8x4 + 5x5 + 3x6 ≥ 5
6x1 + 2x2 + 6x3 + 1x4 + 1x5 + 4x6 ≥ 2
2x1 + 7x2 + 1x3 + 1x4 + 4x5 + 3x6 ≥ 1
 (A.19)
Although LP (A.19) is merely a toy case for modern solvers and computers,
one may guess it is still a little bit complicated for mental arithmetic. In fact,
we can claim the optimal value is 0.8 at a glance without any sophisticated
calculation: summing up the three constraints yields an inequality
10(x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6) ≥ 8 (A.20)
which immediately gives the optimal value is 0.8. To understand why such
a value is indeed the optimum, by adding the constraints together and di-
viding both sides by 10, inequality (A.20) implies that the objective function
must get a value which is greater than or equal to 0.8 at any feasible point;
moreover, to demonstrate that 0.8 is attainable, we can find a point x∗ which
activates the three constraints simultaneously, so (A.20) becomes an equality.
LP duality is merely a formal generalization of this simple trick.
Multiplying each constraint in Ax ≥ b with a non-negative weight λi, and
adding all constraints together, we will see
λTAx ≥ λT b
If we choose λ elaborately such that λTA = cT , then λT b will be a valid
lower bound of the optimal value of (A.18). To improve the lower bound esti-
mation, one may optimize the weighting vector λ, giving rise to the following
problem
max
λ
{λT b | ATλ = c, λ ≥ 0} (A.21)
where λ is the vector of decision variables or dual variables, and the feasible
region D = {λ | ATλ = c, λ ≥ 0} is a polyhedron. Clearly, (A.21) is also
an LP, and is called the dual problem of LP (A.18). Correspondingly, (A.18)
is called the primal problem. From above construction, we immediately con-
clude cTx ≥ λT b.
Proposition A.1. (Weak duality): The optimal value of (A.21) is less than
or equal to the optimal value of (A.18).
In fact, the optimal bound offered by (A.21) is tight.
Proposition A.2. (Strong duality): Optimal values of (A.21) and (A.18) are
equal.
To see this, an explanation is given in [1]. If a real number a is the optimal
value of the primal LP (A.18), the system of linear inequalities
SP :
{
−cTx > −a : λ0
Ax ≥ b : λ
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must have an empty solution set, indicating that at least one of the following
two systems does have a solution (called separation property later)
SD1 :

−λ0c+ATλ = 0
−λ0a+ bTλ ≥ 0
λ0 > 0, λ ≥ 0
SD2 :

−λ0c+ATλ = 0
−λ0a+ bTλ > 0
λ0 ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0
We can show that SP has no solutions if and only if SD1 has a solution.
SD1 has a solution ⇒ SP has no solution is clear. Otherwise, suppose that
SP has a solution x, because λ0 is strictly positive, the weighted summation
of inequalities in SP leads to
0 = 0Tx = (−λ0c+ATλ)Tx = −λ0cTx+ λTAx > −λ0a+ λT b
which is in contradiction with the second inequality in SD1 .
SP has no solution ⇒ SD1 has a solution. Suppose SD1 has no solution,
SD2 must have a solution owing to the separation property (Theorem 1.2.1 in
[1]). Moreover, if λ0 > 0, the solution of system S
D
2 also solves system S
D
1 , so
there must be λ0 = 0. As a result, the solution of S
D
2 is independent of the
values of a and c. Let c = 0 and a = 0, the solution λ of SD2 satisfies A
Tλ = 0,
bTλ > 0. Therefore, for any x with a compatible dimension, λT (Ax − b) =
λTAx − λT b < 0 holds. In addition, because λ ≥ 0, we can conclude that
Ax ≥ b has no solution, a contradiction to the assumption that (A.18) is
feasible.
Now, consider the solution of SD1 . Without loss of generality, we can assume
λ0 = 1; otherwise, if λ0 6= 1, (1, λ/λ0) also solves SD1 . In view of this, in
normalized condition (λ0 = 1), S
D
1 comes down to
SD3 :

ATλ = c
bTλ ≥ a
λ ≥ 0
Now we can see the strong duality: Let a∗ be the optimal solution of (A.18).
For any a < a∗, SP has no solution, so SD1 has a solution (1, λ
∗). According
to SD3 , the optimal value of (A.21) is no smaller than a, i.e., a ≤ bTλ∗ ≤ a∗.
When a tends to a∗, we can conclude that the primal and dual optimal
values are equal. Since the primal problem always has a finite optimum (as
we assumed before), so does the dual problem, as they share the same optimal
value. Nevertheless, even if the primal feasible region is bounded, the dual
feasible set D may be unbounded, and the dual problem is always bounded
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above. Please refer to [29, 30, 31] for more information on duality theory in
linear programming.
Proposition A.3. (Primal-dual optimality condition) If LP (A.18) is feasi-
ble and X is bounded, then any feasible solution to the following system
Ax ≥ b
ATλ = c, λ ≥ 0
cTx = bTλ
(A.22)
solves the original primal-dual pair of LPs: x∗ is the optimal solution of
(A.18), and λ∗ is the optimal solution of (A.21).
(A.22) is also called the primal-dual optimality condition of LPs. It consists
of linear inequalities and equalities, and there is no objective function to be
optimized.
Substituting c = ATλ into the last equation of (A.22) gives λTAx = λT b,
i.e.
λT (b−Ax) = 0
Since λ ≥ 0 and Ax ≥ b, above equation is equivalent to
λi(b−Ax)i = 0
where notation (b − Ax)i and λi stand for the i-th components of vectors
b−Ax and λ, respectively. This condition means that at most one of λi and
(b−Ax)i can take a strictly positive value. In other words, if the i-th inequality
constraint is inactive, then its dual multiplier λi must be 0; otherwise, if
λi > 0, then the corresponding inequality constraint must be binding. This
phenomenon is called the complementarity and slackness condition.
Applying KKT optimality condition for general nonlinear programs to LP
(A.18) we have:
Proposition A.4. (KKT optimality condition) If LP (A.18) is feasible and
X is bounded, the following system
0 ≤ λ⊥Ax− b ≥ 0
ATλ = c
(A.23)
has a solution (x∗, λ∗) (may not be unique), where a⊥b means aT b = 0, x∗
solves (A.18) and λ∗ solves (A.21).
The question that which one of (A.22) and (A.23) is better can be subtle
and has very different practical consequences. At the first look, the former one
seems more tractable because (A.22) is a linear system while (A.23) contains
complementarity and slackness conditions. However, the actual situation in
practice is more complicated. For example, to solve a bilevel program with an
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LP lower level, the LP is often replaced by its optimality condition. In a bilevel
optimization structure, some of the coefficients A, b, and c are optimized by
the upper-level agent, say, the coefficient vector c representing the price is
controlled by the upper level decision maker, while A and b are constants.
If we use (A.22), the term cTx in the single-level equivalence becomes non-
convex, although c is a constant in the lower level, preventing a global optimal
solution from being found easily. In contrast to this, if we use (A.23) and
linearize the complementarity and slackness condition via auxiliary integer
variables, the single-level equivalent problem can be formulated as an MILP,
whose global optimal solution can be procured with reasonable computation
effort.
The dual problem of LPs which maximize its objective can be derived in
the same way. Consider the LP
max{cTx | Ax ≤ b} (A.24)
For this problem, we need an upper bound on the objective function. To this
end, associating a non-negative dual vector λ with the constraint, and adding
the weighted inequalities together, we have
λTAx ≤ λT b
If we intentionally choose λ such that λTA = cT , then λT b will be a valid
upper bound of the optimal value of (A.24). The dual problem
min
λ
{λT b | ATλ = c, λ ≥ 0} (A.25)
optimizes the weighting vector λ to offer the tightest upper bound.
Constraints in the form of equality and ≥ inequality can be considered
using the same paradigm. Bearing in mind that we are seeking an upper
bound, so we need a certification for cTx ≤ a, so the dual variables for
equalities have no signs and those for ≥ inequalities should be negative.
Sometimes it is useful to define the dual cone of a polyhedron, despite that
a bounded polyhedron is not a cone. Recall its definition, the dual cone of a
polyhedron P can be defined as
P ∗ = {y | xT y ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ P} (A.26)
where P = {x | Ax ≥ b}. As we have demonstrated in Sect. A.1.3, the dual
cone is always closed and convex; however, for a general set, its dual cone
does not have an analytical expression.
For polyhedral sets, the condition in (A.26) holds if and only if the minimal
value of xT y over P is non-negative. For a given vector y, let us investigate
the minimum of xT y through an LP
min
x
{yTx | Ax ≥ b}
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It is known from Proposition A.1 that yTx ≥ bTλ, ∀λ ∈ DP , where DP =
{λ | ATλ = y, λ ≥ 0}. Moreover, if ∃λ ∈ DP such that bTλ < 0, Proposition
A.2 certifies the existence of x ∈ P such that yTx = bTλ < 0. In conclusion,
the dual cone of polyhedron P can be cast as
P ∗ = {y | ∃λ : bTλ ≥ 0, ATλ = y, λ ≥ 0} (A.27)
which is also a polyhedron. It can be observed from (A.27) that all constraints
in P ∗ are homogeneous, so P ∗ is indeed a polyhedral cone.
A.2.2 General Conic Linear Program
Linear programs cover vast topics in engineering optimization problems. Its
duality program provides informative quantifications and valuable insights of
the problem at hand, which help develop efficient algorithms for itself and fa-
cilitate building tractable reformulations for more complicated mathematical
programming models, such as robust optimization, multi-level optimization
and equilibrium problems. The algorithms of LPs, which are perfectly devel-
oped by now, can solve quite large instances (with up to hundreds of thou-
sands of variables and constraints). Nevertheless, there are practical problems
which cannot be modeled by LPs. To cope with these essentially nonlinear
cases, one needs to explore new models and computational methods beyond
the reach of LPs.
The broadest class of optimization problems which the LP can be com-
pared with is the class of convex optimization problems. Convexity marks
whether a problem can be solved efficiently, and any local optimizer of a
convex program must be a global optimizer. Efficiency is quantified by the
number of arithmetic operations required to solve the problem. Suppose that
all we know about the problem is its convexity: its objective and constraints
are convex functions in decision variables x ∈ Rn, and their values along with
their derivatives at any given point can be evaluated within M arithmetic
operations. The best known complexity for finding an -solution turns out to
be [1]
O(1)n(n3 +M) ln
(
1

)
Although this bound grows polynomially with n, the computation time may
be still unacceptable for a large n like n = 1, 000, which is in contrast to
LPs which are solvable with n = 100, 000. The reason is: linearity are much
stronger than convexity; the structure of an affine function aTx + b solely
depends on its constant coefficients a and b; function values and derivatives
are never evaluated in a state-of-the-art LP solver. There are many classes
of convex programs which are essentially nonlinear, but still possess nice
analytical structure, which can be used to develop more dedicated algorithms.
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These algorithms may perform much more efficiently than those exploiting
only convexity. In what follows, we consider such a class of convex program,
i.e., the conic program, which is a simple extension of LP. Its general form and
mathematical model are briefly introduced, while the details about interior-
point algorithms is beyond the scope of this book, which can be found in
[1, 2].
1. Mathematical model
When we consider to add some nonlinear factors in LP (A.18), the most
common way is to replace a linear function aTx with a nonlinear but convex
function f(x). As what has been explained, this may not be advantageous
from a computational perspective. In contrast to this, we sustain all functions
to be linear, but inject nonlinearity in the comparative operators ≥ or ≤.
Recall the definition of generalized inequalities K with cone K, we consider
the following problem in this section
min
x
{cTx | Ax K b} (A.28)
which is called a conic programming problem. An LP is a special case of
the conic program with K = Rn+. With this generalization, we are able to
formulate a much wider spectrum of optimization problems which cannot be
modeled as LPs, while enjoy nice properties of structured convexity.
2. Conic duality
Aside from developing high-performance algorithms, the most important
and elegant theoretical result in the area of LP is its duality theorem. In view
of their similarities in mathematical appearances, how can the LP duality
theorem be extended to conic programs? Similarly, the motivation of duality
is the desire of a systematic way to certify a lower bound on the optimal
value of conic program (A.28). Let us try the same trick: multiplying the
dual vector λ on both sides of Ax K b, and adding them together, we obtain
λTAx and bTλ; moreover, if we are lucky to get ATλ = c, we guess bTλ can
serve as a lower bound of the optimum of (A.28) under some condition. The
condition can be translated into: what is the admissible region of λ, such that
the inequality λTAx ≥ bTλ is a consequence of Ax K b? A nice answer has
been given at the end of Sect. A.1.3. Let us explain the problem from some
simple cases.
Particularly, when K = Rn+, the admissible region of λ is also Rn+, because
we have already known the fact that the dual variable of ≥ inequalities in an
LP which minimizes its objective should be non-negative. However, Rn+ is no
longer a feasible region of λ for conic programs with generalized inequality
K if K 6= Rn+. To see this, consider L3C and the corresponding generalized
inequality
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z
 L3C
00
0
⇐⇒ z ≥√x2 + y2
(x, y, z) = (−1,−1, 1.5) is a feasible solution. However, the weighted summa-
tion of both sides with λ = [1, 1, 1]T gives a false inequality −0.5 ≥ 0.
To find the feasible region of λ, consider the condition
∀a K 0 ⇒ λTa ≥ 0 (A.29)
If (A.29) is true, we have the following logical inferences
⇔
⇒
⇔
Ax K b
Ax− b K 0
λT (Ax− b) ≥ 0
λTAx ≥ λT b
Conversely, if λ is an admissible vector for certifying
∀(a, b : a K b) ⇒ λTa ≥ λT b
then, (A.29) is clearly true by letting b = 0. Therefore, the admissible set of
λ for generalized inequality K with cone K can be written as
K∗ = {λ | λTa ≥ 0, ∀a ∈ K} (A.30)
which contains vectors whose inner products with all vectors belonging to K
are nonnegative. Recall the definition in (A.11), we can observe that the set
K∗ is actually the dual cone of cone K.
Now we are ready to setup the dual problem of conic program (A.28). As
in the case of LP duality, we try to recover the objective function from the
linear combination of constraints by choosing a proper dual variable λ, i.e.,
λTAx = cTx, in addition, λ ∈ K∗ ensures λTAx ≥ λT b, implying that λT b is
a valid lower bound of the objective function. The best bound one can expect
is the optimum of the problem
max
λ
{bTλ | ATλ = c, λ K∗ 0} (A.31)
which is also a conic program, and called the dual problem of conic program
(A.28). From above construction, we have already known that cTx ≥ bTλ is
satisfied for all feasible x and λ, which is the weak duality of conic programs.
In fact, the primal-dual pair of conic programs has following properties:
Proposition A.5. (Conic Duality Theorem) [1] : The following conclusions
hold true for conic program (A.28) and its dual (A.31).
1) Conic duality is symmetric: the dual problem is still a conic one, and
the primal and dual problems are dual to each other.
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2) Weak duality holds: the duality gap cTx− bTλ is nonnegative over the
primal and dual feasible sets.
2) If either of the primal problem or the dual problem is strictly feasible
and has a finite optimum, then the other is solvable, and the duality gap is
zero: cTx∗ = bTλ∗ for some x∗ and λ∗.
3) If either of the primal problem or the dual problem is strictly feasible
and has a finite optimum, then a pair of primal-dual feasible solutions (x, λ)
solves the respective problems if and only if
Ax K b
ATλ = c
λ K∗ 0
cTx = bTλ
(A.32)
or
0 K∗ λ⊥Ax− b K 0
ATλ = c
(A.33)
where (A.32) is called the primal-dual optimality condition, and (A.33) is
called the KKT optimality condition.
The proof can be found in [1] and is omitted here. To highlight the role of
strict feasibility in Proposition A.5, consider the following example
min
x
x2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x1x2
x1
 L3C 0

The feasible region is√
x21 + x
2
2 ≤ x1 ⇔ x2 = 0, x1 ≥ 0
So its optimal value is 0. As explained before, second-order cones are self-dual:
(L3C)∗ = L3C , it is easy to see the dual problem is
max
λ
{
0
∣∣∣ λ1 + λ3 = 0, λ2 = 1, λ L3C 0}
The feasible region is{
λ
∣∣∣∣ √λ21 + λ22 ≤ λ3, λ3 ≥ 0, λ2 = 1, λ1 = −λ3}
which is empty, because
√
(−λ3)2 + 1 > λ3.
This example demonstrates that the existence of a strictly feasible point
is indispensable for conic duality. But this condition is not necessary in LP
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duality, which means strong duality holds in conic programming with stronger
assumptions.
Several classes of conic programs with particular cones are of special in-
terests. The cones in these problems are self-dual, so we can set up the dual
program directly, which allows to explore deeply into the original problem,
or convert it into equivalent formulations which are more computationally
friendly. The structure of these relatively simple cones also helps develop ef-
ficient algorithms for corresponding conic programs. In what follows, we will
investigate two extremely important classes of conic programs.
A.2.3 Second-order Cone Program
1. Mathematical models of the primal and dual problems
Second-order cone program is a special class of conic problem with K =
Ln+1C . It minimizes a linear function over the intersection of a polytope and
the Cartesian product of second-order cones, and can be formulated as
min
x
{
cTx
∣∣ Ax− b K 0} (A.34)
where x ∈ Rn, and K = Lm1C × · · · × LmkC × Rmp+ , in other words, the conic
constraints in (A.34) can be expressed as k second-order cones Aix− bi Lmi
0, i = 1, · · · , k plus one polyhedron Apx − bp ≥ 0 with the following matrix
partition
[
A; b
]
=

[A1; b1]
...
[Ak; bk]
[Ap; bp]

Recall the definition of second-order cone, we further partition the sub-
matrices Ai, bi into
[
Ai; bi
]
=
[
Di
pTi
di
qi
]
, i = 1, · · · , k
where Di ∈ R(mi−1)×n, pi ∈ Rn, di ∈ Rmi−1, qi ∈ R. Then we can write
(A.34) as
min
x
cTx
s.t. Apx ≥ bp
‖Dix− di‖2 ≤ pTi x− qi, i = 1, · · · , k
(A.35)
(A.35) is often more convenient for model builders.
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It is easy to see that the cone K in (A.34) is self-dual, as both second-order
cone and non-negative orthant are self-dual. In this regard, the dual problem
of SOCP (A.34) can be expressed as
max
λ
{
bTλ
∣∣ ATλ = c, λ K 0} (A.36)
Partitioning the dual vector as
λ =

λ1
...
λk
λp
 , λi ∈ LmiC , i = 1, · · · , k, λp ≥ 0
We can write the dual problem as
max
λ
k∑
i=1
bTi λi + b
T
p λp
s.t.
k∑
i=1
ATi λi +A
T
p λp = c
λi ∈ LmiC , i = 1, · · · , k
λp ≥ 0
(A.37)
We further partition λi according to the norm representation in (A.35)
λi =
[
µi
νi
]
, µi ∈ Rmi−1, νi ∈ R
all second-order cone constraints are associated with dual variables as[
Dix
pTi x
]
−
[
di
qi
]
∈ LmiC :
[
µi
νi
]
, i = 1, · · · , k
so the admissible region of dual variables (µi, νi) is[
µi
νi
]
∈ (LmiC )∗ ⇒ ‖µi‖2 ≤ νi
Finally, we arrive at the dual form of (A.35)
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max
λ
k∑
i=1
(
µTi di + νiqi
)
+ bTp λp
s.t.
k∑
i=1
(
DTi µi + νipi
)
+ATp λp = c
‖µi‖2 ≤ νi, i = 1, · · · , k
λp ≥ 0
(A.38)
(A.35) and (A.38) are more convenient than (A.34) and (A.37) respectively
because norm constraints can be recognized by most commercial solvers,
whereas generalized inequalities K and constraints with the form ∈ LmiC are
supported only in some dedicated packages. Strict feasibility can be expressed
in a more straightforward manner via norm constraints: the primal problem
is strictly feasible if ∃x : ‖Dix−di‖2 < pTi x− qi, i = 1, · · · , k, Apx > bp; the
dual problem is strictly feasible if ‖µi‖2 < νi, i = 1, · · · , k, λp > 0. In view
of this, (A.35) and (A.38) are treated as the standard forms of an SOCP and
its dual by practitioners whose primary interests are applications.
2. What can be expressed via SOCPs?
Mathematical programs raised in engineering applications may not always
appear in standard convex forms, and convexity may be hidden in seem-
ingly non-convex expressions. Therefore, an important step is to recognize
the potential existence of a convex form that is equivalent to the original
formulation. This task can be rather tricky. We introduce some frequently
used functions and constraints that can be represented by second-order cone
constraints.
a. Convex quadratic constraints
A convex quadratic constraint has the form
xTPx+ qTx+ r ≤ 0 (A.39)
where P ∈ Sn+, q ∈ Rn, r ∈ R are constant coefficients. Let t = qTx + r, we
have
t =
(t+ 1)2
4
− (t− 1)
2
4
Performing the Cholesky factorization P = DTD, (A.39) can be represented
by
‖Dx‖22 +
(t+ 1)2
4
≤ (t− 1)
2
4
So (A.39) is equivalent to the following second-order cone constraint∥∥∥∥∥ 2DxqTx+ r + 1
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ qTx+ r − 1 (A.40)
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However, not every second-order cone constraint can be expressed via a
convex quadratic constraint. By squaring ‖Dx − d‖2 ≤ pTx − q we get an
equivalent quadratic inequality
xT (DTD − ppT )x+ 2(qpT − dTD)x+ dT d− q2 ≤ 0 (A.41)
with pTx − q ≥ 0. The matrix M = DTD − ppT is not always positive
semidefinite. Indeed, M  0 if and only if ∃u, ‖u‖2 ≤ 1 : p = DTu. On this
account, SOCPs are more general than convex QCQPs.
b. Hyperbolic constraints
Hyperbolic constraints are frequently encountered in engineering optimiza-
tion problems. They are non-convex in their original forms but can be rep-
resented by a second-order cone constraint. A hyperbolic constraint has the
form
xTx ≤ yz, y > 0, z > 0 (A.42)
where x ∈ Rn, y, z ∈ R++. Noticing the fact that 4yz = (y + z)2 − (y − z)2,
(A.42) is equivalent to the following second-order cone constraint∥∥∥∥∥ 2xy − z
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ y + z, y > 0, z > 0 (A.43)
However, a hyperbolic constraint can not be expressed via a convex quadratic
constraint, because the compact quadratic form of (A.42) isxy
z
T P
xy
z
 ≤ 0, P =
2I 0 00 0 −1
0 −1 0

where the matric P is indefinite.
Many instances can be regarded as special cases of hyperbolic constraints,
such as the upper branch of hyperbola
{(x, y) | xy ≥ 1, x > 0}
and the epigraph of a fractional-quadratic function g(x, s) = xTx/s, s > 0{
(x, s, t)
∣∣∣∣ t ≥ xTxs , s > 0
}
c. Composition of second-order cone representable functions
A function is called second-order cone representable if its epigraph can
be represented by second-order cone constraints. Second-order cone repre-
sentable functions are closed under composition [10]. Suppose two univariate
convex functions f1(x) and f2(x) are second-order cone representable, and
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f1(x) is monotonically increasing, the composition g(x) = f1(f2(x)) is also
second-order cone representable, because its epigraph {(x, t) | g(x) ≤ t} can
be expressed by
{(x, t) | ∃s : f1(s) ≤ t, f2(x) ≤ s}
where f1(s) ≤ t and f2(x) ≤ s essentially come down to second-order cone
constraints.
d. Maximizing the production of concave functions
Suppose two functions f1(x) and f2(x) are concave with f1(x) ≥ 0, f2(x) ≥
0, and −f1(x) and −f2(x) are second-order cone representable [which means
f1(x) ≥ t1 and f2(x) ≥ t2 are (equivalent to) second-order cone constraints].
Consider the maximum of their production
max
x
{f1(x)f2(x) | x ∈ X, f1(x) ≥ 0, f2(x) ≥ 0} (A.44)
where the feasible region X is the intersection of a polyhedron and second-
order cones. It is not instantly clear whether problem (A.44) is a convex
optimization problem or not. This formulation frequently arises in engineer-
ing applications, such as the Nash Bargaining problem and multi-objective
optimization problems.
By introducing auxiliary variables t, t1, t2, it is immediately seen that prob-
lem (A.44) is equivalent to the following SOCP
max
x,t,t1,t2
t
s.t. x ∈ X
t1 ≥ 0, t2 ≥ 0, t1t2 ≥ t2
f1(x) ≥ t1, f2(x) ≥ t2
(A.45)
At the optimal solution, f1(x)f2(x) = t
2.
3. Polyhedral approximation of second-order cones
Although SOCPs can be solved very efficiently, the state-of-the-art in nu-
merical computing of SOCPs is still incomparable to that in LPs. The salient
computational superiority of LPs inspires a question: can we approximate an
SOCP by an LP without dramatically increasing the problem size? There
have been other reasons to explore LP approximations for SOCPs. For exam-
ple, to solve a bilevel program with an SOCP lower level, the SOCP should
be replaced by its optimality conditions. However, the primal-dual optimality
condition (A.32) may introduce bilinear terms, while the second-order cone
complementarity constraints in KKT optimality condition (A.33) cannot be
linearized easily. If the SOCP can be approximated by an LP, then the KKT
optimality condition can be linearized and the original bilevel program can
be reformulated as an MILP. Clearly, if we only work in original variables,
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the number of additional constraints would quickly grow unacceptable with
the increasing problem dimension and required accuracy. In this section, we
introduce the technique developed in [11], which lifts the problem into higher
dimensions with moderate numbers of auxiliary variables and constraints.
We start with the basic question: find a polyhedral -approximation Π for
L3C such that:
1) If x ∈ L3C , then ∃u : (x, u) ∈ Π.
2) If (x, u) ∈ Π for some u, then
√
x21 + x
2
2 ≤ (1 + )x3.
Geometrically, the polyhedral cone Π includes a system of homogeneous
linear equalities and inequalities in variables x, u; its projection on x-space is
an -outer approximation of L3C , and the error bound is quantified by x3. The
answer to this question is given in [11]. It is shown that Π can be expressed
by
(a)
{
ξ0 ≥ |x1|
η0 ≥ |x2|
(b)

ξj = cos
( pi
2j+1
)
ξj−1 + sin
( pi
2j+1
)
ηj−1
ηj ≥
∣∣∣− sin( pi
2j+1
)
ξj−1 + cos
( pi
2j+1
)
ηj−1
∣∣∣ , j = 1, · · · , v
(c)
 ξ
v ≤ x3
ηv ≤ tan
( pi
2v+1
)
ξv
(A.46)
Formulation (A.46) can be understood from an geometric point of view:
1) Given x ∈ L3C , set ξ0 = |x1|, η0 = |x2|, which satisfies (a) in (A.46),
and point P 0 = (ξ0, η0) belongs to the first quadrant. Let
ξj = cos
( pi
2j+1
)
ξj−1 + sin
( pi
2j+1
)
ηj−1
ηj =
∣∣∣− sin( pi
2j+1
)
ξj−1 + cos
( pi
2j+1
)
ηj−1
∣∣∣
which ensures (b). Point P j = (ξj , ηj) is obtained from P j−1 according to fol-
lowing operation: rotate P j−1 by angle φj = pi/2j+1 clockwise and get a medi-
ate point Qj−1; if Qj−1 resides in the upper half-plane, P j = Qj−1; otherwise
P j is the reflection of Qj−1 with respect to the x-axis. By this construction, it
is clear that all vectors from the origin to P j have the same Euclidean norm,
i.e., ‖[x1, x2]‖2. Moreover, as P 0 belongs to the first quadrant, the angle of Q0
must satisfy −pi/4 ≤ arg(Q0) ≤ pi/4, and 0 ≤ arg(P 1) ≤ pi/4. With the pro-
cedure going on, we have | arg(Qj)| ≤ pi/2j+1, and 0 ≤ arg(P j+1) ≤ pi/2j+1,
for j = 1, · · · , v. In the last step, ξv ≤ ‖P v‖2 = ‖[x1, x2]‖2 ≤ x3 and
0 ≤ arg(P v) ≤ pi/2v+1 hold, ensuring condition (c). In this manner, a point
in L3C has been extended to a solution of (A.46).
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2) Given (x, u) ∈ Π, where u = {ξj , ηj}, j = 1, · · · , v. Define P j = [ξj , ηj ],
and it directly follows from (a) and (b) that all P j belongs to the first
quadrant, and
∥∥P 0∥∥
2
≥
√
x21 + x
2
2. Moreover, recall the construction of
Qj in previous analysis, it is seen ‖P j‖2 = ‖Qj‖2; the absolute value
of the vertical coordinate of P j+1 is no less than that of Qj ; therefore,
‖P j+1‖2 ≥ ‖Qj‖2 = ‖P j‖2. At last
‖P v‖2 ≤
x3
cos
( pi
2v+1
)
so we arrive at
√
x21 + x
2
2 ≤ (1 + )x3, where
 =
1
cos
( pi
2v+1
) − 1 (A.47)
In this way, a solution of (A.46) has been approximately extended to L3C .
Now, let us consider the general case: approximating
Ln+1C =
{
(y, t)
∣∣∣∣ √y21 + · · ·+ y2n ≤ t}
via a polyhedral cone. Without loss of generality, we assume n = 2K . To make
use of the outcome in (A.46), y is split into 2K−1 pairs (y1, y2), · · · , (yn−1, yn),
which are called variables of generation 0. A successor variable is associated
with each pair, which is called variable of generation 1, and is further divided
into 2K−2 pairs and associated with variable of generation 2, and so on.
After K − 1 steps of dichotomy, we complete variable splitting with two
variables of generation K − 1. The only variable of generation K is t. For
notation convenience, let yli be i-th variable of generation l, the original vector
y = [y01 , · · · , y0n], and t = yK1 . The “parents” of yli are variables yl−12i−1, yl−12i .
The total number of variables in the “tower” is 2n− 1.
Using the tower of variables yl, ∀l, the system of constraints√
(yl−12i−1)2 + (y
l−1
2i )
2 ≤ yli, i = 1, · · · , 2K−l, l = 1, · · · ,K (A.48)
gives the same feasible region on y as Ln+1C , and each second-order cone in
L3C in (A.48) can be approximated by a polyhedral cone given in (A.46).
The size of this polyhedral approximation is unveiled in [11]:
1) The dimension of the lifted variable is p ≤ n+O(1)∑Kl=1 2K−lvl.
2) The number of constraints is q ≤ O(1)∑Kl=1 2K−lvl.
The quality of the approximation is [11]
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β =
K∏
l=1
1
cos
( pi
2vl+1
) − 1
Given a desired tolerance , choose
vl = bO(1)l ln 2

c
with a proper constant O(1), we can guarantee the following bounds:
β ≤ 
p ≤ O(1)n ln 2

q ≤ O(1)n ln 2

which implies that the required numbers of variables and constraints grow
linearly in the dimension of the target second-order cone.
A.2.4 Semidefinite Program
1. Notation clarification
In this section, variables appear in the form of symmetric matrices, some
notations should be clarified first.
The Frobenius inner product of two matrices A,B ∈Mn is defined by
〈A,B〉 = tr(ABT ) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
AijBij (A.49)
The Euclidean norm of a matrix X ∈ Mn can be defined through the
Frobenius inner product as follows
‖X‖2 =
√
〈X,X〉 =
√
tr(XTX) (A.50)
Equipped with the Frobenius inner product, the dual cone of a given cone
K ⊂ Sn is defined by
K∗ = {Y ∈ Sn | 〈Y,X〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K} (A.51)
Among the cones in Sn, this section talks about the positive semidefinite
cone Sn+. As what has been demonstrated in Sect. A.1.3, Sn+ is self-dual, i.e.,
(Sn+)∗ = Sn+. The interior of cone Sn+ consists of all n × n matrices that are
positive definite, and is denoted by Sn++.
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2. Primal and dual formulations of SDPs
When K = Sn+, conic program (A.28) boils down to an SDP
min
x
{cTx | Ax− b ∈ Sn+}
which minimizes a linear objective over the intersection of affine plane y =
Ax− b and the positive semidefinite cone Sn+. However, the notation in such
a form is a little confusing: Ax − b is a vector, which is not dimensionally
compatible with the cone Sn+. In fact, we have met a similar difficulty at the
very beginning: the vector inner product does not apply to matrices, which
is consequently replaced with the Frobenius inner product. There are two
prevalent ways to resolve the confliction in dimension, leading to different
formulations which will be discussed.
a. Formulation based on vector decision variables
In this formulation, b is replaced with a matrix B ∈ Sn, and Ax is replaced
with a linear mapping Ax : Rn → Sn. In this way, Ax−B becomes an element
of Sn. A simple way to specify the linear mapping Ax is
Ax =
n∑
j=1
xjAj , x = [x1, · · · , xn]T , A1, · · · , An ∈ Sn
With all these input matrices, an SDP can be written as
min
x
{cTx | x1A1 + · · ·+ xnAn −B  0} (A.52)
where the cone Sn+ is omitted in the operator  without causing confusion.
The constraint in (A.52) is an LMI. This formulation is general enough to
capture the situation in which multiple LMIs exist, because
Aix−Bi  0, i = 1, · · · , k ⇔ Ax−B  0
with Ax = Diag(A1x, · · · ,Akx) and B = Diag(B1, · · · , Bk).
The general form of conic duality can be specified in the case when the
cone K = Sn+. Associating a matrix dual variable Λ with the LMI constraint,
and recalling the fact that (Sn+)∗ = Sn+, the dual program of SDP (A.52)
reads:
max
Λ
{〈B,Λ〉 | 〈Ai,Λ〉 = ci, i = 1, · · · , n, Λ  0} (A.53)
which remains an SDP.
Apply conic duality theorem given in Proposition A.5 to SDPs (A.52) and
(A.53).
1) Suppose A1, · · · , An are linearly independent i.e., no nontrivial linear
combination of A1, · · · , An gives an all zero matrix.
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2) The primal SDP (A.52) is strict feasible, i.e., ∃x : x1A1+· · ·+xnAn  B,
and is solvable (the minimum is attainable)
3) The dual SDP (A.53) is strict feasible, i.e., ∃Λ  0 : 〈Ai,Λ〉 = ci, i =
1, · · · , n, and is solvable (the maximum is attainable).
The optimal values of (A.52) and (A.53) are equal, and the complemen-
tarity and slackness condition
〈Λ, x1A1 + · · ·+ xnAn −B〉 = 0 (A.54)
is necessary and sufficient for a pair of primal and dual feasible solutions (x,Λ)
to be optimal for their respective problems. For a pair of positive semidefinite
matrices, it can be shown that
〈XY 〉 = 0⇔ XY = Y X = 0
indicating that the eigenvalues of these two matrices in some certain basis
are complementary: for every common eigenvector, at most one of the two
eigenvalues of X and Y can be strictly positive.
b. Formulation based on matrix decision variables
This formulation directly incorporates a matrix decision variable X ∈
Sn+, and imposes other restrictions on X through linear equations. In the
objective function, the vector inner product cTx is replaced by a Frobenius
inner product 〈C,X〉. In this way, an SDP can be written as
min
X
〈C,X〉
s.t. 〈Ai, X〉 = bi : λi, i = 1, · · · ,m
X  0 : Λ
(A.55)
By introducing dual variables (following the colon) for individual constraints,
the dual program of (A.55) can be constructed as
max
λ,Λ
bTλ+ 〈0,Λ〉
s.t. Λ + λ1A1 + · · ·+ λnAn = C
Λ  0
Eliminating Λ, we obtain
max
λ
bTλ
s.t. C − λ1A1 − · · · − λnAn  0
(A.56)
It is observed that (A.55) and (A.56) are in the same form compared with
(A.53) and (A.52), respectively, except for the signs of some coefficients.
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SDP handles positive semidefinite matrices, so it is especially powerful in
eigenvalue related problems, such as Lyapunov stability analysis and con-
troller design, which are the main field of control theorists. Moreover, every
SOCP can be formulated as an SDP because
‖y‖2 ≤ t⇔
[
tI y
yT t
]
 0
Nevertheless, solving SOCPs via SDP may not be a good idea. Interior-point
algorithms for SOCPs have much better worst-case complexity than those for
SDPs. In fact, SDPs are extremely popular in the convex relaxation technique
for non-convex quadratic optimization problems, owing to its ability to offer
a nearly global optimal solution in many practical applications, such as the
OPF problem in power systems. The SDP based convex relaxation method
for non-convex QCQPs will be discussed in the next section. Here we talk
about some special cases involving homogeneous quadratic functions or at
most two non-homogeneous quadratic functions.
3. Homogeneous quadratic programs
Consider the following quadratic program
min xTBx
s.t. xTAix ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · ,m
(A.57)
where A1, · · · , Am, B ∈ Sn are constant coefficients. Suppose that problem
(A.57) is feasible. Due to its homogeneity, the optimal value is clear: −∞ or
0, depending on whether there is a feasible solution x such that xTBx < 0
or not. But it is unclear which situation takes place, i.e., to judge xTBx ≥ 0
over the intersection of homogeneous inequalities xTAix ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · ,m,
or whether the implication
xTAix ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · ,m⇒ xTBx ≥ 0 (A.58)
holds.
Proposition A.6. If there exist λi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, · · · such that B 
∑
i λiAi,
then the indication in (A.58) is true.
To see this, B  ∑i λiAi ⇔ xT (B − ∑i λiAi)x ≥ 0 ⇔ xTBx ≥∑
i λix
TAix; therefore, x
TBx is a direct consequence of xTAix ≥ 0, i =
1, · · · ,m, as the right-hand side of the last inequality is non-negative. Propo-
sition A.6 provides a sufficient condition for (A.58), and necessity is generally
not guaranteed. Nevertheless, if m = 1, the condition is both necessary and
sufficient.
Proposition A.7. (S-Lemma) Let A,B ∈ Sn and a homogeneous quadratic
inequality
38 A Basics of Linear and Conic Programs
(a) xTAx ≥ 0
is strictly feasible. Then the homogeneous quadratic inequality
(b) xTBx ≥ 0
is a consequence of (a) if and only if ∃λ ≥ 0 : B  λA.
Proposition A.7 is called the S-Lemma or S-Procedure. It can be proved
by many means. The most instructive one, in our tastes, is based on the
semidefinite relaxation, which can be found in [1].
4. Non-homogeneous quadratic programs with a single constraint
Consider the following quadratic program
min f0(x) = x
TA0x+ 2b
T
0 x+ c0
s.t. f1(x) = x
TA1x+ 2b
T
1 x+ c1 ≤ 0
(A.59)
Let f∗ denote the optimal solution, so f0(x) − f∗ ≥ 0 is a consequence of
−f1(x) ≥ 0. A sufficient condition for this implication is ∃λ ≥ 0 : f0(x) −
f∗+λf1(x) ≥ 0. The left-hand side is a quadratic function with matrix form[
x
1
]T [
A0 + λA1
(b0 + λb1)
T
b0 + λb1
c0 + λc1 − f∗
][
x
1
]
Its non-negativeness is equivalent to[
A0 + λA1
(b0 + λb1)
T
b0 + λb1
c0 + λc1 − f∗
]
 0 (A.60)
Similar to the homogeneous case, this condition is also sufficient. In view
of this, the optimal value f∗ of (A.59) solves the following SDP
min
λ,f
f
s.t.
[
A0 + λA1
(b0 + λb1)
T
b0 + λb1
c0 + λc1 − f
]
 0
(A.61)
This conclusion is known as the non-homogeneous S-Lemma:
Proposition A.8. (Non-homogeneous S-Lemma) Let Ai ∈ Sn, bi ∈ Rn, and
ci ∈ R, i = 0, 1, if ∃x : xTA1x+ 2bT1 x+ c1 < 0, the implication
xTA1x+ 2b
T
1 x+ c1 ≤ 0⇒ xTA0x+ 2bT0 x+ c0 ≤ 0
holds if and only if
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∃λ ≥ 0 :
[
A0
bT0
b0
c0
]
 λ
[
A1
bT1
b1
c1
]
(A.62)
Because the implication can boil down to the maximum of quadratic func-
tion xTA0x+2b
T
0 x+c0 being non-positive over set {x|xTA1x+2bT1 x+c1 ≤ 0},
which is a special case of (A.59) by letting f0(x) = −xTA0x − 2bT0 x − c0,
Proposition A.8 is a particular case of (A.61) with the optimum f∗ = 0.
A formal proof based on semidefinite relaxation is given in [1]. Since a
quadratic inequality describes an ellipsoid, Proposition A.8 can be used to
test whether an ellipsoid is contained in another one.
As a short conclusion, we summarize the relation of discussed convex pro-
grams in Fig. A.8.
澷濣濢濪濙濬澔濤濦濣濛濦濕濡
澷濣濢濝濗澔濤濦濣濛濦濕濡
濇澸濄
濇濃澷濄
澷濣濢濪濙濬澔
濅澷濅濄
激濄
Fig. A.8 Relations of the discussed convex programs.
A.3 Convex Relaxation Methods for Non-convex
QCQPs
One of the most prevalent and promising applications of SDP is to build
tractable approximations of computationally intractable optimization prob-
lems. One of the most quintessential appliances is the convex relaxation of
quadratically constrained quadratic programs (QCQPs), which cover vast en-
gineering optimization problems. QCQPs are generally non-convex and could
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have more than one locally optimal solution, and each of them may yield sig-
nificant different objective values. However, gradient based algorithms can
only find a local solution which largely depends on the initial point. One
primary interest is to identify the global optimal solution or determine a
high-quality bound for the optimum, which can be used to quantify the op-
timality gap of a given local optimal solution. The SDP relaxation technique
for solving non-convex QCQPs are briefly reviewed in this section.
A.3.1 SDP Relaxation and Valid Inequalities
A standard fact of quadratic expression is
xTQx = 〈Q, xxT 〉 (A.63)
where 〈·〉 stands for the Frobenius inner product.
Following the logic in [13], we focus our attention on QCQPs in the fol-
lowing form
min {xTCx+ cTx | x ∈ F} (A.64)
where
F =
{
x ∈ Rn ∣∣ xTAkx+ aTk x ≤ bk, k = 1, · · · ,m, l ≤ x ≤ u} (A.65)
All coefficient matrices and vectors have compatible dimensions. If Ak = 0
in all constraints, then the feasible set F is a polyhedron, and (A.64) reduces
to a quadratic program (QP); If Ak  0, k = 1, · · · ,m and C  0, (A.64)
is a convex QCQP, which is easy to solve. Without loss of generality, we
assume Ak, k = 1, · · · ,m and C are indefinite, F is a non-convex set, and
the objective is a non-convex function. In fact, a number of hard optimization
problems can be cast as non-convex QCQP (A.64). For example, a polynomial
optimization problem can be reduced to a QCQP by introducing a tower of
condensing variables, e.g., x1x2x3x4 could be replaced by quadratic term
x12x34 with x12 = x1x2 and x34 = x3x4. Moreover, a binary constraint x ∈
{0, 1} is equivalent to quadratic equality x(x− 1) = 1 where x is continuous.
A common idea to linearize non-convex terms xTAkx is to define new
variables Xij = xixj , i = 1, · · · , n, j = 1, · · · , n. In this way, xTAkx =∑
i
∑
j Aijxixj =
∑
ij AijXij , and the last term is linear. Recall (A.63), this
fact can be written in a compact form
xTAkx = 〈Ak, X〉, X = xxT
With this transformation, QCQP (A.64) becomes
min {〈C,X〉+ cTx | (x,X) ∈ Fˆ} (A.66)
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where
Fˆ =
{
(x,X) ∈ Rn × Sn
∣∣∣∣∣ 〈Ak, X〉+ a
T
k x ≤ bk, k = 1, · · · ,m
l ≤ x ≤ u, X = xxT
}
(A.67)
In problem (A.66), non-convexity are concentrated in the relation between the
lifting variable X and the original variable x, whereas all other constraints are
linear. Moreover, if we replace Fˆ with its convex hull conv(Fˆ ), the optimal
solution of (A.66) will not change, because its objective function is linear.
However, conv(Fˆ ) does not have a closed form expression. Convex relaxation
approaches can be interpreted as attempting to approximate conv(Fˆ ) through
structured convex constraints which can be recognized by existing solvers.
We define the following linear relaxation
Lˆ =
(x,X) ∈ Rn × Sn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
〈Ak, X〉+ aTk x ≤ bk
k = 1, · · · ,m
l ≤ x ≤ u
 (A.68)
which contains only linear constraints. Now, let us consider the lifting con-
straint
X = xxT (A.69)
which is called a rank-1 constraint. However, a rank constraint is non-convex
and cannot be accepted by most solvers. Notice the fact that if (A.69) holds,
then [
1 xT
x X
]
=
[
1 xT
x xxT
]
=
[
1
x
] [
1
x
]T
 0
Define an LMI constraint
LMI =
{
(x,X)
∣∣∣∣ Y = [1 xTx X
]
 0
}
(A.70)
The positive semi-definiteness condition is true over conv(Fˆ ).
The basic SDP relaxation of (A.66) replaces the rank-1 constraint in Fˆ
with a weaker but convex constraint (A.70), giving rise to the following SDP
min 〈C,X〉+ cTx
s.t. (x,X) ∈ Lˆ ∩ LMI
(A.71)
Clearly, the LMI constraint enlarges the feasible region defined by (A.69),
so the optimal solution to (A.71) may not be feasible in the original QCQP,
and the optimal value is a strict lower bound. In this situation, the SDP
relaxation is inexact. Conversely, if matrix Y is indeed rank-1 at the optimal
solution, then the SDP relaxation is exact and x solves the original QCQP
(A.64).
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The basic SDP relaxation model (A.71) can be further improved by enforc-
ing additional linkages between x and X, which are called valid inequalities.
Suppose linear inequalities αTx ≤ α0 and βTx ≤ β0 are chosen from Lˆ, then
the quadratic inequality
(α0 − αTx)(β0 − βTx) = α0β0 − α0βTx− β0αTx+ xTαβTx ≥ 0
holds for all x ∈ Lˆ. The last quadratic term can be linearized via the lifting
variable X, resulting in the following linear inequality
α0β0 − α0βTx− β0αTx+ 〈βαT , X〉 ≥ 0 (A.72)
Any linear inequality in Lˆ (possibly the same) can be used to construct
valid inequalities. Because additional constraints are imposed on X, the re-
laxation could be tightened, and the feasible region shrinks but may still be
larger than conv(Fˆ ).
If we construct valid inequality (A.72) from side constraint l ≤ x ≤ u, we
get
(xi − li)(xj − lj) ≥ 0
(xi − li)(uj − xj) ≥ 0
(ui − xi)(xj − lj) ≥ 0
(ui − xi)(uj − xj) ≥ 0
 , ∀i, j = 1, · · · , n, i ≤ j (A.73)
Expanding these quadratic inequalities, the coefficients of quadratic terms
xixj are equal to 1, and we obtain simple bounds on Xij
xilj + xj li − lilj ≤ Xij
xiuj + xj li − liuj ≥ Xij
uixj − uilj + xilj ≥ Xij
uixj + xiuj − uiuj ≤ Xij
or in a compact matrix form [13]
RLT =
(x,X)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
lxT + xlT − llT ≤ X
uxT + xuT − uuT ≤ X
xuT + lxT − luT ≥ X
 (A.74)
(A.74) is known as the reformulation-linearization technique after the term
appeared in [14]. These constraints have been extensively studied since it was
proposed in [15], due to the simple structure and satisfactory performance
in various applications. The improved SDP relaxation with valid inequalities
can be written as
min 〈C,X〉+ cTx
s.t. (x,X) ∈ Lˆ ∩ LMI ∩ RLT
(A.75)
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From the construction of Lˆ, LMI, and RLT, it is directly concluded that
conv(Fˆ ) ⊆ Lˆ ∩ LMI ∩ RLT (A.76)
The inclusion becomes tight only in some very special situations, such as those
encountered in the homogeneous and non-homogeneous S-Lemma. Neverthe-
less, what we really need is the equivalence between the optimal solution of
the relaxed problem (A.75) and that of the original problem (A.64): if the
optimal matrix variable of (A.75) allows a rank-1 decomposition[
1 xT
x X
]
=
[
1
x
] [
1
x
]T
which indicates X has a rank-1 decomposition X = xxT , then x is optimal
in (A.64), and the SDP relaxation is said to be exact, although conv(Fˆ ) may
be a strict subset of Lˆ ∩ LMI ∩ RLT.
A.3.2 Successively Tightening the Relaxation
If the matrix X has a rank higher than 1, the corresponding optimal solution
x in (A.75) may be infeasible in (A.64). The rank-1 constraint on X can be
exactly described by a pair of LMIs X  xxT and X  xxT . The former
one is redundant to (A.70) indicated by the Schur complement theorem; the
latter one is non-convex, which is simply neglected in the SDP relaxation.
1. A dynamical valid inequality generation approach
An approach is proposed in [13] to generate valid inequalities dynamically
by harnessing the constraint violations in X  xxT . The motivation comes
from the fact that
X − xxT  0⇔ 〈X, vivTi 〉 ≤ (vTi x)2, i = 1, · · · , n
where {v1, · · · , vn} is a set of orthogonal basis of Rn. To see this, any vec-
tor h ∈ Rn can be expressed as the linear combination of the orthogonal
basis as h =
∑n
i=1 λivi, therefore, h
T (X − xxT )h = 〈X,hhT 〉 − (hTx)2 =∑n
i=1 λ
2
i [〈X, vivTi 〉 − (vTi x)2] ≤ 0. In view of this,
Fˆ = Lˆ ∩ LMI ∩NSD
where
NSD = {(x,X) | X − xxT  0}
= {(x,X) | 〈X, vivTi 〉 ≤ (vTi x)2, i = 1, · · · , n}
If {v1, · · · , vn} is the standard orthogonal basis,
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NSD = {(x,X) | Xii ≤ x2i , i = 1, · · · , n} (A.77)
It is proposed in [13] to construct NSD as
NSD = {(x,X) | 〈X, ηiηTi 〉 ≤ (ηTi x)2, i = 1, · · · , n} (A.78)
where {η1, · · · , ηn} are the eigenvectors of matrix X − xxT , because they
exclude infeasible points with respect to X − xxT  0 most effectively.
Non-convex constraints in (A.77) and (A.78) can be handled by a special
disjunctive programming derived in [16] and the convex-concave procedure
investigated in [17]. The former one is an exact approach which requires
binary variables to formulate disjunctive constraints; the latter is a heuristic
approach which only solves convex optimization problems. We do not further
detail these techniques here.
2. A rank penalty method [18]
In view of the rank-1 exactness condition, another way to tighten SDP
relaxation is to work on the rank of the optimal solution. A successive rank
penalty approach is proposed in [18]. We consider problem (A.66) as a rank-
constrained SDP
min {〈Ω, Y 〉 | Y ∈ Lˆ ∩ LMI ∩ RLT, rank(Y ) = 1} (A.79)
where
Ω =
[
0 0.5cT
0.5c C
]
, Y =
[
1 xT
x X
]
constraints Lˆ, LMI, and RLT (rearranged for variable Y ) are defined in
(A.68), (A.70), and (A.74), respectively. The last constraint in (A.79) en-
sures that Y has a rank-1 decomposition such that X = xxT . Actually, LMI
and RLT are redundant to the rank-1 constraint, but will give a high quality
convex relaxation when the rank constraint is relaxed.
To treat the rank-1 constraint in a soft manner, we introduce a dummy
variable Z, and penalize the matrix rank in the objective function, giving
rising to the following problem
min
Y
{
〈Ω, Y 〉+ min
Z
ρ
2
‖Y − Z‖22
}
s.t. Y ∈ Lˆ ∩ LMI ∩ RLT, rank(Z) = 1
(A.80)
If the penalty parameter ρ is sufficiently large, the penalty term will be zero
at the optimal solution, so Y = Z and rank(Z) = 1. One advantage of this
treatment is that the constraints on Y and Z are decoupled, and the inner
rank minimization problem has a closed-form solution.
To see this, if rank(Y ) = k > 1, the singular value decomposition of Y has
the form Y = UΣV T , where
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Σ = diag(S, 0), S = diag(σ1, · · · , σk), σ1 ≥ · · · ≥ σk > 0
U and V are orthogonal matrices. Let matrix D have the same dimension as
Y , D11 = σ1, and Dij = 0, ∀(i, j) 6= (1, 1), we have
min
Z
{ρ
2
‖Y − Z‖22
∣∣∣ rank(Z) = 1}
= min
Z
{ρ
2
‖U(Y − Z)V T ‖22
∣∣∣ rank(Z) = 1}
= min
Z
{ρ
2
‖Σ− UZV T ‖22
∣∣∣ rank(Z) = 1}
=
ρ
2
‖Σ−D‖22 =
ρ
2
k∑
i=2
σ2i
=
ρ
2
‖Y ‖22 −
ρ
2
σ21(Y )
To represent the latter term via a convex function, let matrix Θ have the
same dimension as Y , Θ11 = 1, and Θij = 0, ∀(i, j) 6= (1, 1), we have
tr(Y TUΘUTY ) = tr(V ΣUTUΘUTUΣV T ) = tr(V ΣΘΣV T ) = tr(ΣΘΣ) = σ21(Y )
Define two functions f(Y ) = 〈Ω, Y 〉+ ρ2‖Y ‖22 and g(Y ) = tr(Y TUΘUTY ).
Because ‖Y ‖2 is convex in Y (Example 3.11, [2]), so is ‖Y ‖22 (composition
rule, page 84, [2]); clearly, f(Y ) is a convex function in Y , as it is the sum
of a linear function and a convex function. For the latter one, the Hessian
matrix of g(Y ) is
∇2Y g(Y ) = UΘUT = UΘTΘUT = (ΘUT )TΘUT  0
so g(Y ) is also convex in Y . Substituting above results into problem (A.80),
the rank constrained SDP (A.79) boils down to
min
Y
{
〈Ω, Y 〉+ ρ
2
‖Y ‖22 −
ρ
2
tr(Y TUΘUTY )
∣∣∣ Y ∈ Lˆ ∩ LMI ∩ RLT} (A.81)
The objective function is a DC function, and the feasible region is convex,
so (A.81) is a DC program. One can employ the convex-concave procedure
discussed in [17] to solve this problem. The flowchart is summarized in Algo-
rithm A.1.
For the convergence of Algorithm A.1, we have the following properties.
Proposition A.9. [18] The optimal value sequence F (Y i) generated by Al-
gorithm A.1 is monotonically decreasing.
Denote by F (Y ) = f(Y )− ρ2g(Y ) the objective function of (A.81) in the DC
form, and H(Y, Y i) = f(Y )− ρ2gL(Y, Y i) the convexified objective function in
(A.83) by linearizing the concave term in F (Y ). Two basic facts help explain
this proposition:
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Algorithm A.1 : Sequential SDP
1: Choose an initial penalty parameter ρ0, a penalty growth rate τ > 0, and
solve the following SDP relaxation model
min {〈Ω, Y 〉 | Y ∈ Lˆ ∩ LMI ∩ RLT}
The optimal solution is Y ∗.
2: Construct the linear approximation of g(Y ) as
gL(Y, Y
∗) = g(Y ∗) + 〈∇g(Y ∗), Y − Y ∗〉 (A.82)
Solve the the following SDP
min
Y
{
f(Y )− ρ
2
gL(Y, Y
∗)
∣∣∣ Y ∈ Lˆ ∩ LMI ∩ RLT} (A.83)
The optimal solution is Y ∗.
3: If rank(Y ∗) = 1, terminate and report the optimal solution Y ∗; otherwise,
update ρ← (1 + τ)ρ, and go to step 2.
1) gL(Y
∗, Y ∗) = g(Y ∗), ∀Y ∗ which directly follows from the definition in
(A.82).
2) For any given Y ∗, g(Y ) ≥ gL(Y, Y ∗), ∀Y , because the graph of a convex
function must lie over its tangent plane at any fixed point.
First we can asset inequality H(Y i+1, Y i) ≤ H(Y i, Y i), because H(Y, Y i)
is optimized in problem (A.83). The optimum H(Y i+1, Y i) deserves a value
no greater than that at any feasible point. Furthermore, with the definition
of H(Y i, Y i), we have
H(Y i+1, Y i) ≤ H(Y i, Y i) = f(Y i)− ρ
2
gL(Y
i, Y i) = f(Y i)− ρ
2
g(Y i) = F (Y i)
On the other hand,
H(Y i+1, Y i) = f(Y i+1)− ρ
2
gL(Y
i+1, Y i) ≥ f(Y i+1)− ρ
2
g(Y i+1) = F (Y i+1)
Consequently, we arrive at the monotonic property
F (Y i+1) ≤ F (Y i)
Proposition A.10. [18] The solution sequence Y i generated by Algorithm
A.1 approaches to the optimal solution of problem (A.79) when ρ→∞.
It is easy to understand that whenever ρ is sufficiently large, the penalty
term will tend to 0, and the rank-1 constraint in (A.79) is met. A formal
proof can be found in [18]. A few more remarks are given below.
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1) The convex-concave procedure in [12] is a local algorithm under mild
conditions and needs a manually supplied initial point. Algorithm A.1, how-
ever, is elaborately initiated at the solution offered by the SDP relaxation
model, which usually appears to be close to the global optimal one for many
engineering optimization problems. Therefore, Algorithm A.1 generally per-
forms well and will identify the global optimal solution, although a provable
guarantee is non-trivial.
2) In practical applications, Algorithm A.1 could converge without the
penalty parameter approaching infinity, because when some constraint quan-
tification holds, there exists an exact penalty parameter ρ∗, such that the
optimal solution leads to a zero penalty term for any ρ ≥ ρ∗ [19, 20], and
Algorithm A.1 converges in a finite number of steps. If the exact penalty
parameter does not exist, Algorithm A.1 may fail to converge. In such cir-
cumstance, one can impose an upper bound on ρ, and use an alternative
convergence criterion: the change of the objective value F (Y ) in two con-
secutive steps is less than a given threshold value. As a result, Algorithm
A.1 will be able to find an approximate solution of problem (A.79), and the
rank-1 constraint may not be enforced.
3) From the numeric computation perspective, a very large ρ may cause
ill-conditioned problem and lead to numerical instability, so it is useful to
gradually increase ρ from a small value. Another reason for the moderate
growth of ρ is that it does not cause dramatic change of optimal solutions
in two successive iterations. As a result, gL(Y, Y
∗) can provide relatively
accurate approximation for g(Y ) in every iteration.
4) The penalty term ρip(Y
i)/2 = ρi
[‖Y i‖22 − tr(Y iTUΘUTY i)] /2 gives
an upper bound on the optimality gap induced by rank relaxation. To see
this, let ρ∗ and Y ∗ be the exact penalty parameter and corresponding optimal
solution of (A.83), i.e., p(Y ∗) = 0; ρi and Y i be the penalty parameter and
optimal solution in i-th iteration. According to Proposition A.9, we have
〈Ω, Y ∗〉 ≤ 〈Ω, Y i〉+ρip(Y i)/2; moreover, since the rank-1 constraint is relaxed
before Algorithm A.1 could converge, 〈Ω, Y i〉 ≤ 〈Ω, Y ∗〉 holds. Therefore,
〈Ω, Y i〉 and 〈Ω, Y i〉+ ρip(Y i)/2 are lower and upper bounds for the optimal
value of problem (A.79). In this regard, ρip(Y
i)/2 is an estimation on the
optimality gap.
A.3.3 Completely Positive Program Relaxation
Inspired by the convex hull expression in (A.14), researchers have shown
that most non-convex QCQPs can be modeled as linear programs over the
intersection of a completely positive cone and a polyhedron [6, 7, 8]. For
example, consider minimizing a quadratic function over a standard simplex
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min xTQx
s.t. eTx = 1
x ≥ 0
(A.84)
where Q ∈ Sn, and e denotes the all-one vector with n entries. Following the
paradigm similar to (A.66), let X = xxT , and then we can construct a valid
inequality
1 = xT eeTx = xTEx = 〈E,X〉
where E = eeT is the all-one matrix. According to (A.14), conv{xxT |x ∈ Rn+}
is given by (Cn+)∗. Therefore, problem (A.84) transforms to
min 〈Q,X〉
s.t. 〈E,X〉 = 1
X ∈ (Cn+)∗
(A.85)
Problem (A.85) is a convex relaxation of (A.84). Because the objective is
linear, the optimal solution must be located at one extremal point of the
convex hull of the feasible region. In view of the representation in (A.14), the
extremal points are exactly rank-1, so the convex relaxation (A.85) is always
exact.
Much more general results are demonstrated in [7] that every quadratic
program with linear and binary constraints can be rewritten as a completely
positive program. More precisely, a mixed-integer quadratic program
min xTQx+ 2cTx
s.t. aTi x = bi, i = 1, · · · ,m
x ≥ 0, xj ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ B
(A.86)
and the following completely positive program
min 〈Q,X〉+ 2cTx
s.t. aTi x = bi, i = 1, · · · ,m
〈aiaTi , X〉 = b2i , i = 1, · · · ,m
xj = Xjj , j ∈ B
X ∈ (Cn+)∗
(A.87)
have the same optimal solution, as long as problem (A.86) satisfies: aTi x = bi,
∀i and x ≥ 0 implies xj ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ B. Actually, this is a relatively mild
condition [7]. Complementarity constraints can be handled in the similar
way. Whether problems with general quadratic constraints can be restated
as completely positive programs in the similar way remains an open question.
The NP-hardness of problem (A.86) makes (A.87) NP-hard itself. The
complexity has been encapsulated into the last cone constraint. The relax-
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ation model is still interesting due to its convexity. Furthermore, it can be
approximated via a sequence of SDPs with growing sizes [9] given an arbi-
trarily small error bound.
A.3.4 MILP Approximation
SDP relaxation technique introduces a squared matrix variable that contains
n(n+ 1)/2 independent variables. Although exploiting the sparse pattern of
X via graphic theory is helpful to expedite problem solution, the computa-
tional burden is still high especially when the initial relaxation is inexact and
a sequence of SDPs should be solved. Inspired by difference-of-convex pro-
gramming an alternative choice is to express the non-convexity of QCQP by
univariate concave functions, and approximate these concave functions via
PWL functions compatible with mixed-integer programming solvers. This
approach has been expounded in [21].
Consider nonconvex QCQP
min xTA0x+ a
T
0 x
s.t. xTAkx+ a
T
k x ≤ bk, k = 1, · · · ,m
(A.88)
We can always find δ0, δ1, · · · , δm ∈ R+, such that Ak+δkI  0, k = 0, · · · ,m.
For example, δk can take the absolute value of the most negative eigenvalue
of Ak, and δk = 0 if Ak  0. Then, problem (A.88) can be cast as
min xT (A0 + δ0I)x+ a
T
0 x− δ01T y
s.t. xT (Ak + δkI)x+ a
T
k x− δk1T y ≤ bk, k = 1, · · · ,m
yi = x
2
i , i = 1, · · · , n
(A.89)
Problem (A.89) is actually a difference-of-convex program; however, the non-
convex terms are consolidated in much simpler parabolic equalities, which
can be linearized via the SOS2 based PWL approximation technique dis-
cussed in Appendix B.1. Except for the last n quadratic equalities, remaining
constraints and objective function of problem (A.89) are all convex, so the
linearized problem gives rise to a mixed-integer convex quadratic program.
Alternatively, we can first perform convex relaxation by replacing yi = x
2
i
with yi ≥ x2i , i = 1, · · · , n; if strict inequality holds at the optimal solution,
a disjunctive cut is generated to remove this point from the feasible region.
However, the initial convex relaxation can be very weak (y = +∞ is usually
an optimal solution). Predefined disjunctive cuts can be added [21].
Finally, nonconvex QCQP is a hard optimization problem. Developing an
efficient algorithm should leverage specific problem structure. For example,
SDP relaxation is suitable for OPF problems; MILP approximation can be
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used for small and dense problems. Unlike SDP relaxation works on a squared
matrix variable, the number of auxiliary variables in (A.89) and its mixed-
integer convex quadratic program approximation is moderate. Therefore, this
approach is promising to tackle practical problems whose coefficient matrices
are usually sparse. Furthermore, no particular assumption is needed to guar-
antee the exactness of relaxation, so this method is general enough to tackle
a wide spectrum of engineering optimization problems.
A.4 MILP Formulation of Nonconvex QPs
In a non-convex QCQP, if the constraints are all linear, it is called a noncon-
vex QP. There is no doubt that convex relaxation methods presented in the
previous section can be applied to nonconvex QPs. However, the relaxation
is generally inexact. In this section, we introduce exact MILP formulations
to globally solve such a nonconvex optimization problem; unlike the mixed-
integer programming approximation method in Sect. A.3.4, in which approx-
imation error is inevitable, by using duality theory, the MILP models will be
completely equivalent to the original QP. Thanks to the advent of powerful
MILP solvers, this method is becoming increasingly competitive compared to
existing global solution methods and is attracting more attentions from the
research community.
A.4.1 Nonconvex QPs over polyhedra
The presented approach is devised in [22]. A nonconvex QP with linear con-
straints has the form of
min
1
2
xTQx+ cTx
s.t. Ax ≤ b
(A.90)
where Q is a symmetric, but indefinite matrix; A, b, c are constant coefficients
with compatible dimensions. We assume that finite lower and upper limits of
the decision variable x have been included, and thus the feasible region is a
bounded polyhedron. The KKT conditions of (A.90) can be written as:
c+Qx+AT ξ = 0
0 ≤ ξ⊥b−Ax ≥ 0 (A.91)
If there is a multiplier ξ so that the pair (x, ξ) of primal and dual vari-
ables satisfies KKT condition (A.91), then x is said to be a KKT point or
a stationary point. The complementarity and slackness condition in (A.91)
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gives bT ξ = xTAT ξ. For any primal-dual pair (x, ξ) that satisfies (A.91), the
following relations hold
1
2
xTQx+ cTx =
1
2
cTx+
1
2
xT (c+Qx)
=
1
2
cTx− 1
2
xTAT ξ =
1
2
(
cTx− bT ξ) (A.92)
As such, the non-convex quadratic objective function is equivalently stated
as a linear function in the primal and dual variables without loss of accuracy.
Thus, if problem (A.90) has an optimal solution, then the solution can be
retrieved by solving an LPCC
min
1
2
(
cTx− bT ξ)
s.t. c+Qx+AT ξ = 0
0 ≤ ξ⊥b−Ax ≥ 0
(A.93)
which is equivalent to the following MILP
min
1
2
cTx− bT ξ
s.t. c+Qx+AT ξ = 0
0 ≤ ξ ≤M(1− z)
0 ≤ b−Ax ≤Mz
z binary
(A.94)
where M is a sufficiently large constant; z is a vector of binary variables.
Regardless of the value of zi, at most one of ξi and (b − Ax)i can take a
strictly positive value. For more rigorous discussions on this method, please
see [22], in which an unbounded feasible region is considered. More tricks in
MILP reformulation technique can be found in the next chapter.
It should be pointed out that the set of optimal solutions of (A.90) is
a subset of stationary points described by (A.91), because (A.91) is only
a necessary condition for optimality but not sufficient. Nevertheless, as we
assumed that the feasible region is a bounded polytope (thus compact), QP
(A.90) must have a finite optimum, then according to [23], the optimal value
is equal to the minimum of objective function values perceived at stationary
points. Therefore, MILP (A.94) provides an exact solution to (A.90).
Finally, we shed some light on the selection of M , since it has notable
impact on the computational efficiency of (A.94). An LP based bound pre-
processing method is thoroughly discussed in [24], which is used in a finite
branch-and-bound method for solving LPCC (A.93). Here we briefly intro-
duce the bounding method.
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For the primal variable x which represents physical quantities or measures,
its bounds depends on practical situations and security considerations, and
we assume that the bound is 0 ≤ x ≤ U . The bound can be tightened by
solving
min(max) {xj | Ax ≤ b, 0 ≤ x ≤ U} (A.95)
In (A.95), we can incorporate individual bounds for the components of vec-
tor x, which never wrecks the optimal solution and can be supplemented in
(A.94).
For the dual variables, we consider (A.90) again with explicit bounds on
primal variable x
min
1
2
xTQx+ cTx
s.t. Ax ≤ b : ξ
0 ≤ x ≤ U : λ, ρ
where ξ, λ, ρ following the colon are dual variables. Its KKT condition reads
c+Qx+AT ξ − λ+ ρ = 0 (A.96a)
0 ≤ ξ⊥b−Ax ≥ 0 (A.96b)
0 ≤ x⊥λ ≥ 0 (A.96c)
0 ≤ U − x⊥ρ ≥ 0 (A.96d)
Multiplying both sides of (A.96a) by a feasible solution xT
cTx+ xTQx+ xTAT ξ − xTλ+ xT ρ = 0 (A.96e)
Substituting ξTAx = ξT b, xTλ = 0, and xT ρ = ρTU concluded from (A.96b)-
(A.96d) into (A.96e) outcomes
cTx+ xTQx+ bT ξ + UT ρ = 0 (A.96f)
The upper bounds (lower bounds are 0) on the dual variables required for
MILP (A.94) can be computed from the following LP:
max λj (A.97a)
s.t. c+Qx+AT ξ − λ+ ρ = 0 (A.97b)
tr(QTX) + cTx+ bT ξ + UT ρ = 0 (A.97c)
Cons-RLT = {(x,X) | (A.74)} (A.97d)
0 ≤ x ≤ U, Ax ≤ b, λ, ξ, ρ ≥ 0 (A.97e)
In (A.97c), quadratic equality (A.96f) is linearized by letting X = xxT , and
(A.97d) is a linear relaxation for above rank-1 condition, as explained in Sect.
A.3.1.
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By exploiting the relaxation revealed in (A.97c), it bas been proved that
problem (A.97) always has a finite optimum, because the recession cone of
the set comprised of the primal and dual variables as well as their associated
valid inequalities is empty, see the proof of Proposition 3.1 in [24]. This is a
pivotal theoretical guarantee. Other bounding techniques which only utilize
KKT conditions hardly ensure a finite optimum.
A.4.2 Standard Nonconvex QPs
The presented approach is devised in [28]. A standard nonconvex QP entails
minimizing a nonconvex quadratic function over a unit probability simplex
v(Q) = min xTQx
s.t. x ∈ ∆n
(A.98)
where Q is a symmetric matrices, and unit simplex
∆n = {x ∈ Rn+ | eTx = 1}
where e is all-one vector. A nonhomogeneous objective can always be trans-
formed to a quadratic form given the simplex constraint ∆n:
xTQx+ 2cTx = xT (Q+ ecT + ceT )x, ∀x ∈ ∆n
Standard nonconvex QPs have wide applications in portfolio optimiza-
tion, quadratic resource allocation, graphic theory and so on. In addition,
for a given symmetric matrix Q, a necessary and sufficient condition for Q
being copositive is v(Q) ≥ 0. Copositive programming is a young and active
research field, and can help the research in convex relaxation. A fundamental
problem is copositivity test, which entails solving (A.98) globally.
Problem (A.98) is a special case of nonconvex QP (A.90), so the methods
in previous subsection also work for (A.98). The core trick is to select a big-M
parameter in linearizing complementarity and slackness conditions. Due to
its specific structure, the valid big-M parameter for problem (A.98) can be
chosen in a much more convenient way. To see this, the KKT condition of
(A.98) reads as
Qx− λe− µ = 0 (A.99a)
eTx = 1 (A.99b)
x ≥ 0 (A.99c)
µ ≥ 0 (A.99d)
xjµj = 0, j = 1, · · · , n (A.99e)
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where λ and µ are dual variables associated with equality constraint eTx = 1
and inequality constraint x ≥ 0. Because the feasible region is polyhedral,
constraint quantification always holds, and any optimal solution of (A.98)
must solve KKT system (A.99).
Multiplying both sides of (A.99a) by x results in xTQx = λxT e−xTµ; sub-
stituting (A.99b) and (A.99e) into the right-hand side concludes xTQx = λ.
Provided with eligible big-M parameter, problem (A.98) is (exactly) equiva-
lent to the following MILP
min λ
s.t. Qx− λe− µ = 0
eTx = 1, 0 ≤ x ≤ y
0 ≤ µj ≤Mj(1− yj), j = 1, · · · , n
(A.100)
where y ∈ {0, 1}n, and Mj is the big-M parameter. It is the upper bound of
dual variable µj . To estimate such a bound, according to (A.99a)
µj = e
T
j Qx− λ, j = 1, · · · , n
where ej is the j-th column of n× n identity matrix. For the first term,
xTQej ≤ max
i∈{1,··· ,n}
Qij , j = 1, · · · , n
As for the second term, we know λ ≥ v(Q), so any known lower bound of
v(Q) can be used to obtain an upper bound of Mj . One possible lower bound
of v(Q) is suggested in [28] as
l(Q) = min
1≤i,j≤n
Qij +
1∑n
k=1
(
Qkk − min
1≤i,j≤n
Qij
)−1
If the minimal element of Q locates on the main diagonal, the second term
vanishes and l(Q) = min1≤i,j≤nQij .
In summary, a valid choice of Mj would be
Mj = max
i∈{1,··· ,n}
Qij − l(Q), j = 1, · · · , n (A.101)
It is found in [28] that if we relax (A.99a) as an inequality and solve the
following MILP
min λ
s.t. Qx− λe− µ ≤ 0
eTx = 1, 0 ≤ x ≤ y
0 ≤ µj ≤Mj(1− yj), j = 1, · · · , n
(A.102)
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which is an relaxed version of (A.100), the optimal solution will not change.
However, in some instances, solving (A.102) is significantly faster than solving
(A.100). More thorough theoretical analysis can be found in [28].
A.5 Further Reading
Decades of wonderful research has resulted in elegant theoretical develop-
ments and sophisticated computational softwares, which have brought con-
vex optimization to an unprecedented dominating stage where it serves as
the baseline and reference model for optimization problems in almost every
discipline. Only problems which can be formulated as convex programs are
regarded as theoretically solvable. We suggest following materials for readers
who want to build a solid mathematical background or know more about
applications in the field of convex optimization.
1. Convex analysis and convex optimization. Convex analysis is a clas-
sic topic in mathematics, and focuses on basic concepts and topological
properties of convex sets and convex functions. We recommend monographs
[25, 26, 27]. The last one sheds more light on optimization related topics,
including DC programming, polynomial programming, and equilibrium con-
strained programming, which are originally non-convex. The most popular
textbooks on convex optimization include [1, 2]. They contain important ma-
terials that everyone who wants to apply this technique should know.
2. Special convex optimization problems. The most mature convex opti-
mization problems are LPs, SOCPs, and SDPs. We recommend [29, 30, 31]
for the basic knowledge of duality theory, simplex algorithm, interior-point
algorithm, and applications of LPs. The modeling abilities of SOCPs and
SDPs have been well discussed in [1, 2]. A geometric program is a type of
optimization problem whose objective and constraints are characterized by
special monomials and posynomial functions. Through a logarithmic variable
transformation, a geometric program can be mechanically converted to a con-
vex optimization problem. Geometric programming is relatively restrictive in
structure, and it may not be apparent to see whether a given problem can
be expressed by a geometric program. We recommend a tutorial paper [32]
and references therein on this topic. Copositive program is a relatively young
field in operational research. It is a special class of conic programming which
is more general than SDP. Basic information on copositive/completely pos-
itive programs is introduced in [33, 34, 35]. They are particularly useful in
combinatorial and quadratic optimization. Though very similar to SDPs in
appearances, copositive programs are NP-hard. Algorithms and applications
of copositive and completely positive programs have continued to be highly
active research fields [36, 37, 38].
3. General convex optimization problems. Beside above mature convex
optimization models that can be specified without high level of expertise,
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recognizing the convexity of a general mathematical programming problem
may be rather tricky. A deep understanding on convex analysis is unavoid-
able. Furthermore, to solve the problem using off-the-shelf solvers, a user
must find a way to transform the problem into one of the standard forms (if
a general purpose NLP solver fails to solve it). The so-called disciplined con-
vex programming method is proposed in [39] to lower this expertise barrier.
The method consists of a set of rules and conventions that one must follow
when setting up the problem such that the convexity is naturally sustained.
This methodology has been implemented in cvx toolbox under Matlab envi-
ronment.
4. Convex relaxation methods. One major application of convex optimiza-
tion is to derive tractable approximations for non-convex programs, so as
to facilitate problem resolution in terms of computational efficiency and ro-
bustness. A general QCQP is a quintessential non-convex optimization prob-
lem. Among various convex relaxation approaches, the SDP relaxation is
shown to be able to offer high quality solutions for many QCQPs raised
in signal process [40, 41] and power system energy management [42, 43].
Decades of excellent studies on SDP relaxation methods for QCQPs are com-
prehensively reviewed in [13, 44, 45]. Some recent advances are reported in
[46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52]. The rank of the matrix variable has a decisive
impact on the exactness (or tightness) of the SDP relaxation. Low rank SDP
method are attracting increasing attentions from researchers, and many ap-
proaches are proposed to recover a low-rank solution. More information can
be found in [53, 54, 55, 56, 57] and references therein.
5. Sum-of-squares (SOS) programming is originally devised in [58] to de-
compose a polynomial f(x) as the square of another polynomial g(x) (if there
exists), such that f(x) = [g(x)]2 must be non-negative. Non-negativity of a
polynomial over a semi-algebraic set can be certified in a similar way via Pos-
itivstellensatz refutations. This can be done by solving a structured SDP [58],
and implemented in a Matlab based toolbox [59]. Based on these outcomes, a
promising methodology is quickly developed for polynomial programs, which
cover a broader class of optimization problems than QCQPs. It is proved that
the global solution of a polynomial program can be found by solving a hier-
archy of SDPs under mild conditions. This is very inspiring since polynomial
programs are generally non-convex while SDPs are convex. We recommend
[60] for a very detailed discussion on this approach, and [61, 62, 63, 64] for
some recent advances. However, users should be aware that this approach
may be unpractical because the size of the relaxed SDP quickly becomes
unacceptable after a few steps. Nonetheless, the elegant theory still marks a
milestone in the research field.
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Appendix B
Formulation Recipes in Integer
Programming
There is no problem in all mathematics that cannot be
solved by direct counting. But with the present
implements of mathematics many operations can be
performed in a few minutes which without
mathematical methods would take a lifetime.
−Ernst Mach
As stated in Appendix A, generally speaking, convex optimization problems
can be solved efficiently. However, the majority of optimization problems en-
countered in practical engineering are non-convex, and gradient based NLP
solvers terminate at a local optimum, which may be far away from the global
one. In fact, any nonlinear function can be approximated by a PWL function
with adjustable errors by controlling the granularity of partitions. A PWL
function can be expressed via a logic form or incorporating integer variables.
Thanks to the latest progress in branch-and-cut algorithms and the develop-
ment of state-of-the-art MILP solvers, a large-scale MILP can often be solved
globally within reasonable computational efforts [1], although the MILP it-
self is proved to be NP-hard. In view of this fact, PWL/MILP approximation
serves as a viable option to tackle real-world non-convex optimization prob-
lems, especially those with special structures.
This chapter introduces PWL approximation methods for nonlinear func-
tions and linear representations of special non-convex constraints via integer
programming techniques. When the majority of a problem at hand is linear
or convex, while non-convexity arises from nonlinear functions with only one
or two variables, linear complementarity constraints, logical inferences and
so on, it is worth trying the methods in this chapter, in view of the fact that
MILP solvers are becoming increasingly efficient to retrieve a solution with
a pre-defined optimality gap.
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(a) Piecewise linear approximation (dash line)
(b) Piecewise constant approximation (dash line)
Fig. B.1 Piecewise linear and piecewise constant approximations.
B.1 Piecewise Linear Approximation of Nonlinear
Functions
B.1.1 Univariate Continuous Function
Considering a nonlinear continuous function f(x) in a single variable x, we
can evaluate the function values f(x0), f(x1), · · · , f(xn) at given breakpoints
x0, x1, · · · , xk, and replace f(x) with the following PWL function
f(x) =

m1x+ c1, x ∈ [x0, x1]
m2x+ c2, x ∈ [x1, x2]
...
...
mkx+ ck, x ∈ [xk−1, xk]
(B.1)
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As an illustrative example, two curves of the original nonlinear function
and its PWL approximation are portrayed in part (a), Fig. B.1. The PWL
function in (B.1) is a finite union of line segments, but still non-convex.
Moreover, the logic representation in (B.1) is not compatible with commercial
solvers. Given the fact that any point on a line segment can be expressed as
a convex combination of two terminal points, (B.1) can be written as
x =
∑
i
λixi
y =
∑
i
λif(xi)
λ ≥ 0,
∑
i
λi = 1
λ ∈ SOS2
(B.2)
where SOS2 stands for the special ordered set of type 2, describing a vec-
tor of variables with at most two adjacent ones being able to take nonzero
values. The SOS2 constraint on λ can be declared via the build-in module
of commercial solvers such as CPLEX or GUROBI. Please note that if f(x)
is convex and to be minimized, then the last SOS2 requirement is naturally
met (thus can be relaxed), because the epigraph of f(x) is a convex region.
Otherwise, relaxing the last SOS2 constraint in (B.2) gives rise to the convex
hull of the sampled points (x0, y0), · · · , (xk, yk). In general, the relaxation is
inexact.
Branch-and-bound algorithms which directly working on SOS variables
exhibit good performance [2], but it is desirable to explore equivalent MILP
formulations to leverage the superiority of state-of-the-art solvers. To this
end, we first provide an explicit form using additional integer variables.
λ0 ≤ z1
λ1 ≤ z1 + z2
λ2 ≤ z2 + z3
...
λk−1 ≤ zk−1 + zk
λk ≤ zk
zi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i,
∑k
i=1
zi = 1
λi ≥ 0, ∀i,
∑k
i=0
λi = 1
(B.3)
Formulation (B.3) illustrates how integer variables can be used to enforce
SOS2 requirements on the weighting coefficients. This formulation does not
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involve any manually supplied parameter, and often gives stronger bounds
when the integrality of binary variables are relaxed.
Sometimes, it is more convenient to use a piecewise constant approxima-
tion, especially when the original function f(x) is not continuous. An example
is exhibited in part (b), Fig. B.1. In this approach, the feasible interval of
x is partitioned into S − 1 segments (associated with binary variables θs,
s = 1, · · · , S − 1) by S breakpoints x1, · · · , xS (associated with S contin-
uous weight variables λs, s = 1, · · · , S); In the s-th interval between xs
and xs+1, the function value f(x) is approximated by the arithmetic mean
fs = 0.5[f(xs) +f(xs+1)], s = 1, · · · , S−1, which is a constant as illustrated
in Fig. B.1. With an appropriate number of partitions, an arbitrary function
f(x) can be approximated by a piecewise constant function as follows
x =
S∑
s=1
λsxs, y =
S−1∑
s=1
θsfs (B.4a)
λ1 ≤ θ1, λS ≤ θS−1 (B.4b)
λs ≤ θs−1 + θs, s = 2, · · · , S − 1 (B.4c)
λs ≥ 0, s = 1, · · · , S,
∑S
s=1
λs = 1 (B.4d)
θs ∈ {0, 1}, s = 1, · · · , S − 1,
∑S−1
s=1
θs = 1 (B.4e)
In (B.4), binary variable θs = 1 indicates interval s is activated, and con-
straint (B.4e) ensures that only one interval will be activated; Furthermore,
constraints (B.4b)-(B.4d) enforce weigh coefficients αs, s = 1, · · · , S to be
SOS2; Finally, constraint (B.4a) expresses y and x via the linear combination
of sampled values. The advantage of piecewise constant formulation (B.4) lies
in the binary expression of function value y, such that the product of y and
another continuous variable can be easily linearized via integer programming
technique, which can be seen in Sect. B.2.3.
Clearly, the required number of binary variables introduced in formulation
(B.3) is k, which grows linearly with respect to the number of breakpoints,
and the final MILP model may suffer from computational overheads due to
the presence of a large number of binary variables when more breakpoints
are involved for improving accuracy. In what follows, we present a useful
formulation that only engages a logarithmic number of binary variables and
constraints. This technique is proposed in [3, 4, 5]. Consider the following
constraints:
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G1 0    0    0
G2 0    0    1
G3 0    1    1
G4 0    1    0
G5 1    1    0
G6 1    0    0
G7 1    0    1
G8 1    1    1
R1 R2 R3
R1 R2 11
R1 L3
R1 L2 00
L2 R3
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Fig. B.2 Gray codes and sets Ln, Rn for two and three binary variables.
∑
i∈Ln
λi ≤ zn, ∀n ∈ N∑
i∈Rn
λi ≤ 1− zn, ∀n ∈ N
zn ∈ {0, 1}, ∀n ∈ N
λ ≥ 0,
∑k
i=0
λi = 1
(B.5)
where Ln and Rn are index sets of weights λi, N is an index set corresponding
to the number of binary variables. The dichotomy sequences {Ln, Rn}n∈N
constitute a branching scheme on the indices of weights, such that constraint
(B.5) guarantees that at most two adjacent elements of λ can take strictly
positive values, so as to meet the SOS2 requirement. The required number
of binary variables zn is dlog2 ke, which is significantly smaller than that
involved in formulation (B.3).
Next, we demonstrate how to design the sets Ln and Rn based on the
concept of Gray codes. For notation brevity, we restrict the discussion to
the instances with 2 and 3 binary variables (which are shown in Fig. B.2),
indicating 5 and 9 breakpoints (or 4 and 8 intervals) in consequence.
As shown in Fig. B.2, Gray codes G1 - G8 form a binary system where any
two adjacent numbers only differ in one bit. For example, G4 and G5 differ
in the first bit, and G5 and G6 differ in the second bit. Such Gray codes are
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used to describe which two adjacent weights are activated. In general, sets
Rn and Ln are constructed as follows: the index v ∈ Ln if the binary values of
the n-th bit of two successive codes Gn and Gn+1 are equal to 1, or v ∈ Rn if
they are equal to 0. This principle can be formally defined in a mathematical
way as
Ln =
v
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(Gnv = 1 and G
n
v+1 = 1)
∪ (v = 0 and Gn1 = 1)
∪ (v = k and Gnk = 1)
 (B.6)
Rn =
v
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(Gnv = 0 and G
n
v+1 = 0)
∪ (v = 0 and Gn1 = 0)
∪ (v = k and Gnk = 0)
 (B.7)
where Gnv stands for the n-th bit of code Gv.
For example, sets R1, R2, R3 and L1, L2, L3 for Gray codes G1-G8 are
shown in Fig. B.2. In such a way, we can establish the rule that only two
adjacent weights can be activated via (B.5). To see this, consider that if
λi > 0 for i = 4, 5 and λi = 0 for other indices, we let z1 = 1, z2 = 1, z3 =
0, which leads to the following constraint set:
λ0 + λ1 + λ2 + λ3 ≤ 1− z1 = 0
λ5 + λ6 + λ7 + λ8 ≤ z1 = 1
λ0 + λ1 + λ6 ≤ 1− z2 = 0
λ3 + λ4 + λ8 ≤ z2 = 1
λ0 + λ4 + λ5 ≤ 1− z3 = 1
λ2 + λ7 + λ8 ≤ z3 = 0
λi ≥ 0,∀i,
∑8
i=0
λi = 1
Thus we can conclude that
λ4 + λ5 = 1, λ4 ≥ 0, λ5 ≥ 0,
λ0 = λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = λ6 = λ7 = λ8 = 0
This mechanism can be interpreted as follows: z1 = 1 enforces λi = 0,
i = 0, 1, 2, 3 through set R1; z2 = 1 further enforces λ6 = 0 through set
R2; finally, z3 = 0 enforces λ7 = λ8 = 0 through set L3. Then the remaining
weights λ4 and λ5 constitute the positive coefficients. In this regard, only
log2 8 = 3 binary variables and 2 log2 8 = 6 additional constraints are in-
volved. Compared with formulation (B.3), the gray code can be regarded as
extra branching operation enabled by problem structure, so the number of
binary variables in expression (B.5) is greatly reduced in the case with a large
value of k.
As a special case, consider the following problem
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min
{∑
i
fi(xi)
∣∣∣∣∣ x ∈ X
}
(B.8)
where fi(xi), i = 1, 2, · · · are convex univariate functions, and X is a poly-
tope. This problem is convex but nonlinear. The DCOPF problem, a funda-
mental issue in power market clearing, is given in this form, in which fi(xi) is
a convex quadratic function. Although any local NLP algorithm can find the
global optimal solution of (B.8), there are still reasons to seek approximated
LP formulations. One is that problem (B.8) may be embedded in another
optimization problem and serve as its constraint. This is a pervasive model-
ing paradigm to study the strategic behaviors and market powers of energy
providers, where the electricity market is cleared according to a DCOPF,
and delivered energy of generation companies and nodal electricity prices are
extracted from the optimal primal variables and dual variables associating
with power balancing constraints, respectively. An LP representation allows
to exploit the elegant LP duality theory for further analysis, and helps char-
acterize optimal solution through primal-dual or KKT optimality conditions.
To this end, we can opt to solve the following LP
min
x,y,λ
∑
i
yi
s.t. yi =
∑
k
λikfi(xik), ∀i
xi =
∑
k
λikxik, ∀i, x ∈ X
λ ≥ 0,
∑
k
λik = 1, ∀i
(B.9)
where xik, k = 1, 2, · · · are break points (constants) for variable xi, and the
associated weights are λik. Because fi(xi) are convex functions, the SOS2
requirement on the weight variable λ is naturally met, so it is relaxed from
the constraints.
B.1.2 Bivariate Continuous Nonlinear Function
Consider a continuous nonlinear function f(x, y) in two variables x and y.
The entire feasible region is partitioned into M × N disjoint sub-rectangles
by M + N + 2 breakpoints xn, n = 0, 1, · · · , N and ym, m = 0, 1, · · · ,M ,
as illustrated in Fig. B.3, and the corresponding function values are fmn =
f(xm, yn). By introducing a planar weighting coefficient matrix {λmn} for
each grid point that satisfies
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λmn ≥ 0, ∀m,∀n
M∑
m=0
N∑
n=0
λmn = 1
(B.10a)
we can present any point (x, y) in the feasible region by a convex combination
of the extreme points of the sub-rectangle it resides in:
x =
M∑
m=0
N∑
n=0
λmnxn =
N∑
n=0
(
M∑
m=0
λmn
)
xn
y =
M∑
m=0
N∑
n=0
λmnym =
M∑
m=0
(
N∑
n=0
λmn
)
ym
(B.10b)
and its function value
f(x, y) =
M∑
m=0
N∑
n=0
λmnfmn (B.10c)
is also a convex combination of the function values at the corner points.
As we can see from Fig. B.3, in a valid representation, if (x∗, y∗) belongs
to a sub-rectangle, only the weight parameter associated with the four corner
points can be non-negative, while others should be forced at 0. In such a
pattern, the sum of columns/rows of matrix Λ = [λmn],∀m,n, which remains
a vector, should constitute an SOS2, and Λ is called a planar SOS2, which can
be implemented via two SOS1 constraints on the marginal weight vectors. In
fact, at most three of the four corner points can be associated with uniquely
determined non-negative weights. Consider point O and the active rectangle
ABCD shown in Fig. B.3. The location of O can be expressed by a linear
combination of the coordinates of corner points xA, xB , xC , xD associating
with non-negative weights λA, λB , λC , λD as:
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xO = λAxA + λBxB + λCxC + λDxD (B.11a)
In the first case
λ1A, λ
1
B , λ
1
C , λ
1
D ≥ 0, λ1A + λ1B + λ1C + λ1D = 1 (B.11b)
In the second case
λ2A, λ
2
C , λ
2
D ≥ 0, λ2B = 0, λ2A + λ2C + λ2D = 1 (B.11c)
In the third case
λ3B , λ
3
C , λ
3
D ≥ 0, λ3A = 0, λ3B + λ3C + λ3D = 1 (B.11d)
We use superscripts 1, 2, 3 to distinguish values of weights in different rep-
resentations. According to Caratheodory theorem, the non-negative weights
are uniquely determined in (B.11f) and (B.11g), and in the former (latter)
case, we say ∆ACD (∆BCD) is activated or selected. Denote function values
in these three cases by
f1(xO) = λ
1
Af(xA) + λ
1
Bf(xB) + λ
1
Cf(xC) + λ
1
Df(xD) (B.11e)
f2(xO) = λ
2
Af(xA) + λ
2
Cf(xC) + λ
2
Df(xD) (B.11f)
f3(xO) = λ
3
Bf(xB) + λ
3
Cf(xC) + λ
3
Df(xD) (B.11g)
Suppose f(xA) < f(xB), the plane defined by points B, C, D lies above that
defined by points A, C, D, hence f2(xO) < f1(xO) < f3(xO). If a smaller
(larger) function value is in favor, then ∆ACD (∆BCD) will be activated at
the optimal solution. Please bear in mind that as long as A, B, C, D are not
in the same plane, f1(xO) will be strictly less (greater) than f3(xO) (f2(xO)).
Therefore, (B.11e) will not become binding at the optimal solution, and the
weights for active corners are uniquely determined. If rectangle ABCD is small
enough, such a discrepancy can be neglected. Nonetheless, non-uniqueness of
the corner weights has little injury on its application, because the optimal
solution xO and optimal value will be consistent with the original problem.
The weights do not correspond to physical strategies that need to be deployed,
and the linearization method can be considered as a black box to the decision
maker, who provides function values at xA, xB , xC , xD and receives a unique
solution xO.
Detecting the active sub-rectangle that (x∗, y∗) resides in requires addi-
tional constraints on the weight parameter λmn. The aforementioned integer
formulation is used to impose planar SOS2 constraints. Let λn and λm be
the aggregated weights for x and y, respectively, i.e.,
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λn =
M∑
m=0
λmn, ∀n
λm =
N∑
n=0
λmn, ∀m
(B.12)
which are also called the marginal weight vectors, and introduce the following
constraints:
For x:

∑
n∈L1k
λn ≤ z1k∑
n∈R1k
λn ≤ 1− z1k
z1k ∈ {0, 1}

, ∀k ∈ K1 (B.13)
For y:

∑
m∈L2k
λm ≤ z2k∑
m∈R2k
λm ≤ 1− z2k
z2k ∈ {0, 1}

, ∀k ∈ K2 (B.14)
where L1k, L
2
k and R
2
k, R
2
k are index sets of weights λ
n and λm, K1 and K2
are index sets of binary variables. The dichotomy sequences {L1k, R1k}k∈K1
and {L2k, R2k}k∈K2 constitute a branching scheme on the indices of weights,
such that constraints (B.13) and (B.14) would guarantee that at most two
adjacent elements of λn and λm can take strictly positive values, so as to
detect the active sub-rectangle. In this approach, the required number of
binary variables is dlog2Me+ dlog2Ne. The construction of these index sets
has been explained in the univariate case.
Likewise, the discussions for problems (B.8) and (B.9) can be easily ex-
tended if the objective function is the sum of bi-variate convex functions,
implying that the planar SOS2 condition is naturally met.
B.1.3 Approximation Error
This section answers a basic question: For a given function, how many inter-
vals (break points) are needed to achieve certain error bound ε? For the ease
of understanding, we restrict our attention to univariate function, includ-
ing the quadratic function f(x) = ax2, and more generally, the continuous
function f(x) that is three times continuously differentiable. Let φf (x) be the
PWL approximation for function f(x) on X = {x|xl ≤ x ≤ xm}, the absolute
maximum approximation error is defined by ∆ = maxx∈X |f(x)− φf (x)|.
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First let us consider the quadratic function f(x) = ax2, which has been
thoroughly studied in [6]. The analysis is briefly introduced here. Choose an
arbitrary interval [xi−1, xi] ⊂ X, the PWL approximation can be parameter-
ize in a single variable t ∈ [0, 1] as
x(t) = xi−1 + t(xi − xi−1)
φf (x(t)) = ax
2
i−1 + at(x
2
i − x2i−1)
Clearly, f(x(0)) = φf (x(0)) = x
2
i−1, f(x(1)) = φf (x(1)) = x
2
i , and φf (x(t)) >
f(x(t)), ∀t ∈ (0, 1). The maximal approximation error in the interval must
be found at a critical point which satisfies
d
dt
(φf (x(t))− f(x(t)))
=
d
dt
a
[
x2i−1 + t(x
2
i − x2i−1)− (xi−1 + t(xi − xi−1))2
]
=
d
dt
a(xi − xi−1)2(t− t2)
= a(xi − xi−1)2(1− 2t)
= 0⇒ t = 1
2
implying that x(1/2) is always a critical point where the approximation error
reaches maximum, regardless of the partition of intervals, and the error is
given by
∆ = φ
(
x
(
1
2
))
− f
(
x
(
1
2
))
= a
[
x2i−1 +
1
2
(x2i − x2i−1)−
1
4
(xi−1 + xi)2
]
=
a
4
(xi − xi−1)2
which is quadratic in the length of the interval and independent of its location.
In this regard, the intervals must be evenly distributed with equal length in
order to get the best performance. IfX is divided into n intervals, the absolute
maximum approximation error is
∆ =
a
4n2
(xm − xl)2
Therefore, for a given tolerance , the number of intervals should satisfy
n ≥
√
a
ε
xm − xl
2
For quadratic function f(x) = ax2, coefficient a determines its second-
order derivative. For more general situations, above discussion implies that
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the number of intervals needed to perform a PWL approximation for func-
tion f(x) may depend on its second-order derivative. This problem has been
thoroughly studied in [7]. The conclusion is: for a three times continuously
differentiable f(x) in the interval [xl, xm], the optimal number of segments
s(ε) under given error tolerance ε can be selected as
s(ε) ∝ c√
ε
, ε→ 0+
where
c =
1
4
∫ xm
xl
√
|f ′′(x)|
The conclusion still holds if
√|f ′′(x)| has integrable singularities at the end-
points.
B.2 Linear Formulation of Product Terms
Product of two variables, or a bilinear term, naturally arises in optimization
models from various disciplines. For one example, in economic studies, if the
price c and the quantity q of a commodity are variables, then the cost cq would
be a bilinear term. For another, in circuit analysis, if both of the voltage v and
the current i are variables, then the electric power vi would be a bilinear term.
Bilinear terms are non-convex. Throughout history, linearizing bilinear terms
using linear constraints and integer variables is a frequently used technique
in optimization community. This section presents several techniques for the
central question of product linearization: how to enforce constraint z = xy,
depending on the types of x and y.
B.2.1 Product of Two Binary Variables
If x ∈ B and y ∈ B, then z = xy is equivalent to the following linear inequal-
ities
0 ≤ z ≤ y
0 ≤ x− z ≤ 1− y
x ∈ B, y ∈ B, z ∈ B
(B.15)
It can be verified that if x = 1, y = 1, then z = 1 is achieved; if x = 0
or y = 0, then z = 0 is enforced, regardless of the value of y or x. This is
equivalent to the requirement z = xy.
If x ∈ Z+ belongs to interval [xL, xU ], and y ∈ Z+ belongs to interval
[yL, yU ], given the following binary expansion
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x = xL +
K1∑
k=1
2k−1uk
y = yL +
K2∑
k=1
2k−1vk
(B.16)
where K1 = dlog2(xU − xL)e, K2 = dlog2(yU − yL)e. To develop a vector
expression, define vectors b1 = [20, 21, · · · , 2K1−1], u = [u1, u2, · · · , uK1 ]T ,
b2 = [20, 21, · · · , 2K2 ], v = [v1, v2, · · · , vK2 ]T , and matrices B = (b1)T b2,
z = uvT , then
xy = xLyL + xLb2v + yLb1u+ 〈B, z〉
where product matrix z = uvT , and 〈B, z〉 = ∑i∑j Bijzij . Relation among
u, v, and z can be linearized via equation (B.15) element-wise. Its compact
form is given by
0K1×K2 ≤ z ≤ 1K1×1vT
0K1×K2 ≤ u11×K2 − z ≤ 1K1×K2 − 1K1×1vT
u ∈ BK1×1, v ∈ BK2×1, z ∈ BK1×K2
(B.17)
B.2.2 Product of Integer and Continuous Variables
We consider the binary-continuous case. If x ∈ R belongs to interval [xL, xU ],
and y ∈ B, and then z = xy is equivalent to the following linear inequalities
xLy ≤ z ≤ xUy
xL(1− y) ≤ x− z ≤ xU (1− y)
x ∈ R, y ∈ B, z ∈ R
(B.18)
It can be verified that if y = 0, then z is enforced to be 0 and xL ≤ x ≤ xU
is naturally met; if y = 1, then z = x and xL ≤ z ≤ xU must be satisfied,
indicating the same relationship on x, y, and z. As for the integer-continuous
case, the integer variable can be represented as (B.16) using binary variables,
yielding a linear combination of binary-continuous products.
It should be mentioned that the upper bound xU and the lower bound
xL are crucial for creating linearization inequalities. If explicit bounds are
not available at hand, one can incorporate a constant M that is big enough.
The value of M will have a notable impact on the computation time. To
enhance efficiency, a desired value should be the minimal M that ensures
that inequality −M ≤ x ≤ M never becomes binding at optimum, as it
leads to the strongest bound if integrality of binary variables is neglected,
expediting the converge of the branch-and-bound procedure. However, such
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a value is generally unclear before we solve the problem. Nevertheless, we
do not actually need to find the smallest value M∗. Any M ≥ M∗ produces
the same optimal solution and is valid for linearization. Please bear in mind
that an over-large M not only deteriorates the computation time, but also
cause numeric instability due to a large conditional number. So a proper
tradeoff must be made between efficiency and accuracy. A proper M can be
determined from estimating the bound of x from certain heuristics, which is
problem-dependent.
B.2.3 Product of Two Continuous Variables
If x ∈ R belongs to interval [xL, xU ], and y ∈ R belongs to interval [yL, yU ],
there are three options for linearizing their product xy. The first one considers
z = xy as a bivariate function f(x, y), and applies the planar SOS2 method
in Sect. B.1.2. The second one discretizes y, for example, as follows
y = yL +
K∑
k=1
2k−1uk∆y
∆y =
yU − yL
2K
, uk ∈ B, ∀k
(B.19)
and
xy = xyL +
K∑
k=1
2k−1vk∆y (B.20)
where vk = ukx can be linearized through equation (B.18) as
xLuk ≤ vk ≤ xUuk, ∀k
xL(1− uk) ≤ x− vk ≤ xU (1− uk), ∀k
x ∈ R, uk ∈ B, ∀k, vk ∈ R, ∀k
(B.21)
In practical problems, bilinear terms often appear as the inner production
of two vectors. For convenience, we present the compact linearization of xT y
via binary expansion. Let y be the candidate vector variable to be discretized;
perform (B.19) on each element of y
yj = y
L
j +
K∑
k=1
2k−1ujk∆yj , ∀j
and thus
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xjyj = xjy
L
j +
K∑
k=1
2k−1vjk∆yj , ∀j, vjk = ujkxj , ∀j,∀k
Relation vjk = ujkxj can be expressed via linear constraints
xLj ujk ≤ vjk ≤ xUj ujk, xLj (1− ujk) ≤ xj − vjk ≤ xUj (1− ujk), ∀j,∀k
Denote by V and U are matrix variables consisting of vjk and ujk, respec-
tively; 1K stands for all-one column vector with a dimension of K; ∆Y is a di-
agonal matrix with ∆yj being non-zero entries; vector ζ = [2
0, 21, · · · , 2K−1].
Combining all above element-wise expressions together, we have the linear
formulation of xT y in a compact matrix form
xT y = xT yL + ζV T∆y
in conjunction with
y = yL + ∆Y Uζ
T
(xL · 1TK)⊗ U ≤ V ≤ (xU · 1TK)⊗ U
(xL · 1TK)⊗ (1− U) ≤ x · 1TK − V ≤ (xU · 1TK)⊗ (1− U)
x ∈ RJ , y ∈ RJ , U ∈ BJ×K , V ∈ RJ×K
(B.22)
where ⊗ represents element-wise product of two matrices with the same di-
mension.
One possible drawback of this formulation is that the discretized variable
is no longer continuous. The approximation accuracy can be improved by
increasing the number of breakpoints without introducing too many binary
variables, whose number is given by dlog2(yU − yL)/∆ye. Furthermore, the
variable to be discretized must have clear upper and lower bounds. This is
not restrictive because decision variables of engineering problems are subject
to physical operating limitations, such as the maximum and minimum output
of a generator. Nevertheless, if x, for example, is unbounded in formulation,
but the problem has a finite optimum, we can replace xU (xL) in (B.21) with
a large enough big-M parameter M(−M), so that the true optimal solution
remains feasible. It should be pointed out that the value of M may influence
the computational efficiency of the equivalent MILP, as mentioned previously.
The optimal choice of M in general cases remains an open problem, but there
could be heuristic methods for specific instances. For example, if x stands for
the marginal production cost, which is a dual variable whose bounds are
unclear, one can alternatively determine a suitable bound from historical
data or price forecast.
An alternative formulation for the second option deals with product term
xf(y), and xy is a special case when f(y) = y. By performing the piecewise
constant approximation (B.4) on function f(y), the product becomes xy =
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s=1 xθsys, where ys is constant, x is continuous, and θs is binary. The
products xθs, s = 1, · · · , S − 1 can be readily linearized via the method in
B.2.2. In this approach, the continuity of x and y are retained. However, the
number of binary variables in the piecewise constant approximation for f(y)
grows linearly in the number of samples on y.
The third one converts the product into a separable form, and then per-
forms PWL approximation for univariate nonlinear functions. To see this,
consider a bilinear term xy. Introduce two continuous variables u and v de-
fined as follows
u =
1
2
(x+ y)
v =
1
2
(x− y)
(B.23)
Now we have
xy = u2 − v2 (B.24)
In (B.24), u2 and v2 are univariate nonlinear functions, and can be ap-
proximated by the PWL method presented in Sect. B.1.1. Furthermore, if
xl ≤ x ≤ xu, yl ≤ y ≤ yu, then the lower and upper bounds of u and v are
given by
1
2
(xl + yl) ≤ u ≤ 1
2
(xu + yu)
1
2
(xl − yu) ≤ v ≤ 1
2
(xu − yl)
Formulation (B.24) has a connotative advantage. If xy appears in the
objective function which is to be minimized and is not involved in constraints,
we only need to approximate v2 because u2 is convex and −v2 is concave.
The minimum amount of binary variables in this method is a logarithmic
function in the number of break points, as explained in Sect. B.1.1.
The bilinear term xy can be replaced by a single variable z in the following
situation: 1) if the lower bounds xl and yl are nonnegative; 2) either x or y is
not referenced anywhere else except in xy. For instance, y is such a variable,
then the bilinear term xy can be replaced by variable z and constraint xyl ≤
z ≤ xyu. Once the problem is solved, y can be recovered by y = z/x if x > 0,
and the inequality constraint on z guarantees y ∈ [yl, yu]; otherwise if x = 0,
then y is undetermined and has no impact on the optimum.
B.2.4 Monomial of Binary Variables
Previous cases discuss linearizing the product of two variables. Now we con-
sider a binary monomial with n variables
z = x1x2 · · ·xn, xi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, · · · , n (B.25)
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Clearly, this monomial takes a binary value. Since the product of two binary
can be expressed by a single one in light of (B.15), the monomial can be
linearized recursively. Nevertheless, by making full use of the binary property
of z, a smarter and concise way to represent (B.25) is given by
z ∈ {0, 1} (B.26)
z ≤ x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn
n
(B.27)
z ≥ x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn − n+ 1
n
(B.28)
If at least one of xi is equal to 0, because
∑n
i=1 xi − n + 1 ≤ 0, (B.28)
becomes redundant; moreover,
∑n
i=1 xi/n ≤ 1 − 1/n, which removes z = 1
from the feasible region, so z will take a value of 0; otherwise, if all xi are equal
to 1,
∑n
i=1 xi/n = 1, and the right-hand side of (B.28) is 1/n, which removes
z = 0 from the feasible region. Hence z is forced to be 1. In conclusion, linear
constraints (B.26)-(B.28) have the same effect as (B.25).
In view of the above transformation technique, a binary polynomial pro-
gram can always be reformulated as a binary linear program. Moreover, if
a single continuous variable appears in the monomial, the problem can be
reformulated as an MILP.
B.2.5 Product of Functions in Integer Variables
First, let us consider z = f1(x1)f2(x2), where decision variables are positive
integers, i.e., xi ∈ {di,1, di,2, · · · , di,ri}, i = 1, 2. Without particular tricks, f1
and f2 can be expressed as
f1 =
r1∑
j=1
f1(d1,j)u1,j , u1,j ∈ {0, 1},
r1∑
j=1
u1,j = 1
f2 =
r2∑
j=1
f2(d2,j)u2,j , u2,j ∈ {0, 1},
r2∑
j=1
u2,j = 1
and the product of two binary variables can be linearized via (B.15). Above
formulation introduces a lot of intermediary binary variables, and is not pro-
pitious to represent a product with more functions recursively.
Ref. [8] suggests another choice
z =
r2∑
i=1
f2(d2,j)σ2,j ,
r2∑
i=1
σ2,j = f1(x1), σ2,j = f1(x1)u2,j (B.29)
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where u2,j ∈ {0, 1} and
∑r2
j=1 u2,j = 1. Although f1(x1)u2,j remains nonlin-
ear because of decision variable x1, (B.29) can be used to linearize a product
with more than two nonlinear functions.
To see this, Denote by z1 = f1(x1), zi = zi−1fi(xi), i = 2, · · · , n; integer
variable xi ∈ {di,1, di,2, · · · , di,ri}, fi(xi) > 0, i = 1, · · · , n. By using (B.29),
zi, i = 1, · · · , n have the following expressions [8]
z1 =
r1∑
j=1
f1(d1,j)u1,j
z2 =
r2∑
j=1
f2(d2,j)σ2,j ,
r2∑
i=1
σ2,j = z1, · · ·
zn =
rn∑
j=1
fn(dn,j)σn,j ,
rn∑
i=1
σn,j = zn−1
0 ≤ zi−1 − σi,j ≤ z¯i−1(1− ui,j)
0 ≤ σi,j ≤ z¯i−1ui,j , ui,j ∈ {0, 1}
}
,
j = 1, · · · , ri,
i = 2, · · · , n
xi =
ri∑
j=1
di,jui,j ,
ri∑
j=1
ui,j = 1, i = 1, 2, · · · , n
(B.30)
In (B.30), the number of binary variables is
∑n
i=1 ri, and grow linearly in
the dimension of x and the interval length of each xi. To reduce the number
of auxiliary binary variable ui,j , the dichotomy procedure in Sect. B.1.1 for
SOS2 can be applied, which is discussed in [8].
B.2.6 Log-sum Functions
We consider log-sum function log(x1 + x2 + · · · + xn), which arises from
solving a signomial geometric programming problem. The basic element in
such a problem has a form of
ck
l∏
j=1
y
ajk
j (B.31)
where yj > 0, ck is a constant, and ajk ∈ R. Non-integer value of ajk makes
signomial geometric programming problem even harder than polynomial pro-
grams. Under some variable transformation, the non-convexity of a signomial
geometric program can be concentrated in some log-sum functions [9]. In view
of the form in (B.31), we discuss log-sum function in Sect. B.2.
We aim to represent function log(x1 + x2 + · · · + xn) in terms of log x1,
log x2, · · · , log xn. Following the method in [9], define a univariate function
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F (X) = log(1 + eX) and let Xi = log xi, Γi = log(x1 + · · ·+xi), i = 1, · · · , n.
The relation between Xi and Γi can be revealed. Because
F (Xi+1 − Γi) = log
(
1 + elog xi+1−log(x1+···+xi)
)
= log
(
1 +
xi+1
x1 + · · ·+ xi
)
= Γi+1 − Γi
By stipulating Wi = Xi+1 − Γi, we have the following recursive equations
Γi+1 = Γi + F (Wi), i = 1, · · · , n− 1
Wi = Xi+1 − Γi, i = 1, · · · , n− 1
(B.32)
Function F (Wi) can be linearized using the method in Sect. B.1.1. Based
on this technique, an outer-approximation approach is proposed in [9] to solve
signomial geometric programming problem via MILP.
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B.3.1 Minimum Values
Let x1, x2, · · · , xn be continuous variables with known lower bound xLi and
upper bound xUi , and L = min{xL1 , xL2 , · · · , xLn}, then their minimum y =
min{x1, x2, · · · , xn} can be expressed via linear constraints
xLi ≤ xi ≤ xUi , ∀i
y ≤ xi,∀i
xi − (xUi − L)(1− zi) ≤ y,∀i
zi ∈ B, ∀i,
∑
i
zi = 1
(B.33)
The second inequality guarantees y ≤ min{x1, x2, · · · , xn}; in addition, if
zi = 1, then y ≥ xi, hence y achieves the minimal value of {xi}. According
to the definition of L, xi − y ≤ xUi − L,∀i holds, thus the third inequality is
inactive for the remaining n− 1 variables with zi = 0.
B.3.2 Maximum Values
Let x1, x2, · · · , xn be continuous variables with known lower bound xLi and
upper bound xUi , and U = max{xU1 , xU2 , · · · , xUn }, then their maximum y =
max{x1, x2, · · · , xn} can be expressed via linear constraints
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xLi ≤ xi ≤ xUi , ∀i
y ≥ xi,∀i
xi + (U − xLi )(1− zi) ≥ y,∀i
zi ∈ B, ∀i,
∑
i
zi = 1
(B.34)
The second inequality guarantees y ≥ max{x1, x2, · · · , xn}; in addition, if
zi = 1, then y ≤ xi, hence y achieves the maximal value of {xi}. According
to the definition of U , y − xi ≤ U − xLi ,∀i holds, thus the third inequality is
inactive for the remaining n− 1 variables with zi = 0.
B.3.3 Absolute Values
Suppose x ∈ R and |x| ≤ U , the absolute value function y = |x|, which is
nonlinear, can be expressed via PWL function as
0 ≤ y − x ≤ 2Uz, U(1− z) ≥ x
0 ≤ y + x ≤ 2U(1− z), − Uz ≤ x
−U ≤ x ≤ U, z ∈ B
(B.35)
When x > 0, the first line yields z = 0 and y = x, while the second line is
inactive. When x < 0, the second line yields z = 1 and y = −x, while the first
line is inactive. When x = 0, either z = 0 or z = 1 gives y = 0. In conclusion,
(B.35) has the same effect as y = |x|.
B.3.4 Linear Fractional of Binary Variables
A linear fractional of binary variables takes the form of
a0 +
∑n
i=1 aixi
b0 +
∑n
i=1 bixi
(B.36)
We assume b0 +
∑n
i=1 bixi 6= 0 for all x ∈ {0, 1}n. Define a new continuous
variable
y =
1
b0 +
∑n
i=1 bixi
(B.37)
The lower bound and upper bound of y can be easily computed. Then the
linear fractional shown in (B.36) can be replaced with a linear expression
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a0y +
n∑
i=1
aizi (B.38)
with constraints
b0y +
n∑
i=1
bizi = 1 (B.39)
zi = xiy, ∀i (B.40)
where (B.40) describes a product of a binary variable and a continuous vari-
able, which can be linearized through equation (B.18).
B.3.5 Disjunctive Inequalities
Let {P i}, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m be a finite set of bounded polyhedra. Disjunctive
inequalities usually arise when the solution space is characterized by the
union S = ∪mi=1P i of these polyhedra. Unlike intersection operator which
preserves convexity, disjunctive inequalities form a non-convex region. It can
be represented by MILP model using binary variables. We introduce three
emblematic methods.
1. Big-M formulation
The hyperplane representations of polyhedra are given by P i = {x ∈
Rn|Aix ≤ bi}, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m. By introducing binary variables zi, i =
1, 2, · · · ,m, an MILP formulation for S can be written as
Aix ≤ bi +M i(1− zi), ∀i
zi ∈ B, ∀i,
m∑
i=1
zi = 1
(B.41)
where M i is a vector such that when zi = 0, A
ix ≤ bi + M i holds. To show
the impact of the value of M on the tightness of formulations (B.41) when
integrality constraints zi ∈ B,∀i are relaxed as zi ∈ [0, 1],∀i, we contrivedly
construct 4 polyhedra in R2, which are depicted in Fig. B.4. The continuous
relaxations of (B.41) with different values of M are illustrated in the same
graph, showing that the smaller the value of M , the tighter the relaxation of
(B.41).
From a computational perspective, the element in M should be as small
as possible, because a huge constant without any insights about problem
data will feature a bad conditional number. Furthermore, the continuous
relaxation of MILP model will be very weak, resulting in poor objective
value bounds and excessive branch-and-bound computation. The goal of big-
M parameter selection is to create a model whose continuous relaxation is
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Fig. B.4 Big-M formulation and their relaxed regions.
close to the convex hull of the original constraint, i.e. the smallest convex set
that contains the original feasible region. A possible selection of the big-M
parameter is
M il =
(
max
j 6=i
M ijl
)
− bil
M ijl = maxx
{
[Aix]l : A
jx ≤ bj} (B.42)
where subscript l stands for the l-th element of a vector or l-th row of a
matrix. As polyhedron P i are bounded, all bound parameters in (B.42) are
well defined.
However, even the tightest big-M parameter will yield a relaxed solution
space that is generally larger than the convex hull of the original feasible set.
In many applications, good variable bounds can be estimated from certain
heuristic methods which explore specific problem data and structure.
2. Convex hull formulation
Let vert(P i) = {vil}, l = 1, 2, · · · , Li denote sets of vertices of polyhedra
{P i}, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m, where Li is the number of vertices of P i. The set of
extreme rays is empty since P i is bounded. By introducing binary variables
zi, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m, an MILP formulation for S is given by
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m∑
i=1
Li∑
l=1
λilv
i
l = x
Li∑
l=1
λil = zi, ∀i
λil ≥ 0, ∀i, ∀l
zi ∈ B, ∀i,
m∑
i=1
zi = 1
(B.43)
Formulation (B.43) does not rely on manually supplied parameter. In-
stead, it requires enumerating all extreme points of polyhedra P i. Although
the vertex representation and hyperplane representation of a polyhedron are
interchangeable, given the fact that vertex enumeration is time consuming
for high-dimensional polyhedra, (B.43) is useful only if P i are originally rep-
resented by extreme points.
3. Lifted formulation
A smarter formulation exploits the fact that bounded polyhedra P i share
the same recession cone {0}, i.e., equation Aix = 0 has no non-zero solutions.
Otherwise, suppose Aix∗ = 0, x∗ 6= 0, and y ∈ P i, then y+λx∗ ∈ P i, ∀λ > 0,
because Ai(y + λx∗) = Aiy ≤ bi. As a result, P i is unbounded. Bearing this
in mind, an MILP formulation for S is given by
Aixi ≤ bizi, ∀i
m∑
i=1
xi = x
zi ∈ B, ∀i
m∑
i=1
zi = 1
(B.44)
Formulation (B.44) is also parameter-free. Since it incorporates additional
continuous variable for each polytope, we call it a lifted formulation. It is
easy to see that the feasible region of x is the union of P i: if zi = 0, x
i = 0
as analyzed before; otherwise, if zi = 1, x = x
i ∈ P i.
4. Complementarity and slackness condition
Complementarity and slackness condition naturally arises in the KKT op-
timality condition of a mathematical programming problem, an equilibrium
problem, a hierarchical optimization problem, and so on. It is a quintessential
law to characterize the logic condition under which a rational decision-making
progress must obey. Here we pay attention to the linear case and equivalent
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MILP formulation, because nonlinear cases give rise to MINLPs, which are
challenging to solve and not superior from the computational point of view.
A linear complementarity and slackness condition can be written as
0 ≤ y⊥Ax− b ≥ 0 (B.45)
where vectors x and y are decision variables; A and b are constant coefficients
with compatible dimensions; notation ⊥ stands for the orthogonality of two
vectors. In fact, (B.45) encompasses the following nonlinear constraints in
traditional form
y ≥ 0, Ax− b ≥ 0, yT (Ax− b) = 0 (B.46)
In view of the non-negativeness of y and Ax− b, the orthogonality condition
is equivalent to the element-wise logic form yi = 0 or aix− bi = 0, ∀i, where
ai is the i-th row of A; in other words, at most one of yi and aix − bi can
take a strictly positive value, implying that the feasible region is either the
slice yi = 0 or the slice aix− bi = 0. Therefore, (B.45) can be regarded as a
special case of the disjunctive constraints.
In practical application, (B.45) usually serves as constraints in an opti-
mization problem. For example, in a sequential decision making or a linear
bilevel program, the KKT condition of the lower-level LP appears in the form
of (B.45), which is the constraint of the upper-level optimization problem.
The main computation challenge arises from the orthogonality condition,
which is nonlinear and non-convex, and violates the linear independent con-
straint qualification, see Appendix D.3 for an example. Nonetheless, in view
of the switching logic between yi and aix − bi, we can introduce a binary
variable zi to select which slice is active [10]
0 ≤ aix− bi ≤Mzi, ∀i
0 ≤ yi ≤M(1− zi), ∀i
(B.47)
where M is a large enough constant. According to (B.47), if zi = 0, then
(Ax− b)i = 0 must hold, and the second inequality is redundant; otherwise,
if zi = 1, then we have yi = 0, and the first inequality becomes redundant.
(B.47) can be written in a compact form as
0 ≤ Ax− b ≤Mz
0 ≤ y ≤M(1− z) (B.48)
It is worth mentioning that the big-M parameter M has a notable impact
on the feasible region of the relaxed problem as well as the computational
efficiency of the MILP model, as illustrated in Fig. B.4. One should make
sure that (B.48) would not remove the optimal solution from the feasible
set. If both x and y have clear bounds, then M can be easily estimated;
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otherwise, we may prudently employ a large M , at the cost of sacrificing the
computational efficiency.
Furthermore, if we are aiming to solve (B.45) without an objective func-
tion and other constraints, such a problem is called a linear complemen-
tarity problem (under some proper transformation), for which we can build
parameter-free MILP models. More details can be found in Appendix D.4.2.
B.3.6 Logical Conditions
Logical conditions are associated with indicator constraints with a statement
like “if event A then event B”. An event can be described in many ways.
For example, a binary variable a = 1 can stand for event A happens, and
otherwise a = 0; a point x belongs to a set X can denote a system is under
secure operating condition, and otherwise x /∈ X. In view of this, the disjunc-
tive constraints discussed above is a special case of logical condition. In this
section, we expatiate on how some usual logical conditions can be expressed
via linear constraints. Let A, B, C, · · · associated with binary variables a, b,
c, · · · represent events. Main results for linearizing typical logical conditions
are summarized in B.1 [11].
Table B.1 Linear form of some typical logic conditions
If A then B b ≥ a
Not B 1− b
If A then not B a+ b ≤ 1
If not A then B a+ b ≥ 1
A if and only if B a = b
If A then B and C b+ c ≥ 2a
If A then B or C b+ c ≥ a
If B or C then A 2a ≥ b+ c
If B and C then A a ≥ b+ c− 1
If M or more of N events then A (N −M + 1)a ≥ b+ c+ · · · −M + 1
Logical AND is formulated as a function of two binary inputs. Specifically,
c = a AND b can be expressed as c = min{a, b} or c = ab. The former one
can be linearized via (B.33) and the letter one through (B.15), and both of
them renders
c ≤ a, c ≤ b, c ≥ a+ b− 1, c ≥ 0 (B.49)
For the case with multiple binary inputs, i.e., c = min{c1, · · · , cn}, or
c =
∏n
i=1 ci, (B.49) can be generalized as
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c ≤ ci, ∀i, c ≥
∑n
i=1
ci − n+ 1, c ≥ 0 (B.50)
Logical OR is formulated as a function of two binary inputs, i.e., c =
max{a, b}, which can be linearized via (B.34), yielding
c ≥ a, c ≥ b, c ≤ a+ b, c ≤ 1 (B.51)
For the case with multiple binary inputs, i.e., c = max{c1, · · · , cn}, (B.51)
can be generalized as
c ≥ ci, ∀i, c ≤
∑n
i=1
ci, c ≤ 1 (B.52)
B.4 Further Reading
Throughout the half-century long research and development, MILP has be-
come an indispensable and unprecedentedly powerful modeling tool in math-
ematics and engineering, thanks to the advent of efficient solvers that encap-
sulate many state-of-the-art techniques [12]. This chapter aims to provide an
overview on formulation recipes that transform complicated conditions into
MILPs, so as to take full advantages of off-the-shelf solvers. The paradigm is
able to deal with a fairly broad class of hard optimization problems.
Readers who are interested in the strength of MILP model, may find in-
depth discussions in [13] and references therein. For those interested in the
PWL approximation of nonlinear functions, we refer to [14, 15, 16] and ref-
erences therein, for various models and methods. The most promising one
may be the convex combination model with a logarithmic number of binary
variables, whose implementation has been thoroughly discussed in [3, 4, 5].
For those who are interested in the polyhedral study of single-term bilinear
sets and MILP based methods for bilinear programs may find extensive in-
formation in [17, 18] and references therein. For those who need more knowl-
edge about mathematical program with disjunctive constraints, in which con-
straint activity is controlled by logical conditions, we recommend [19]; specif-
ically, the choice of big-M parameter is discussed in [20]. For those who wish
to learn more about integer programming techniques, we refer to [21] for the
formulation of union of polyhedra, [22] for the representability of MILP, and
[23, 24] for the more general mixed-integer conic programming as well as
its duality theory. To the best of our knowledge, dissertation [25] launches
the most comprehensive and in-depth study on MILP approximation of non-
convex optimization problems. State-of-the-art MILP formulations which bal-
ance problem size, strength, and branching behavior are developed and com-
pared, including those mentioned above. The discussions in [25] offer insights
on designing efficient MILP models that perform extremely well in practice,
despite of their theoretically non-polynomial complexity in the worst case.
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Appendix C
Basics of Robust Optimization
To be uncertain is to be uncomfortable, but to be
certain is to be ridiculous.
Real-world decision-making models often involve unknown data. Reasons for
data uncertainty could come from inexact measurements or forecast errors.
For example, in power system operation, the wind power generation and sys-
tem loads are barely known exactly at the time when the generation sched-
ule should be made; in inventory management, market price and demand
volatility is the main source of financial risks. In fact, optimal solutions to
mathematical programming problems can be highly sensitive to parameter
perturbations [1]. The optimal solution to the nominal problem may be highly
suboptimal or even infeasible in reality due to parameter inaccuracy. Conse-
quently, there is a great need of a systematic methodology that is capable
of quantifying the impact of data inexactness on the solution quality, and is
able to produce robust solutions that are insensitive to data uncertainty.
Optimization under uncertainty has been a focus of the operational re-
search community for a long time. Two approaches are prevalent to deal with
uncertain data in optimization, namely stochastic optimization (SO) and ro-
bust optimization (RO). They differ in the ways of modeling uncertainty.
The former one assumes that the true probability distribution of uncertain
data is known or can be estimated from available information, and minimizes
the expected cost in its objective function. SO provides strategies that are
optimal in the sense of statistics. However, the probability distribution itself
may be inexact owing to the lack of enough data, and the performance of
the optimal solution could be sensitive to the probability distribution chosen
in the SO model. The latter one considers uncertain data resides in a pre-
defined uncertainty set, and minimizes the cost in the worst-case scenario in
its objective function. Constraint violation is not allowed for all possible data
realizations in the uncertainty set. RO is popular because it relies on simple
data and distribution-free. From the computational perspective, it is equiv-
alent to convex optimization problems for a variety of uncertainty sets and
problem types; for the intractable cases, it can be solved via systematic iter-
ation algorithms. For more technical details about RO, we refer to [1, 3, 4, 5],
survey articles [6, 7], and many references therein. Recently, distributionally
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robust optimization (DRO), an emerging methodology that inherits the ad-
vantages of SO and RO, has attracted wide attention. In DRO, uncertain data
are described by probability distribution functions which are not known ex-
actly and restricted in a functional ambiguity set constructed from available
information and structured properties. The expected cost associated with the
worst-case distribution is minimized, and the probability of constraint viola-
tions can be controlled via robust chance constraints. In many cases, the DRO
can be reformulated as a convex optimization problem, or solved iteratively
via convex optimization. RO and DRO approaches are young and active re-
search fields, and the challenge is to explore tractable reformulations with
various kinds of uncertainties. SO is a relatively mature technique, and the
current research is focusing on probabilistic modeling of uncertainty, chance
constrained programming, multi-stage SO such as stochastic dual dynamic
programming, as well as more efficient computational methods.
There are several ways to categorize robust optimization methods. Ac-
cording to how uncertainty is dealt with, they can be classified into static
(single-stage) RO and dynamic (multi-stage) RO. According to how uncer-
tainty is modeled, they can be divided into RO and DRO. In the latter cat-
egory, the ambiguity set for probability distribution can be further classified
into the moment based one and the divergence based one. We will shed light
on each of them in this chapter. Specifically, RO will be discussed in Sect.
C.1 and Sect. C.2, moment-based DRO will be presented in Sect. C.3, and
divergence-based DRO, also called robust SO will be illuminated in Sect. C.4.
In the operations research community, DRO and robust SO refer to the same
thing: optimization problem with distributional uncertainty, and can be used
interchangeably, although DRO is preferred by the majority of researchers.
In this book, we intentionally distinguish them because the moment ambi-
guity set can be set up with little information and is more likely a RO; the
divergence based set relies on an empirical distribution (may be inexact), so
is more similar to an SO. In fact, the gap between SO and RO has been
significantly narrowed by recent research progress in the sense of data-driven
optimization.
C.1 Static Robust Optimization
For the purpose of clarity, we begin to explain the paradigm of static RO from
LPs, the best known and most frequently used mathematical programming
problem in engineering applications. It is relatively easy to derive tractable
robust counterparts with various uncertainty sets. Nevertheless, most results
can be readily generalized to robust conic programs. The general form of an
LP with uncertain parameters can be written as follows:
min
x
{
cTx
∣∣ Ax ≤ b} : (A, b, c) ∈W (C.1)
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where x is the decision variable, A, b, c are coefficient matrices with com-
patible dimensions, and W denotes the set of all possible data realizations
constructed from available information or historical data, or merely a rough
estimation.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the objective function and
the constraint right-hand side in (C.1) are certain, and uncertainty only exists
in coefficient matrix A. To see this, it is not difficult to observe that problem
(C.1) can be written as an epigraph form
min
t,x,y
{t | cTx− t ≤ 0, Ax− by ≤ 0, y = 1} : (A, b, c) ∈W
By introducing additional scalar variables t and y, coefficients appearing in
the objective function and constraint right-hand side are constants. With
this transformation, it will be more convenient to define the feasible solution
and the optimal solution to (C.1). Hereinafter, we neglect the uncertainty in
cost coefficient vector c and constraint right-hand vector b without particular
mention, and consider problem
min
x
{
cTx
∣∣ Ax ≤ b} : A ∈W (C.2)
Next we present solution concepts of static RO under uncertain data.
C.1.1 Basic Assumptions and Formulations
Basic assumptions and definitions in static RO [1] are summarized as follows.
Assumption C.1 Vector x represents “here-and-now” decisions: they should
be determined without knowing exact values of uncertain parameters.
Assumption C.2 Once the decisions are made, constraints must be feasible
when the actual data is within the uncertainty set W , and may be either
feasible or not when the actual data step outside the uncertainty set W .
These assumptions bring about the definition for a feasible solution of
(C.2).
Definition C.1. A vector x is called a robust feasible solution to (C.2) if the
following condition holds:
Ax ≤ b, ∀A ∈W (C.3)
To prescribe an optimal solution, the worst-case criterion is widely ac-
cepted in RO studies, leading to the following definition:
Definition C.2. The robust optimal value of (C.2) is the minimum value of
the objective function over all possible x that satisfies (C.3).
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After we have agreed on the meanings of feasibility and optimality of (C.2),
we can seek the optimal solution among all robust feasible solutions to the
problem. Now, the robust counterpart (RC) of the uncertain LP (C.2) can
be described as:
min
x
cTx
s.t. aTi x ≤ bi, ∀i, ∀A ∈W
(C.4)
where aTi is the i-th row of matrix A, and bi is the i-th element of vector b.
We have two observations on the formulation of robust constraints in (C.4).
Proposition C.1. Robust feasible solutions of (C.4) remain the same if we
replace W with the Cartesian product Wˆ = W1 × · · · × Wn, where Wi =
{ai|∃A ∈W} is the projection of W on the coefficient space of i-th row of A.
This is called the constraint-wise property in static RO [1]. The reason is
aTi x ≤ bi, ∀A ∈W ⇔ max
A∈W
aTi x ≤ bi ⇔ max
ai∈Wi
aTi x ≤ bi
As a result, problem (C.4) comes down to
min
x
cTx
s.t. aTi x ≤ bi,∀ai ∈Wi, ∀i
(C.5)
Proposition C.1 seems rather counter-intuitive. One may perceive that
(C.4) will be less conservative with uncertainty set W since it is a subset
of Wˆ . In fact, later we will see that this intuition is true for adjustable
robustness.
Proposition C.2. Robust feasible solutions of (C.5) remain the same if we
replace Wi with its convex hull conv(Wi).
To see this, let vector aji , j = 1, 2, · · · be the extreme points of Wi, then
any point a¯i ∈ conv(Wi) can be expressed by a¯i =
∑
j λja
j
i , where λj ≥ 0,∑
j λj = 1 are weight coefficients. If x is feasible for all extreme points a
j
i ,
i.e., ajix ≤ bi, ∀j, then
a¯Ti x =
∑
j
λja
j
ix ≤
∑
j
λjbi = bi
which indicates that the constraint remains intact for all uncertain parame-
ters reside in conv(Wi).
Combining Propositions C.1 and C.2, we can conclude that the robust
counterpart of an uncertain LP with a certain objective remains intact even
if sets Wi of uncertain data are extended to their closed convex hulls, and W
to the Cartesian product of the resulting sets. In other words, we can make
a further assumption on the uncertainty set without loss of generality.
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Assumption C.3 The uncertainty set W is the Cartesian product of closed
and convex sets.
C.1.2 Tractable Reformulations
The constraint-wise property enables us to analyze the robustness of each
constraint aTi x ≤ bi, ∀ai ∈ Wi separately. Without particular mention, we
will omit the subscript i for brevity. To facilitate discussion, it is convenient
to parameterize the uncertain vector as a = a¯+ Pζ, where a¯ is the nominal
value of a, P is a constant matrix, ζ is a new variable that is uncertain.
This section will focus on how to derive tractable reformulation for robust
constraints in the form of
(a¯+ Pζ)Tx ≤ b, ∀ζ ∈ Z (C.6)
where Z is the uncertainty set of variable ζ. For same reasons, we can assume
that Z is closed and convex. A computationally tractable problem means
that there are known solution algorithms which can solve the problem with
polynomial running time in its input size even in the worst case. It has been
shown in [1] that problem (C.5) is generally intractable even if each Wi is
closed and convex. Nevertheless, tractability can be preserved for some special
classes of uncertainty sets. Some well-known results are summarized in the
following.
Condition (C.6) contains an infinite number of constraints due to the enu-
meration over set Z. Later we will see that for some particular uncertainty
sets, the ∀ quantifier as well as the uncertain parameter ζ can be eliminated
by using duality theory, and the resulting constraint in variable x is still
convex.
1. Polyhedral uncertainty set
We start with a commonly used uncertainty set: a polyhedron
Z = {ζ | Dζ + q ≥ 0} (C.7)
where D and q are constant matrices with compatible dimensions.
To exclude the ∀ quantifier for variable ζ, we investigate the worst case of
the left-hand side and require
a¯Tx+ max
ζ∈Z
(PTx)T ζ ≤ b (C.8)
For a fixed x, the second term is the optimum of an LP in variable ζ.
Duality theory of LP says that the following relation holds
(PTx)T ζ ≤ qTu, ∀ζ ∈ Z, ∀u ∈ U (C.9)
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where u is the dual variable, and U = {u | DTu + PTx = 0, u ≥ 0} is the
feasible region of the dual problem. Please be cautious on the sign of u. We
actually replace u with −u in the original dual LP. Therefore, a necessary
condition to validate (C.6) is
∃u ∈ U : a¯Tx+ qTu ≤ b (C.10)
It is also sufficient if the second term takes its minimum value over U , because
strong duality always holds for LPs, i.e. (PTx)T ζ = qTu is satisfied at the
optimal solution. In this regard, (C.8) is equivalent to
a¯Tx+ min
u∈U
qTu ≤ b (C.11)
In fact, the “min” operator in (C.11) can be omitted in a RC optimization
problem that minimizes the objective function, and thus renders polyhedral
constraints, although (C.8) is not given in a closed form and seems non-
convex.
In summary, the RC problem of an uncertain LP with polyhedral uncer-
tainty
min
x
cTx
s.t. (a¯i + Piζi)
Tx ≤ bi, ∀ζi ∈ Zi, ∀i
Zi = {ζi | Diζi + qi ≥ 0}, ∀i
(C.12)
can be equivalently formulated as
min
x
cTx
s.t. a¯Ti x+ q
T
i ui ≤ bi, ∀i
DTi ui + P
T
i x = 0, ui ≥ 0, ∀i
(C.13)
which is still an LP.
2. Cardinality constrained uncertainty set
Cardinality constrained uncertainty set is a special class of polyhedral
uncertainty set which incorporates a budget constraint and defined as follows
Z(Γ) =
ζ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ − 1 ≤ ζj ≤ 1, ∀j,
∑
j
|ζj | ≤ Γ
 (C.14)
where Γ is called the budget of uncertainty [2]. Motivated by the fact that each
entry ζj is unlikely to reach 1 or −1 at the same time, the budget constraint
controls the total data deviation from their forecast values. In other words,
the decision maker can achieve a compromise between the level of solution
robustness and the optimal cost by adjusting the value of Γ, which should
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be less than the dimension of ζ, otherwise the the budget constraint will be
redundant.
Although the cardinality constrained uncertainty set Z(Γ) is essentially a
polyhedron, the number of its facets, or the number of linear constraints in
(C.7), grows exponentially in the dimension of ζ, leading to a huge and dense
coefficient matrix for the uncertainty set. To circumvent this difficulty, we
can lift it into a higher dimensional space as follows by introducing auxiliary
variables
Z(Γ) =
ζ, σ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ − σj ≤ ζj ≤ σj , σj ≤ 1, ∀j,
∑
j
σj ≤ Γ
 (C.15)
The first inequality naturally suggests σj ≥ 0, ∀j. It is easy to see the equiv-
alence of (C.14) and (C.15), and the numbers of variables and constraints in
the latter one grows linearly in the dimension of ζ.
Following a similar paradigm, certifying constraint robustness with a car-
dinality constrained uncertainty set requires the optimal value function of
the following LP in variables ζ and σ representing the uncertainty
max
ζ,σ
(PTx)T ζ
s.t. − ζj − σj ≤ 0, ∀j : unj
ζj − σj ≤ 0, ∀j : umj
σj ≤ 1, ∀j : ubj∑
j
σj ≤ Γ : ur
(C.16)
where unj , u
m
j , u
b
j , ∀j, and ur following a colon are the dual variables associ-
ated with each constraint. The dual problem of (C.16) is given by
min
un,um,ub,ur
urΓ +
∑
j
ubj
s.t. umj − unj = (PTx)j , ∀j
− umj − unj + ubj + ur = 0, ∀j
umj , u
n
j , u
b
j ≥ 0, ∀j, ur ≥ 0
(C.17)
In summary, the RC problem of an uncertain LP with cardinality con-
strained uncertainty
min
x
cTx
s.t. (a¯i + Piζi)
Tx ≤ bi, ∀ζi ∈ Zi(Γi), ∀i
(C.18)
can be equivalently formulated as
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Table C.1 Equivalent convex formulations with different uncertainty sets
Uncertainty Z Robust reformulation Tractability
Box ‖ζ‖∞ ≤ 1 a¯T x+ ‖PT x‖1 ≤ b LP
Ellipsoidal ‖ζ‖2 ≤ 1 a¯T x+ ‖PT x‖2 ≤ b LP
p-norm ‖ζ‖p ≤ 1 a¯T x+ ‖PT x‖q ≤ b Convex program
Proper cone Dζ + q ∈ K

a¯
T
x+ q
T
u ≤ b
D
T
u+ P
T
x = 0
u ∈ K∗
Conic LP
Convex constraints hk(ζ) ≤ 0, ∀k

a¯
T
x+
∑
k
λkh
∗
k
(
uk
λk
)
≤ b∑
k
u
k
= P
T
x
λk ≥ 0, ∀k
Convex program
min
x
cTx
s.t. a¯Ti x+ uriΓi +
∑
j
ubij ≤ bi, ∀i
umij − unij = (PTi x)j , ∀i, ∀j
− umij − unij + ubij + uir = 0, ∀i, ∀j
umij , u
n
ij , u
b
ij ≥ 0, ∀i, ∀j, uir ≥ 0, ∀i
(C.19)
which is still an LP.
3. Several other uncertainty sets
Equivalent convex formulations of the uncertain constraint (C.6) with
some other uncertainty sets are summarized in Table C.1 [4]. These outcomes
are derived using the similar method described previously.
Table C.1 includes three cases: the p-norm uncertainty, the conic uncer-
tainty, and general convex uncertainty. In the p-norm case, the Ho¨lder’s in-
equality is used, i.e.:
(PTx)T ζ ≤ ‖PTx‖p‖ζ‖q (C.20)
where ‖ · ‖p and ‖ · ‖q with p−1 + q−1 = 1 are a pair of dual norms. Since
norm function of any order is convex [8], the resulting RC is a convex program.
Moreover, if q is a positive rational number, the q-order cone constraints can
be represented by a set of SOC inequalities [9], which is computationally
more friendly. Box (∞-norm) and ellipsoidal (2-norm) uncertainty sets are
special kinds of p-norm ones.
In the general conic case, conic duality theory [10] is used. K∗ stands for
the dual cone of K, and the polyhedral uncertainty is a special kind of this
case when K is the nonnegative orthant.
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In the general convex case, Fenchel duality, a basic theory in convex anal-
ysis, is needed. Notation h∗ stands for the convex conjugate function, i.e.
h∗(x) = supy x
T y − h(y). The detailed proof of RC reformulations and more
examples can be found in [11].
Above analysis focuses on the situation in which problem functions are
linear in decision variables, and problem data are affine in some uncertain
parameters, such as the form a = a¯ + Pζ. For robust quadratic optimiza-
tion, robust semidefinite optimization, robust conic optimization, and robust
discrete optimization, in which the optimization problem is nonlinear and dis-
continuous, please refer to [1] and [3]; for quadratic type uncertainty, please
refer to [1] (in Sect. 1.4) and [11].
C.1.3 Formulation Issues
To help practitioners build a well-defined and easy-to-solve robust optimiza-
tion model, some important modeling issues and deeper insights are discussed
in this section.
1. Choosing the uncertainty set
Since a robust solution remains feasible if the uncertain data does not
step outside the uncertainty set, the level of robustness mainly depends on
the shape and size of the uncertainty set. The more reliable, the higher the
cost. One may wish to seek a trade-off between reliability and economy. This
inspires the development of smaller uncertainty sets with a certain probability
guarantee that the constraint violation is unlikely to happen. Such guarantees
are usually described via a chance constraint
Prζ [a(ζ)
Tx ≤ b] ≥ 1− ε (C.21)
For ε = 0, chance constraint (C.21) is protected in the traditional sense of
RO. When ε > 0, it becomes challenging to derive tractable reformulation
for (C.21), especially when the probability distribution of uncertain data is
unclear or inaccurate. In fact, this issue is closely related to the DRO that
will be discussed later on. Here we provide some simple results which help
the decision maker choose the parameter of the uncertainty set.
It is revealed that if E[ζ] = 0, the components of ζ are independent, and
the uncertainty set takes the form
Z = {ζ | ‖ζ‖2 ≤ Ω, ‖ζ‖∞ ≤ 1} (C.22)
then chance constraint (C.21) holds with a probability of at least 1 −
exp(−Ω2/2) (see [1], Proposition 2.3.3).
Moreover, if the uncertainty set takes the form
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Z = {ζ | ‖ζ‖1 ≤ Γ, ‖ζ‖∞ ≤ 1} (C.23)
then chance constraint (C.21) holds with a probability of at least 1 −
exp(−Γ2/2L), where L is the dimension of ζ (see [1], Proposition 2.3.4, and
[2]).
It is proposed to construct uncertainty sets based on the central limit
theorem. If each component of ζ is independent and identically distributed
with mean µ and variance σ2, the uncertainty set can be built as [12]
Z =
{
ζ
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
L∑
i=1
ζi − Lµ
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ρ√Lσ, ‖ζ‖∞ ≤ 1
}
(C.24)
where parameter ρ is used to control the probability guarantee. Variations
of this formulation can take other distributional information into account,
such as data correlation and long tail-effect. It is a special kind of polyhedral
uncertainty, however, it is unbounded for L > 1, since the components can
be arbitrarily large as long as their summation is relatively small. Unbound-
edness may prevents establishing tractable RCs.
Additional references are introduced in further reading.
2. How to solve a problem without a clear tractable reformulation?
The existence of a tractable reformulation for a static RO problem largely
depends on the type of the uncertainty set. If the robust counterpart can-
not be written as a tractable convex program, a smart remedy is to use an
adaptive scenario generation procedure: first solve the problem with a smaller
uncertainty set ZS which is a subset of the original one Z, and the problem
with ZS has a known tractable reformulation. If the optimal solution x
∗ is
robust against all scenarios in Z, it is also an optimal solution of the original
problem. Otherwise, we have to identify a scenario ζ∗ ∈ Z which leads to the
most severe violation, which can be implemented by solving
max
{
(PTx∗)T ζ | ζ ∈ Z} (C.25)
where Z is a closed and convex set as validated in Assumption C.3, and then
append a cutting plane
a(ζ∗)Tx ≤ b (C.26)
to the reformulation problem. (C.26) removes x that will cause infeasibility
in scenario ζ∗, so is called a feasibility cut. It is linear and does not alter
tractability. Then the updated problem is solved again. According to Propo-
sition C.2, the new solution x∗ will be robust for uncertain data in the convex
hull of ZS ∪ ζ∗. Above procedure continues until robustness is certified over
the original uncertainty set Z.
This simple approach often converges quickly in a few number of iterations.
Its advantage is that tractability is preserved. When we choose ZS = ζ
0,
where ζ0 is the nominal scenario or forecast, it could be more efficient than
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using convex reformulations, because only LPs (whose sizes are almost equal
to the problem without uncertainty, and grows slowly) and simple convex
programs (C.25) are solved, see [13] for a comparison. This paradigm is an
essential strategy for solving the adjustable RO problems in the next section.
3. How to deal with equality constraints?
Although the theory of static RO is relatively mature, it encounters diffi-
culties in dealing with equality constraints. For example, consider x+ a = 1
where a ∈ [0, 0.1] is uncertain. However, one can seldom find a solution that
makes the equality hold true for multiple values of a. The problem remains
if you write a equality into a pair of opposite inequalities. In fact, this is-
sue is inevitable in the static setting. In addition, this limitation will lead to
completely different robust counterpart formulations for originally equivalent
deterministic problems.
Consider the inequality ax ≤ 1, which is equivalent to ax+ s = 1, s ≥ 0.
Suppose a is uncertain and belongs to interval [1, 2], their respective robust
counterparts are given by
ax ≤ 1, ∀a ∈ [1, 2] (C.27)
and
ax+ s = 1, ∀a ∈ [1, 2], s ≥ 0 (C.28)
The feasible set for (C.27) is x ≤ 1/2, and is x = 0 for (C.28). By observing
this difference, it is suggested that a static RO model should avoid using slack
variables in constraints with uncertain parameters.
Sometimes, the optimization problem may contain state variables which
can respond to parameter changes by adjusting their values. In such circum-
stance, equality constraint can be used to eliminate state variables. Never-
theless, such an action may lead to a problem that contains nonlinear un-
certainties, which are challenging to solve. An example is taken from [4] to
illustrate this issue. The constraints are
ζ1x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
x1 + x2 + ζ2x3 ≤ 5
(C.29)
where ζ1 and ζ2 are uncertain.
If x1 is a state variable and ζ1 6= 0, substituting x1 = (1− x2 − x3)/ζ1 in
the second inequality results in(
1− 1
ζ1
)
x2 +
(
ζ2 − 1
ζ1
)
x3 ≤ 5− 1
ζ1
in which the uncertainty becomes nonlinear in the coefficients.
If x2 is a state variable, substituting x2 = 1− ζ1x1 − x3 in the inequality
yields
(1− ζ1)x1 + (ζ2 − 1)x3 ≤ 4
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in which the uncertainty sustains linear in the coefficients.
If x3 is a state variable, substituting x3 = 1− ζ1x1 − x2 in the inequality
gives
(1− ζ1ζ2)x1 + (1− ζ2)x2 ≤ 5− ζ2
in which the uncertainty is nonlinear in the coefficients.
In conclusion, in the case that x2 is a state variable, the problem is easier
from a computational perspective. It is important to note that the physical
interpretation of variable elimination is to determine the adjustable variable
with exact information on the uncertain data. If no adjustment is allowed in
(C.29), the only robust feasible solution is x1 = x3 = 0, x2 = 1, which is
rather restrictive. The adjustable RO will be elaborated in detail in the next
section.
4. Pareto efficiency of the robust solution
The concept of Pareto efficiency in RO problems is proposed in [14]. If
the optimal solution under the worst-case data realization is not unique, it
is rational to compare their performances in non-worst-case scenarios: an
alternative solution may give an improvement in the objective value for at
least one data scenario without deteriorating the objective performances in all
other scenarios. To present related concept tersely, we restrict the discussion
on the following robust LP with objective uncertainty
max{pTx | s.t. x ∈ X, ∀p ∈W} = max
x∈X
{
min
p∈W
pTx
}
(C.30)
where W = {p | Dp ≥ d} is a polyhedral uncertainty set for the price vector
p; X = {x | Ax ≤ b} is the feasible region which is independent of the
uncertainty. More general cases are elaborated in [14]. We consider this form
because it is easy to discuss related issues, although objective uncertainty
can be moved into constraints.
For a given strategy x, the worst-case uncertainty is
min{pTx | s.t. p ∈W} = max{dT y | s.t. y ∈ Y } (C.31)
where Y = {y | DT y = x, y ≥ 0} is the feasible set for dual variable y.
Substituting (C.31) in (C.30) gives
max{dT y | s.t. DT y = x, y ≥ 0, x ∈ X} (C.32)
which is an LP. Its solution x is the robust optimal one to (C.30), and the
worst-case price p can be found by solving the left-hand side LP in (C.31).
Let zRO be the optimal value of (C.32), and then the set of robust optimal
solutions for (C.30) can be expressed via
XRO = {x | x ∈ X : ∃y ∈ Y such that yT d ≥ zRO} (C.33)
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If (C.32) has a unique optimal solution, XRO is a singleton; otherwise, a
Pareto optimal robust solution can be formally defined.
Definition C.3. [14] x ∈ XRO is a Pareto optimal solution for problem
(C.30) if there is no other x¯ ∈ X such that pT x¯ ≥ pTx, ∀p ∈ W and
p¯T x¯ > p¯Tx for some p¯ ∈W .
The terminology “Pareto optimal” is borrowed from multi-objective opti-
mization theory: RO problem (C.30) is viewed as a multi-objective LP with
infinitely many objectives, each of which corresponds to a particular p ∈W .
Some interesting problems are elaborated.
a. Pareto efficiency test
In general, it is not clear whether XRO contains multiple solutions, at least
before a solution x ∈ XRO is found. To test whether a given solution x is a
robust optimal one or not, it is proposed to solve a new LP
max
y
p¯T y
s.t. y ∈W ∗
x+ y ∈ X
(C.34)
where p¯ is a relative interior of the polyhedral uncertainty set W , which is
usually set to the nominal scenario, and W ∗ = {y | ∃λ : dTλ ≥ 0, DTλ =
y, λ ≥ 0} is the dual cone of W . Please refer to Sect. A.2.1 and equation
(A.27) for the dual cone of a polyhedral set. Since y = 0, λ = 0 is always
feasible in (C.34), the optimal value is either zero or strictly positive. In the
former case, x is also a Pareto optimal solution; in the latter case, x¯ = x+y∗
dominates x and itself is Pareto optimal for any y∗ that solves LP (C.34) [14].
The interpretation of (C.34) is clear: since y ∈W ∗, yT p must be non-negative
for all p ∈ W . If we can find y that leads to a strict objective improvement
for p¯, then x+ y would be Pareto optimal.
In view of the above interpretation, it is a direct conclusion that for an
arbitrary relative interior point p¯ ∈W , the optimal solutions to the problem
max
{
p¯Tx | x ∈ XRO} (C.35)
are Pareto optimal.
b. Characterizing the set of Pareto optimal solutions
It is interesting to characterize the Pareto optimal solution set XPRO.
After we get zRO and XRO, solve the following LP
max
x,y,λ
p¯T y
s.t. dTλ ≥ 0, DTλ = y, λ ≥ 0
x ∈ XRO, x+ y ∈ X
(C.36)
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and we can conclude XPRO = XRO if and only if the optimal value of (C.36)
is equal to 0 [14]. If this is true, the decision maker would not have to worry
about Pareto efficiency, as any solution in XRO is also Pareto optimal. More
broadly, the set XPRO is shown to be non-convex and is contained in the
boundary of XRO.
c. Optimization over Pareto optimal solutions
In the case that XPRO is not a singleton, one may consider to optimize a
linear secondary objective over XPRO, i.e.:
max{rTx | s.t. x ∈ XPRO} (C.37)
It is demonstrated in [14] that if r lies in the relative interior of W , the
decision maker can simply replaceXPRO withXRO in (C.37) without altering
the problem solution, due to the property revealed in (C.35). In more general
cases, problem (C.37) can be formulated as an MILP [14]
max
x,µ,η,z
rTx
s.t. x ∈ XRO
µ ≤M(1− z)
b−Ax ≤Mz
DATµ− dη ≥ Dp¯
µ, η ≥ 0, z ∈ {0, 1}m
(C.38)
where M is a sufficiently large number, m is the dimension of vector z. To
show their equivalence, it is revealed that the feasible set of (C.38) depicts
an optimal solution of (C.34) with a zero objective value [14]. In other words,
the constraints of (C.38) contain the KKT optimality condition of (C.34).
To see this, the binary vector z imposes the complementarity and slackness
condition µT (b − Ax) = 0, which ensures λ, µ, η are the optimal solution of
the following primal-dual LP pair
Primal :
max
λ
p¯TDTλ
s.t. λ ≥ 0
dTλ ≥ 0
ADTλ ≤ b−Ax
Dual :
min
µ,η
µT (b−Ax)
s.t. µ ≥ 0
η ≥ 0
DATµ− dη ≥ Dp¯
The original variable y in (C.34) is eliminated via equality DTλ = y in the
dual cone W ∗. According to strong duality, the optimal value of the primal
LP (C.34) is p¯TDTλ = p¯T y = 0, and Pareto optimality is guaranteed.
In practice, Pareto inefficiency is not a contrived phenomenon, see various
examples in [14] and power market examples in [15, 16].
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5. On max-min and min-max formulations
In many literatures, the robust counterpart problem of (C.2) is written as
a min-max form
Opt-1 = min
x
max
A∈W
{
cTx | s.t. Ax ≤ b} (C.39)
which means x is determined before A takes a value in W , and the deci-
sion maker can foresee the worst consequence of deploying x brought by the
perturbation of A. To make a prudent decision that is insensitive to data per-
turbation, the decision maker resorts to minimizing the maximal objective.
The max-min formulation
Opt-2 = max
A∈W
min
x
{
cTx | s.t. Ax ≤ b} (C.40)
has a different interpretation: the decision maker can first observe the re-
alization of uncertainty, and then recovers the constraints by deploying a
corrective action x as a response to the observed A. Certainly, this specific x
may not be feasible for other A ∈W . On the other hand, the uncertainty, like
a rational player, can foresee the optimal action taken by the human decision
maker, and select a strategy that will yield a maximal objective value even
an optimal corrective action is deployed.
From above analysis, the feasible region of x in (C.39) is a subset of that
in (C.40), because (C.40) only accounts for a special scenario in W . As a
result, their optimal values satisfy Opt-1 ≥ Opt-2.
Consider the following problem in which the uncertainty is not constraint-
wise
min
x
x1 + x2
s.t. x1 ≥ a1, x2 ≥ a2, ∀a ∈W
(C.41)
where W = {a | a ≥ 0, ‖a‖2 ≤ 1}.
For the min-max formulation, since x should be feasible for all possible
values of a, it is necessary to require x1 ≥ 1 and x2 ≥ 1, and Opt-1 = 2 for
problem (C.41).
As for the max-min formulation, as x is determined in response to the
value of a, it is clear that the optimal choice is x1 = a1 and x2 = a2, so the
problem becomes
max
a
a1 + a2
s.t. a21 + a
2
2 ≤ 1
whose optimal value is Opt-2 =
√
2 < Opt-1.
As a short conclusion, static RO models discussed in this section are used
to immunize against constraint violation or objective volatility caused by data
perturbations, without jeopardizing computational tractability. General ap-
proaches involve reformulating the original uncertainty dependent constraints
into deterministic convex ones without uncertain data, such that feasible so-
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lutions of the robust counterpart program remain feasible for all data real-
izations in the pre-specified uncertainty set, which interprets the meaning of
robustness.
C.2 Adjustable Robust Optimization
Several reasons call for developing new decision-making mechanisms to over-
come limitations of the static RO approach: 1) Equality constraints often give
rise to infeasible robust counterpart problems in the static setting; 2) real-
world decision-making process may involve multiple stages, in which some
decisions indeed can be made after the uncertain data has been known or
can be predicted accurately. Take power system operation for an example,
the on-off status of generation units must be made several hours before real-
time dispatch when the renewable power is unclear; however, the output of
some units (called AGC units) can change in response to the real values of
system demands and renewable generations. This section will be devoted to
the adjustable robust optimization (ARO) with two stages, which leverages
the adaptability in the second stage. We still focus our attention on the linear
case.
C.2.1 Basic Assumptions and Formulations
The essential difference between static RO and ARO approaches stems from
the manner of decision making.
Assumption C.4 In an ARO problem, some variables are “here-and-now”
decisions, whereas the rest are “wait-and-see” decisions: they can be made at
a later moment according to the observed data.
In analogy to the static case, the decision-making mechanism can be ex-
plained.
Assumption C.5 Once the here-and-now decisions are made, there must be
at least one valid wait-and-see decision which is able to recover constraints
in response to the observed data realization, if the actual data is within the
uncertainty set.
In this regard, we can say here-and-now decisions are robust against the
uncertainty, and wait-and-see decisions are adaptive to the uncertainty. These
terminologies are borrowed from two-stage SO models. In fact, there is a close
relation between two-stage SO and two-stage RO [17, 18].
Now we are ready to post the compact form of a linear ARO problem with
an uncertain constraint right-hand side:
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min
x∈X
{
cTx+ max
w∈W
min
y(w)∈Y (x,w)
dT y(w)
}
(C.42)
where x is the here-and-now decision variable (or the first-stage decision
variable), and X is the feasible region of x; w is the uncertain parameter, and
W is the uncertainty set, which has been discussed in the previous section;
y(w) is the wait-and-see decision variable (or second-stage decision variable),
which can be adjusted according to the actual data of w, so it is represented
as a function of w; Y is the feasible region of y given the values of x and w,
because the here-and-now decision is not allowed to change in this stage, and
the exact value of w is known. It has a polyhedral form
Y (x,w) = {y | Ax+By + Cw ≤ b} (C.43)
where A, B, C, and b are constant matrices and vector with compatible
dimensions. It is clear that both of the here-and-now decision x and the data
uncertainty w can influence the feasible region Y in the second stage. We
define w = 0 the nominal scenario and assume 0 is a relative interior of W .
Otherwise, we can decompose the uncertainty as w = w0 + ∆w and merge
the constant term Cw0 into the right-hand side as b→ b−Cw0, where w0 is
the predicted or expected value of w, and ∆w is the forecast error, which is
the real uncertain parameter.
It should be pointed out that x, w, and y may contain discrete decision
variables. Later we will see, integer variables in x and w do not significantly al-
ter the solution algorithm of ARO. However, because integrality in y prevents
the use of LP duality theory, the computation will be greatly challenged. Al-
though we assume coefficient matrices are constants in (C.43), most results in
this section can be generalized if matrix A is a linear function in w; the situa-
tion would be complicated in matrixB is uncertainty-dependent. The purpose
for the specific form in (C.43) is that it is more dedicated to the problems
considered in this book: uncertainties originates from renewable/load volatil-
ity can be modeled by term Cw in (C.43), and the coefficients representing
component and network parameters are constants.
Assumption C.5 inspires the definition for a feasible solution of ARO
(C.42).
Definition C.4. A first-stage decision x is called robust feasible in (C.42) if
the feasible region Y (x,w) is non-empty for all w ∈W , and the set of robust
feasible solutions are given by:
XR = {x | x ∈ X : ∀w ∈W, Y (x,w) 6= ∅} (C.44)
Please be aware of the sequence in (C.44): x takes its value first, and
then parameter w chooses a value in W before some y ∈ Y does. The non-
emptiness of Y is guaranteed by the selection of x for an arbitrary w. If we
swap the latter two terms and write Y (x,w) 6= ∅, ∀w ∈W , like the form in a
static RO, it sometimes cause confusion that both x and y are here-and-now
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type decisions, the adaptiveness vanishes, and thus XR may become empty
if uncertainty appears in an equality constraint, as analyzed in the previous
section.
The definition of an optimal solution depends on the decision maker’s at-
titude towards the cost in the second stage. In (C.42), we adopt the following
definition.
Definition C.5. (Min-max cost criterion) An optimal solution of (C.42) is
a pair of here-and-now decision x ∈ XR and wait-and-see decision y(w∗)
corresponding to the worst-case scenario w∗ ∈W , such that the total cost in
scenario w∗ is minimal, where the worst-case scenario w∗ means that for the
fixed x, the optimal second-stage cost is maximized over W .
Other criteria may give different robust formulations. For example, the
minimum nominal cost formulation and min-max regret formulation.
Definition C.6. (Minimum nominal cost criterion) An optimal solution un-
der the minimum nominal cost criterion is a pair of here-and-now decision
x ∈ XR and wait-and-see decision y0 corresponding to the nominal scenario
w0 = 0, such that the total cost in scenario w0 is minimal.
The minimum nominal cost criterion leads to the following robust formu-
lation
min cTx+ dT y
s.t. x ∈ XR
y ∈ Y (x,w0)
(C.45)
where robustness is guranteed by XR.
To explain the concept of regret, the minimum perfect-information total
cost is
CP (w) = min
{
cTx+ dT y | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y (x,w)}
where w is known to the decision maker. For a fixed first-stage decision x,
the maximum regret is defined as
Reg(x) = max
w∈W
{
min
y∈Y (x,w)
{cTx+ dT y} − CP (w)
}
Definition C.7. (Min-max regret criterion) An optimal solution under the
min-max regret criterion is a pair of here-and-now decision x and wait-and-
see decision y(w), such that the worst-case regret under all possible scenarios
w ∈W is minimized.
The min-max regret cost criterion leads to the following robust formulation
min
x∈X
{
cTx+ max
w∈W
{
min
y∈Y (x,w)
dT y − min
x′∈X,y′∈Y (x,w)
{
cTx′ + dT y′
}}}
(C.46)
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In an ARO problem, we can naturally assume that the uncertainty set
is a polyhedron. To see this, if x is a robust solution under an uncertainty
set consists of discrete scenarios, i.e., W = {w1, w2, · · ·wS}, according to
Definition C.4, there exist corresponding {y1, y2, · · · yS} such that
By1 ≤ b−Ax− Cw1
By2 ≤ b−Ax− Cw2
...
ByS ≤ b−Ax− CwS
For non-negative weighting parameters λ1, λ2, · · · , λS ≥ 0,
∑S
s=1 λs = 1, we
have
S∑
s=1
λs(By
s) ≤
S∑
s=1
λs(b−Ax− Cws)
or equivalently
B
S∑
s=1
λsy
s ≤ b−Ax− C
S∑
s=1
λsw
s
indicating that for any w =
∑S
s=1 λsw
s ∈ conv({w1, w2, · · ·wS}), the
wait-and-see decision y =
∑S
s=1 λsy
s can recover all constraints, and thus
Y (x,w) 6= ∅. This property inspires the following proposition that is in anal-
ogy to Proposition C.2
Proposition C.3. Suppose x is a robust feasible solution for a discrete un-
certainty set {w1, w2, · · ·wS}, then it remains robust feasible if we replace the
uncertainty set with its convex hull.
Proposition C.3 also implies that in order to ensure the robustness of x, it
is sufficient to consider the extreme points of a bounded polytope. Suppose
the vertices of the polyhedral uncertainty set are ws, s = 1, 2, · · · , S. Consider
the following set
Ξ = {x, y1, y2, · · · , yS | Ax+Bys ≤ b− Cws, s = 1, 2, · · · , S} (C.47)
Robust feasible region XR is the projection of polyhedron Ξ on x-space, which
is also a polyhedron (Theorem B.2.5 in [10]).
Proposition C.4. If the uncertainty set has a finite number of extreme
points, set XR is a polytope.
Despite the nice theoretical properties, it is still difficult to solve an ARO
problem in its general form (C.42). There have been considerable efforts spent
on developing different approximations and approaches to tackle the compu-
tational challenges. We leave the solution methods of ARO problems to the
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next subsection. Here we demonstrate the benefit from postponing some de-
cisions to the second stage via a simple example taken from [1].
Consider an uncertain LP
min
x
x1
s.t. x2 ≥ 0.5ξx1 + 1 (aξ)
x1 ≥ (2− ξ)x2 (bξ)
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0 (cξ)
where ξ ∈ [0, ρ] is an uncertain parameter and ρ is a constant (level of un-
certainty) which may take a value in the open interval (0, 1).
In a static setting, both x1 and x2 must be independent of ξ. When ξ = ρ,
constraint (aξ) suggests x2 ≥ 0.5ρx1+1; when ξ = 0, constraint (bξ) indicates
x1 ≥ 2x2; as a result, we arrive at the conclusion x1 ≥ ρx1 +2, so the optimal
value in the static case satisfies
Opt ≥ x1 ≥ 2
1− ρ
Thus the optimal value tends to infinity when ρ approaches 1.
Now consider the adjustable case, in which x2 is a wait-and-see decision.
Let x2 = 0.5ξx1 + 1, (aξ) is always satisfied; substituting x2 in constraint
(bξ) yields:
x1 ≥ (2− ξ)(1
2
ξx1 + 1), ∀ξ ∈ [0, ρ]
Substituting x1 = 4 into above inequality we have
4 ≥ 2(2− ξ)ξ + 2− ξ,∀ξ ∈ [0, ρ]
This inequality can be certified by the fact that ξ ≥ 0 and ξ(2 − ξ) ≤ 1,
∀ξ ∈ R, indicating that x1 = 4 is a robust feasible solution. Therefore, the
optimal value should be no greater than 4 in the adjustable case for any ρ. The
difference of optimal values in two cases can go arbitrarily large, depending
on the value of ρ.
C.2.2 Affine Policy Based Approximation Model
ARO problem (C.42) is difficult to solve because the functional dependence
of the wait-and-see decision on w is arbitrary, and there lacks a closed-form
formula to characterize the optimal solution function y(w) or certify whether
Y (x,w) is empty or not. At this point, we consider to approximate the recurse
function y(w) using a simpler one, naturally, an affine function
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y(w) = y0 +Gw (C.48)
where y0 is the action in the second stage for the nominal scenario w = 0, and
G is the gain matrix to be designed. (C.48) is called a linear decision rule or
affine policy. It explicitly characterizes the wait-and-see decisions as an affine
function in the revealed uncertain data. The rationality for employing an
affine policy instead of other parametric ones is that it yields computationally
tractable robust counterpart reformulations. This finding is firstly reported
in [19].
To validate (C.44) under the linear decision rule, substituting (C.48) in
(C.43)
Ax+By0 + (BG+ C)w ≤ b, ∀w ∈W (C.49)
In (C.49), decision variables are x, y0, and G, which should be made before w
is known, and thus are here-and-now decisions. The wait-and-see decision (or
the incremental part) is naturally determined from (C.48) without further
optimization, and cost reduction is considered in the determination of gain
matrix G. (C.49) is in form of (C.6), and hence its robust counterpart can be
derived via the methods in Appendix C.1.2. Here we just provide the results
of polyhedral uncertainty as an example.
Suppose the uncertainty set is described by
W = {w | Sw ≤ h}
If we assume that y0 is the optimal second stage decision when w = 0, then
we have
Ax+By0 ≤ b
Furthermore, (C.49) must hold if
max
w∈W
(BG+ C)iw ≤ 0, ∀i (C.50)
where (·)i stands for the i-th row of the input matrix. According to LP duality
theory,
max
w∈W
(BG+ C)iw = min
Λi∈Πi
Λih, ∀i (C.51)
where Λ is a matrix consists of the dual variables, Λi is the i-th row of Λ and
also the dual variable of the i-th LP in (C.51), and the set
Πi = {Λi | Λi ≥ 0, ΛiS = (BG+ C)i}
is the feasible region of the i-th dual LP.
The minimization operator in the right-hand side of (C.51) can be omitted
if the objective is to seek a minimum. Moreover, if we adopt the minimum
nominal cost criterion, the ARO problem with a linear decision rule in the
second stage can be formulated as an LP
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min cTx+ dT y0
s.t. Ax+By0 ≤ b,Λh ≤ 0
Λ ≥ 0, ΛS = BG+ C
(C.52)
In (C.52), decision variables are vectors x and y0, gain matrix G and dual
matrix Λ. The constraints actually constitute a lifted formulation for XR
in (C.44). If the min-max cost criterion is employed, the objective can be
transformed into a linear inequality constraint with uncertainty via an epi-
graph form, whose robust form can be derived using similar procedures shown
above.
Affine policy based method is attractive because it reduces the conser-
vatism in the static RO approach by incorporating corrective actions, and
sustains computational tractability. In theory, the affine assumption more or
less restricts the adaptability in the recourse stage. Nevertheless, research
work in [20, 21, 22] shows that linear decision rules are indeed optimal or
near optimal for many practical problems.
For more information on other decision rules and their reformulations,
please see [1] (Chapter 14.3) for the quadratic decision rule, [23] for the
extended linear decision rule, [24, 25] for the piecewise constant decision rule
(finite adaptability), [26, 27] for the piecewise linear decision rule, and [28]
for generalized decision rules. The methods in [24, 27] can be used to cope
with integer wait-and-see decision variables. See also [4].
C.2.3 Algorithms for Fully Adjustable Models
Fully adjustable models are generally NP-hard [29]. To find the solution in
Definition C.2, the model is decomposed into a master problem and a sub-
problem, which are solved iteratively, and a sequence of lower bound and
upper bound of the optimal values are generated, until they get close enough
to each other. To explain the algorithm for ARO problems, we discuss two
instances.
1. Second-stage problem is an LP
Now we consider problem (C.42) without specific functional assumptions
on the wait-and-see variables. We start from the second-stage LP with fixed
x and w:
min
y
dT y
s.t. By ≤ b−Ax− Cw : u
(C.53)
where u is the dual variable, and the dual LP of (C.53) is
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max
u
uT (b−Ax− Cw)
s.t. BTu = d, u ≤ 0
(C.54)
If the primal LP (C.53) has a finite optimum, the dual LP (C.54) is also
feasible and has the same optimum; otherwise, if (C.53) is infeasible, then
(C.54) will be unbounded. Sometimes, an improper choice of x indeed leads
to an infeasible second-stage problem. To detect infeasibility, consider the
following LP with slack variables
min
y,s
1T s
s.t. s ≥ 0
By − Is ≤ b−Ax− Cw : u
(C.55)
Its dual LP is
max
u
uT (b−Ax− Cw)
s.t. BTu = 0, − 1 ≤ u ≤ 0
(C.56)
(C.55) and (C.56) are always feasible and have the same finite optimums. If
the optimal value is equal to 0, then LP (C.53) is feasible; otherwise, if the
optimal value is strictly positive, then LP (C.53) is infeasible.
For notation brevity, define feasible sets for the dual variable
UO = {u | BTu = d, u ≤ 0}
UF = {u | BTu = 0, − 1 ≤ u ≤ 0}
The former one is associated with the dual form (C.54) of the second-stage
optimization problem (C.53); the latter one corresponds to the dual form
(C.56) of the second-stage feasibility test problem (C.55).
Next, we proceed to the middle level with fixed x:
R(x) = max
w∈W
min
y∈Y (x,w)
dT y (C.57)
which is a linear max-min problem that identifies the worst-case uncertainty.
If LP (C.53) is feasible for an arbitrarily given value of w ∈ W , then we
conclude x ∈ XR defined in (C.44); otherwise, if LP (C.53) is infeasible for
some w ∈W , then x /∈ XR and R(x) = +∞.
To check whether x ∈ XR or not, we investigate the following problem
max
w
min
y,s
1T s
s.t. w ∈W, s ≥ 0
By − Is ≤ b−Ax− Cw : u
(C.58)
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It maximizes the minimum of (C.55) over all possible values of w ∈ W .
Since the minimums of (C.55) and (C.56) are equal, problem (C.58) is equiv-
alent to maximizing the optimal value of (C.56) over the uncertainty set W ,
leading to a bilinear program
r(x) = max
u,w
uT (b−Ax− Cw)
s.t. w ∈W, u ∈ UF
(C.59)
Because both W and UF are bounded, (C.59) must have a finite optimum.
Clearly, 0 ∈ UF , so r(x) must be non-negative. In fact, if r(x) = 0, then
x ∈ XR; if r(x) > 0, then x /∈ XR. With the duality transformation, the
opposite optimization operators in (C.58) come down to a traditional NLP.
For similar reasons, by replacing the second-stage LP (C.53) with its dual
LP (C.54), problem (C.57) is equivalent to the following bilinear program
r(x) = max
u,w
uT (b−Ax− Cw)
s.t. w ∈W, u ∈ UO
(C.60)
The fact that a linear max-min problem can be transformed as a bilinear
program using LP duality is reported in [30]. Bilinear programs can be locally
solved by general purpose NLP solvers, but the non-convexity prevents a
global optimal solution from being found easily. In what follows, we introduce
some methods that exploit specific features of the uncertainty set and are
widely used by the research community. In view that (C.59) and (C.60) only
differ in the dual feasibility set, we will use set U to refer either UF or UO in
the unified solution method.
a. General polytope
Suppose that the uncertainty set is described by
W = {w | Sw ≤ h}
An important feature in (C.59) and (C.60) is that the constraint set W
and U are separated and there is no constraint that involves w and u simul-
taneously, so the bilinear program can be considered in the following format
max
u∈U
uT (b−Ax) + max
w
(−uTCw)
s.t. Sw ≤ h : ξ
(C.61)
The bilinear term uTCw is non-convex. If we treat the second part maxw∈W (−uTCw)
as an LP in w where u is a parameter, whose KKT optimality condition is
given by
0 ≤ ξ⊥h− Sw ≥ 0
ST ξ + CTu = 0
(C.62)
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The stationary point of LCP (C.62) gives the optimal primal and dual so-
lutions simultaneously. As the uncertainty set is a bounded polyhedron, the
optimal solution must be bounded, and strong duality holds, so we can replace
−uTCw in the objective with a linear term hT ξ and additional constraints
in (C.62). Moreover, the complementarity and slackness condition in (C.62)
can be linearized via the method in Appendix B.3.5. In summary, problem
(C.61) can be solved via an equivalent MILP
max
u,w,ξ
uT (b−Ax) + hT ξ
s.t. u ∈ U, θ ∈ {0, 1}m
ST ξ + CTu = 0
0 ≤ ξ ≤M(1− θ)
0 ≤ h− Sw ≤Mθ
(C.63)
where m is the dimension of θ, and M is a large enough constant. Compared
with (C.61), non-convexity migrates from the objective function to the con-
straints with binary variables. The number of binary variables in (C.63) only
depends on the number of constraints in set W , and is independent of the
dimension of x.
Another heuristic method for bilinear programs in the form of (C.59) and
(C.60) is the mountain climbing method in [31], which is summarized in
Algorithm C.1
Algorithm C.1 : Mountain climbing
1: Choose a convergence tolerance ε > 0, and an initial w∗ ∈W ;
2: Solve the following LP with current w∗
R1 = max
u∈U
uT (b−Ax− Cw∗) (C.64)
The optimal solution is u∗ and the optimal value is R1;
3: Solve the following LP with current u∗
R2 = max
w∈W
(b−Ax− Cw)Tu∗ (C.65)
The optimal solution is w∗ and the optimal value is R2;
4: If R2−R1 ≤ ε, report the optimal value R2 as well as the optimal solution
w∗, u∗, and terminate; otherwise, go to step 2.
The optimal solutions of LPs must be found at one of the vertices of
its feasible region, hence w∗ ∈ vert(W ) and u∗ ∈ vert(U) hold. As its name
implies, the sequence of objective values generated by Algorithm C.1 is mono-
tonically increasing, until a local maximum is found [31]. The convergence
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is guaranteed by the finiteness of vert(U) and vert(W ). If we try multiple
initial points that are chosen elaborately and pick up the best one among the
returned results, the solution quality is often satisfactory. The key point is,
these initial points should span along most directions in the w-subspace. For
example, one may search the 2m points on the boundary of W in directions
±emi , i = 1, 2, · · · ,m, where m is the dimension of w, and emi is the i-th
column of an m ×m identity matrix. As LPs can be solved very efficiently,
Algorithm C.1 is especially suitable for the instances with very complicated
U and W , and usually outperforms general NLP solvers for bilinear programs
with disjoint constraints.
Algorithm C.1 is also valid if W is other convex set, say, an ellipsoid, and
converges to a local optimum in a finite number of iterations for a given
precision [32].
b. Cardinality constrained uncertainty set
A continuous cardinality constrained uncertainty set in the form of (C.14)
is a special class of the polyhedral case, see the transformation in (C.15).
Therefore, the previous method can be applied, and the number of inequalities
in the polyhedral form is 3m + 1, which is equal to the number of binary
variables in MILP (C.63). As revealed in Proposition C.3, for a polyhedral
uncertainty set, we can merely consider the extreme points.
Consider a discrete cardinality constrained uncertainty set
W =
{
w
∣∣∣∣∣wj = w
0
j + w
+
j z
+
j − w−j z−j ,∀j
∃ z+, z− ∈ Z
}
(C.66a)
Z =
z+, z−
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
z+, z− ∈ {0, 1}m
z+j + z
−
j ≤ 1, ∀j
1T (z+ + z−) ≤ Γ
 (C.66b)
where the budget of uncertainty Γ ≤ m is an integer. In (C.66a), each element
wj takes one of three possible values: w
0
j , w
0
j+w
+
j , and w
0
j−w−j , and at most Γ
of the m elements wj can take a value that is not equal to w
0
j . If the forecast
error is symmetric, i.e., w+j = w
−
j , then (C.66) is called symmetric as the
nominal scenario locates at the center of W . We discuss this case separately
because this representation allows to linearize the non-convexity in (C.59)
and (C.60) with fewer binary variables.
Expanding the bilinear term uTCw in an element-wise form
uTCw = uTCw0 +
∑
i
∑
j
(cijw
+
j uiz
+
j − cijw−j uiz−j )
where cij is the element of matrix C. Let
v+ij = uiz
+
j , v
−
ij = uiz
−
j , ∀i, ∀j
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the bilinear term can be expressed via a linear function. The product involving
a binary variable and a continuous variable can be linearized via the method
illuminated in Appendix B.2.2.
In conclusion, bilinear subproblems (C.59) and (C.60) can be solved via
MILP
max uT (b−Ax)− uTCw0 −
∑
i
∑
j
(cijw
+
j v
+
ij − cijw−j v−ij)
s.t. u ∈ U, {z+, z−} ∈ Z
0 ≤ v+ij − uj ≤M(1− z+j ),−Mz+j ≤ v+ij ≤ 0, ∀i,∀j
0 ≤ v−ij − uj ≤M(1− z−j ),−Mz−j ≤ v−ij ≤ 0, ∀i,∀j
(C.67)
where M = 1 for problem (C.59) since −1 ≤ u ≤ 0, and M is a sufficiently
large number for problem (C.60), because there is no clear bounds for the
dual variable u. The number of binary variables in MILP (C.67) is 2m, which
is less than that in (C.63) if the uncertainty set is replaced by its convex hull.
The number of additional continuous variables v+ij and v
−
ij is also moderate
since the matrix C is sparse.
Finally, we are ready to give the decomposition algorithm which is pro-
posed in [33]. In light of Proposition C.3, it is sufficient to consider the ex-
treme points w1, w2, · · · , wS in the uncertainty set, inspiring the following
epigraph formulation which is equivalent to (C.42)
min
x,ys,η
cTx+ η
s.t. x ∈ X
η ≥ dT ys, ∀s
Ax+Bys ≤ b− Cws,∀s
(C.68)
Recall (C.47), the last constraint is in fact a lifted formulation for XR. For
polytope and cardinality constrained uncertainty sets, the number of extreme
points are finite, but may grow exponentially in the dimension of uncertainty.
Actually, it is difficult and also unnecessary to enumerate every extreme
point, because most of them actually provide redundant constraints. A smart
method is to identify active scenarios which contribute binding constraints
in XR. This motivation has been widely used in complex optimization prob-
lems and formalized in Sect. C.1.3. The procedure of the adaptive scenario
generation algorithm for ARO is summarized in Algorithm C.2.
Algorithm C.2 converges in a finite number of iterations, which is bounded
by the number of extreme points of the uncertainty set. In practice, this al-
gorithm often converges in a few iterations, because problems (C.59) and
(C.60) always identify the most critical scenario that should be considered.
This is why we name the algorithm “adaptive scenario generation”. It is
called “constraint-and-column generation algorithm” in [33], because the
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Algorithm C.2 : Adaptive scenario generation
1: Choose a tolerance ε > 0, set LB = −∞, UB = +∞, iteration index
k = 0, and the critical scenario set O = w0;
2: Solve the following master problem
min
x,ys,η
cTx+ η
s.t. x ∈ X, η ≥ dT ys, s = 0, · · · , k
Ax+Bys ≤ b− Cws,∀ws ∈ O
(C.69)
The optimal solution is xk+1, ηk+1, and update LB = cTxk+1 + ηk+1;
3: Solve bilinear feasibility testing problem (C.59) with xk+1, the optimal
solution is wk+1, uk+1; if the optimal value rk+1 > 0, update O = O ∪
wk+1, and add a scenario cut
η ≥ dT yk+1, Ax+Byk+1 ≤ b− Cwk+1 (C.70)
with a new variable yk+1 to the master problem (C.69), update k ← k+1,
and go to Step 2;
4: Solve bilinear optimality testing problem (C.60) with xk+1, the optimal
solution is wk+1, uk+1, and the optimal value is Rk+1; update O = O ∪
wk+1 and UB = cTxk+1 + Rk+1, create scenario cut (C.70) with a new
variable yk+1.
5: If UB − LB ≤ ε, report the optimal solution, terminate; otherwise, add
the scenario cut in step 4 to the master problem (C.69), update k ← k+1,
and go to step 2;
numbers of decision variables (columns) and constraints increase simulta-
neously. Please note that the scenario cut streamlines the feasibility cut and
optimality cut used in the existing literature.
Bilinear subproblems (C.59) and (C.60) can be solved by the methods dis-
cussed previously, according to the form of the uncertainty set. In Algorithm
C.2, we utilize w to create scenario cuts, which are also called primal cuts.
In fact, the optimal dual variable u of (C.59) and (C.60) provides sensitiv-
ity information, and can be used to construct dual cuts, which is a single
inequality in the first-stage variable x. See Benders decomposition algorithm
in [29]. Since scenario cuts are much tighter than Benders cuts, Algorithm
C.2 is the most prevalent method for solving ARO problems.
If matrix A is uncertainty-dependent, the scenario constraints in the mas-
ter problem (C.69) becomes A(ws)x + Bys ≤ b − Cws, ∀ws, where A(ws)
is constant but varies in different scenarios; the objective function of bilin-
ear subproblems changes to uT [b − A(w)x − Cw], where x is given in the
subproblem. If A can be expressed as a linear function in w, the problem
structure remains the same, and previous methods are still valid. Even if the
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second-stage problem is an SOCP, the adaptive scenario generation frame-
work remains applicable, and the key procedure is to solve a max-min SOCP.
Such a model originates from the robust operation of a power distribution
network with uncertain generation and demand. By dualizing the inner-most
SOCP, the max-min SOCP is cast as a bi-convex program, which can be
globally or locally solved via an MISOCP or the mountain climbing method.
Recently, the duality theory of fully-adjustable robust optimization prob-
lem has been proposed in [34]. It has been shown that this kind of problem is
self-dual, i.e., the dual problem remains an ARO. However, solving the dual
problem may enjoy better efficiency. An extended CCG algorithm which al-
ways produces a feasible fist-stage decision (if one exists) is proposed in [35].
2. Second-stage problem is an MILP
Now we consider the case in which some of the wait-and-see decisions are
discrete. As what can be observed from the previous case, the most impor-
tant tasks in solving an ARO problem is to validate feasibility and optimality,
which can boil down to solving a linear max-min problem. When the wait-
and-see decisions are continuous and the second-stage problem is linear, LP
duality theory is applied such that the linear max-min problem is cast as
a traditional bilinear program. However, discrete variables appearing in the
second stage make the recourse problem a mixed-integer linear max-min prob-
lem with a non-convex inner level, preventing the use of LP duality theory.
As a result, validating feasibility and optimality becomes more challenging.
The compact form of an ARO problem with integer wait-and-see decisions
can be written as
min
x∈X
{
cTx+ max
w∈W
min
y,z∈Y (x,w)
dT y + gT z
}
(C.71)
where z is binary and depends on the exact value of w; the feasible region
Y (x,w) =
{
y, z
∣∣∣∣∣ By +Gz ≤ b−Ax− Cwy ∈ Rm1 , z ∈ Φ
}
where feasible set Φ = {z|z ∈ Bm2 , T z ≤ v}; m1 and m2 are dimensions of y
and z; T and v are constant coefficients; all coefficient matrices have compat-
ible dimensions. We assume that the uncertainty set W can be represented
by a finite number of extreme points. This kind of problem is studied in [36].
A nested constraint-and-column generation algorithm is proposed.
Different from the mainstream idea that directly solves a linear max-min
program as a bilinear program, the mixed-integer max-min program in (C.71)
is expanded to a tri-level problem
max
w∈W
min
z∈Φ
gT z + min
y
dT y
s.t. By ≤ b−Ax− Cw −Gz
(C.72)
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For the ease of discussion, we assume all feasible sets are bounded, because
decision variables of practical problems have physical bounds. By replacing
the innermost LP in variable y with its dual LP, problem (C.72) becomes
max
w∈W
{
min
z∈Φ
{
gT z + max
u∈U
uT (b−Ax− Cw −Gz)
}}
(C.73)
where u is the dual variable, and set U = {u | u ≤ 0, BTu = d}. Because
both w and z are expressed via binary variables, bilinear terms uTCw and
uTGz have linear representations by using the method in Appendix B.2.2.
Since Φ has a countable number of elements, problem (C.73) (in its linearized
version) has the same form as ARO problem (C.42), and can be solved by
Algorithm C.2. More exactly, write (C.73) into an epigraph form by enumer-
ating all possible elements z ∈ Φ, then perform Algorithm C.2 and identify
binding elements. In this way, the minimization operator in the middle level
is eliminated.
The nested adaptive scenario generation algorithm for ARO problem
(C.71) with mixed-integer recourses is summarized in Algorithm C.3. Be-
cause both W and Φ are finite sets with countable elements, Algorithm C.3
converges in a finite number of iterations. Notice that we do not distinguish
feasibility and optimality subproblems in above algorithm due to their sim-
ilarities. One can also introduce slack here-and-now variables in the second
stage and penalty terms in the objective function, such that the recourse
problem is always feasible. It should be pointed out that Algorithm C.3 in-
corporates double loops, and an MILP should be solved in each iteration in
the inner loop, so we’d better not expect too much on its efficiency. Nonethe-
less, it is the first systematic method to solve an ARO problem with integer
variables in the second stage. Another concept which should be clarified is
that although the second-stage discrete variable z is treated as scenario and
enumerated on the fly when solving problem (C.73) in step 3 (the inner loop),
it is a decision variable of the master problem (C.74) in the outer loop.
As a short conclusion, to overcome the limitation of traditional static RO
approaches which require all decisions should be made without exact infor-
mation on the underlying uncertainty, ARO employs a two-stage decision-
making framework and allows a subset of decision variables to be made after
the uncertain data are revealed. Under some special decision rules, compu-
tational tractability can be preserved. In fully adjustable cases, the ARO
problem can be solved by a decomposition algorithm. The subproblem comes
down to a (mixed-integer) linear max-min problem, which is generally chal-
lenging to solve. We introduce MILP reformulations for special classes of
uncertainty sets, which are compatible with commercial solvers, and help
solve an engineering optimization problem in a systematic way.
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Algorithm C.3 : Nested adaptive scenario generation
1: Choose a tolerance ε > 0, set LB = −∞, UB = +∞, iteration index
k = 0, and the critical scenario set O = w0;
2: Solve the following master problem
min
x,y,z,η
cTx+ η
s.t. x ∈ X
η ≥ dT ys + gT zs, zs ∈ Φ, s = 0, · · · , k
Ax+Bys +Gzs ≤ b− Cws, ∀ws ∈ O
(C.74)
The optimal solution is xk+1, ηk+1, and update LB = cTxk+1 + ηk+1;
3: Solve problem (C.73) with xk+1, the optimal solution is
(zk+1, wk+1, uk+1), and optimal value is Rk+1; update O = O ∪ wk+1,
UB = min{UB, cTxk+1 + Rk+1}, create new variables (yk+1, zk+1) and
scenario cuts
η ≥ dT yk+1 + gT zk+1, zk+1 ∈ Φ
Ax+Byk+1 +Gzk+1 ≤ b− Cwk+1 (C.75)
4: If UB −LB ≤ ε, terminate and report the optimal solution and optimal
value; otherwise, add scenario cuts (C.75) to the master problem (C.74),
update k ← k + 1, and go to step 2;
C.3 Distributionally Robust Optimization
Static and adjustable RO models presented in Sect. C.1 and Sect. C.2 do
not rely on specifying probability distributions of the uncertain data, which
are used in SO approaches for generating scenarios, evaluating probability of
constraint violation, or deriving analytic solutions for some specific problems.
Instead, RO design principle aims to cope with the worst-case scenario in a
pre-defined uncertainty set in the space of uncertain variables, which is a
salient distinction between these two approaches. If the exact probability
distribution is precisely known, optimal solutions to SO models would be less
conservative than the robust ones from the statistical perspective. However,
the optimal solution to SO models could have poor statistical performances
if the actual distribution is not identical to the designated one [37]. As for
the RO approach, as it hedges against the worst-case scenario, which rarely
happens in reality, the robust strategy could be conservative thus suboptimal
in most cases.
A method which aims to build a bridge connecting SO and RO approaches
is the DRO, whose optimal solutions are designed for the worst-case probabil-
ity distribution within a family of candidate distributions, which are described
by statistic information, such as moments, and structure properties, including
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symmetry, unimodality, and so on. This approach is generally less conserva-
tive than the traditional RO because dispersion effect of uncertainty is taken
into account, i.e., the probability of an extreme event is low. Meanwhile, the
statistic performances of the solution is less sensitive to the perturbation
in probability distributions than that of an SO model, as it hedges against
the worst distribution. Publications on this method have been proliferating
rapidly in the past few years. This section only sheds light on some most
representative methods which have been used in energy system studies.
C.3.1 Static Distributionally Robust Optimization
In analogy with the terminology used in Sect C.1, “static” means that all
decision variables are here-and-now type. Theoretical outcomes in this part
mainly come from [38]. A static DRO problem can be formulated as
min
x
cTx
s.t. x ∈ X
Pr
(
ai(ξ)
Tx ≤ bi(ξ), i = 1, · · · ,m
) ≥ 1− ε, ∀f(ξ) ∈ P (C.76)
where x is the decision variable, X is a closed and convex set that is inde-
pendent of the uncertain parameter, c is a deterministic vector, and ξ is the
uncertain data, whose probability density function f(ξ) is not known exactly,
and belongs to P, a set comprised of candidate distributions. Robust chance
constraint in (C.76) requires a finite number of linear inequalities depending
on ξ to be met with a probability of at least 1 − ε, regardless of the true
probability density function of ξ. We assume uncertain coefficients ai and bi
are linear functions in ξ, i.e.
ai(ξ) = a
0
i +
k∑
j=1
aji ξj
bi(ξ) = b
0
i +
k∑
j=1
bji ξj
where a0i , a
j
i are constant vectors and b
0
i , b
j
i are constant scalars. Define
yji (x) = (a
j
i )
Tx− bji , ∀i, ∀j
the chance constraint in (C.76) can be expressed via
Pr
(
y0i (x) + yi(x)
T ξ ≤ 0, i = 1, · · · ,m) ≥ 1− ε, ∀f(ξ) ∈ P (C.77)
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where vector yi(x) = [y
1
i (x), · · · , yki (x)]T is affine in x. Since the objective is
certain and constraint violation is bounded by a small probability, problem
(C.76) is also called a robust chance-constrained program.
Chance constraints can be transformed into tractable ones that are convex
in variable x only for a few special cases. For example, if ξ follows a Gaussian
distribution, ε ≤ 0.5, and m = 1, then the individual chance constraint
without distribution uncertainty is equivalent to a single SOC constraint
[39]. For m > 1, joint chance constraints form convex feasible region when the
right-hand side terms bi(ξ) are uncertain and follow a log-concave distribution
[38, 40], while coefficients ai, i = 1, · · · ,m are deterministic.
Constraint (C.77) is even more challenging at first sight: not only the
random vector ξ, but also the probability distribution function f(ξ) itself is
uncertain. Because in many practical situations, probability distribution must
be estimated from enough historical data, which may not be available at hand.
Typically, one may only have access to some statistical indicators about f(ξ),
e.g. its mean value, covariance, and support set. Using a specific f(ξ) ∈ P
may lead to over-optimistic solutions which fail to satisfy the probability
guarantee under the true distribution.
Similar to the paradigm in static RO, a prudent way to immunize a chance
constraint against uncertain probability distribution is to investigate the situ-
ation in the worst case, inspiring the following distributionally robust chance
constraint, which is equivalent to (C.77)
inf
f(ξ)∈P
Pr
(
y0i (x) + yi(x)
T ξ ≤ 0, i = 1, · · · ,m) ≥ 1− ε (C.78)
Clearly, if x satisfies (C.78), the probability of constraint violation is upper
bounded by ε for the true probability distribution of ξ.
This section introduces convex optimization models for approximating
robust chance constraints under uncertain probability distributions, whose
first- and second-order moments as well as the support set (or equivalently
the feasible region) of random variable are known. More precisely, we let
EP (ξ) = µ ∈ Rk be the mean value and EP ((ξ − µ)(ξ − µ)T ) = Σ ∈ Sk++ be
the covariance matrix of random variable ξ under the true distribution P .
We define the moment matrix
Ω =
[
Σ + µµT µ
µT 1
]
for ease of notation.
To help readers understand the fundamental ideas in DRO, we briefly
introduce the worst-case expectation problem, which will be used throughout
this section. Recall that P represents the set of all probability distributions
on Rk with mean vector µ and covariance matrix Σ  0,. the problem is
formulated by
θmP = sup
f(ξ)∈P
E
[
(g(ξ))+
]
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where g : Rk → R is a function of ξ; (g(ξ))+ means the maximum between 0
and g(ξ). Write the problem into an integral format
θmP = sup
f(ξ)∈P
∫
ξ∈Rk
max{0, g(ξ)}f(ξ)dξ
s.t. f(ξ) ≥ 0, ∀ξ ∈ Rk∫
ξ∈Rk
f(ξ)dξ = 1 : λ0∫
ξ∈Rk
ξf(ξ)dξ = µ : λ∫
ξ∈Rk
ξξT f(ξ)dξ = Σ + µµT : Λ
(C.79)
In problem (C.79), the decision variables are the values of f(ξ) over all
possible ξ ∈ Rk, so there are infinitely many decision variables, and prob-
lem (C.79) is an infinite-dimensional LP. The former two constraints enforce
f(ξ) to be a valid distribution function; the latter two ensure consistent first-
and second-order moments. The optimal solution gives the worst-case distri-
bution. However, it is difficult to solve (C.79) in its primal form. We now
associate dual variables λ0 ∈ R, λ ∈ Rk, and Λ ∈ Sk with each integral
constraint, and the dual problem of (C.79) can be constructed following the
duality theory of conic LP, which is given by
θmD = inf
λ0,λ,Λ
λ0 + µ
Tλ+ tr[ΛT (Σ + µµT )]
s.t. λ0 + ξ
Tλ+ tr[ΛT (ξξT )]
≥ max{0, g(ξ)},∀ξ ∈ Rk
(C.80)
To understand this dual form in (C.80), we can image a discrete version of
(C.79), in which ξ1, · · · , ξn are sampled scenarios of the uncertain parameter,
and their associated probabilities f(ξ1), · · · , f(ξn) are decision variables of
(C.79). Moreover, if we replace the integral arithmetic in the constraints with
the summation arithmetic, (C.79) comes down to a traditional LP, and its
dual is also an LP, where the constraint becomes
λ0 + ξ
T
i λ+ tr[Λ
T (ξiξ
T
i )] ≥ max{0, g(ξi)}, i = 1, · · · , n
Let n→ +∞ and ξ spread over Rk, we can get the dual problem (C.80).
Unlike the primal problem (C.79) that has infinite decision variables, the
dual problem (C.80) has finite variables and an infinite number of constraints.
In fact, we are optimizing over the coefficients of a polynomial in ξ. Because
Σ  0, Slater condition is met, and thus strong duality holds (this conclusion
can be found in many other literatures, such as [43]), i.e., θmP = θ
m
D . In the
following, we will eliminate ξ and reduce the constraint into convex ones in
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dual variables λ0, λ, and Λ. Recall the definition of matrix Ω, the compact
form of problem (C.80) can be expressed as
inf
M∈Sk+1
tr[ΩTM ]
s.t.
[
ξT 1
]
M
[
ξT 1
]T ≥ 0, ∀ξ ∈ Rk[
ξT 1
]
M
[
ξT 1
]T ≥ g(ξ), ∀ξ ∈ Rk
(C.81)
where the matrix decision variable is
M =
 Λ λ2λT
2
λ0

and the first constraint is equivalent to an LMI M  0.
A special case of the worst-case expectation problem is
θmP = sup
f(ξ)∈P
Pr[ξ ∈ S] (C.82)
which quantifies the maximum probability of the event ξ ∈ S, where S is
a Borel measurable set. This problem has a close relationship with general-
ized probability inequalities discussed in [43] and the generalized moments
problem studied in [44]. By defining an indicator function as
IS(ξ) =
{
1
0
if ξ ∈ S
otherwise
The dual problem of (C.82) can be written as
inf
M∈Sk+1
tr[ΩTM ]
s.t. M  0, [ξT 1]M [ξT 1] ≥ 1, ∀ξ ∈ S (C.83)
which is a special case of (C.81) when g(ξ) = IS(ξ).
Next we present how to formulate a robust chance constraint (C.78) as
convex constraints that can be recognized by convex optimization solvers.
1. Individual chance constraints
Consider a single robust chance constraint
inf
f(ξ)∈P
Pr
(
y0(x) + y(x)T ξ ≤ 0) ≥ 1− ε (C.84)
The feasible set in x is denoted by XSR.
To eliminate the optimization over function f(ξ), we leverage the con-
cept of conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) introduced by [45]. For a given loss
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function L(ξ) and tolerance ε ∈ (0, 1), the CVaR at level ε is defined as
CVaR(L(ξ), ε) = inf
β∈R
β +
1
ε
Ef(ξ)
(
[L(ξ)− β]+
)
(C.85)
where the expectation is taken over a given probability distribution f(ξ).
CVaR is the conditional expectation of loss greater than the (1− ε)-quantile
of the loss distribution. Indeed, condition
Pr [L(ξ) ≤ CVaR(L(ξ), ε)] ≥ 1− ε
holds regardless of the probability distribution and loss function L(ξ) [38].
Therefore, to certify Pr(L(ξ) ≤ 0) ≥ 1 − ε, a sufficient condition without
probability evaluation is CVaR(L(ξ), ε) ≤ 0, or more precisely:
sup
f(ξ)∈P
CVaR
(
y0(x) + y(x)T ξ, ε
) ≤ 0
=⇒ inf
f(ξ)∈P
Pr
(
y0(x) + y(x)T ξ ≤ 0) ≥ 1− ε (C.86)
According to (C.85), above worst-case CVaR can be expressed by
sup
f(ξ)∈P
CVaR
(
y0(x) + y(x)T ξ, ε
)
= sup
f(ξ)∈P
inf
β∈R
{
β +
1
ε
Ef(ξ)
([
y0(x) + y(x)T ξ − β]+)}
= inf
β∈R
{
β +
1
ε
sup
f(ξ)∈P
Ef(ξ)
([
y0(x) + y(x)T ξ − β]+)}
(C.87)
The maximization and minimization operators are interchangeable because
of the saddle point theorem in [46]. Recall previous analysis; the worst-case
expectation can be computed from problem
inf
β,M∈Sk+1
tr[ΩTM ]
s.t. M  0,[
ξT 1
]
M
[
ξT 1
] ≥ y0(x) + y(x)T ξ − β, ∀ξ ∈ Rk
The semi-infinite constraint has a matrix quadratic form
[
ξ
1
]T M −
 0 y(x)2y(x)T
2
y0(x)− β

[ξ1
]
≥ 0, ∀ξ ∈ Rk
which is equivalent to
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M −
 0 y(x)2y(x)T
2
y0(x)− β
  0
As a result, the worst-case CVaR can be calculated from an SDP
sup
f(ξ)∈P
CVaR
(
y0(x) + y(x)T ξ, ε
)
= inf
β,M
β +
1
ε
tr(ΩTM)
s.t. M  0
M 
 0 y(x)2y(x)T
2
y0(x)− β

(C.88)
It is shown that the indicator ⇒ in (C.86) is in fact an equivalence ⇔ [38]
in static DRO. In conclusion, robust chance constraint (C.84) can be written
as a convex set in variable x, β, and M as follows
XSR =

x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∃β ∈ R, M  0 such that
β +
1
ε
tr(ΩTM) ≤ 0
M 
 0 y(x)2y(x)T
2
y0(x)− β


(C.89)
2. Joint chance constraints
Now consider the joint robust chance constraints
inf
f(ξ)∈P
Pr
(
y0i (x) + yi(x)
T ξ ≤ 0, i = 1, · · · ,m) ≥ 1− ε (C.90)
The feasible set in x is denoted by XJR.
Let α be the vector of strictly positive scaling parameters, and A =
{α | α > 0}. It is clear that constraint
inf
f(ξ)∈P
Pr
[
max
i=1,··· ,m
{
αi
(
y0i (x) + yi(x)
T ξ
)} ≤ 0] ≥ 1− ε (C.91)
imposes the same feasible region in variable x as (C.90). Nonetheless, it turns
out that parameter αi can be co-optimized to improve the quality of the
convex approximation for XJR. (C.91) is a single robust chance constraint,
and can be conservatively approximated by a worst-case CVaR constraint
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sup
f(ξ)∈P
CVaR
[
max
i=1,··· ,m
{
αi
(
y0i (x) + yi(x)
T ξ
)}
, ε
]
≤ 0 (C.92)
It defines a feasible region in variable x with auxiliary parameter α ∈ A,
which is denoted by XJR(α). Clearly, X
J
R(α) ⊆ XJR, ∀α ∈ A. Unlike (C.88),
condition (C.92) is α-dependent.
By observing the fact that[
ξT 1
]
M
[
ξT 1
] ≥ max
i=1,··· ,m
{
αi
(
y0i (x) + yi(x)
T ξ
)}− β, ∀ξ ∈ Rk
⇐⇒ [ξT 1]M [ξT 1] ≥ αi (y0i (x) + y(x)Ti ξ)− β, ∀ξ ∈ Rk, i = 1, · · · ,m
⇐⇒M −
 0 αiyi(x)2αiyi(x)T
2
αiy
0
i (x)− β
  0, i = 1, · · · ,m
and employing the optimization formulation of the worst-case expectation
problem, the worst-case CVaR in (C.92) can be calculated by
J(x, α) = sup
f(ξ)∈P
CVaR
[
max
i=1,··· ,m
{
αi
(
y0i (x) + yi(x)
T ξ
)}
, ε
]
= inf
β∈R
{
β +
1
ε
sup
f(ξ)∈P
Ef(ξ)
([
max
i=1,··· ,m
{
αi
(
y0i (x) + yi(x)
T ξ
)}− β]+)}
= inf
β,M
β + 1ε tr(ΩTM)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ s.t. M  0, M 
 0 αiyi(x)2αiyi(x)T
2
y0i (x)− β
 ,∀i

(C.93)
In conclusion, for any fixed α ∈ A, the worst-case CVaR constraint (C.92)
can be written as a convex set in variables x, β, and M as follows
XJR(α) =

x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∃β ∈ R, M  0 such that
β +
1
ε
tr(ΩTM) ≤ 0
M 
 0 αiyi(x)2αiyi(x)T
2
y0i (x)− β
 ,∀i

(C.94)
Moreover, it is revealed in [38] that the union
⋃
α∈AX
J
R(α) gives an exact
description of XJR, which indicates that the original robust chance constrained
program
min
x
{
cTx
∣∣ s.t. x ∈ X ∩XJR} (C.95)
and the worst-case CVaR formulation
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min
x,α
{
cTx
∣∣ s.t. x ∈ X ∩XJR(α), α ∈ A}
or equivalently
min
x,α
{
cTx
∣∣ s.t. x ∈ X, α ∈ A, J(x, α) ≤ 0} (C.96)
have the same optimal value. The constraints of (C.96) contain bilinear ma-
trix inequalities, which means that if either x or α is fixed, J(x, α) ≤ 0 in
(C.96) can come down to LMIs, however, when both x and α are variables,
the constraint is non-convex, making problem (C.96) difficult to solve. In
view of the biconvex feature [32], a sequential convex optimization procedure
is presented to find an approximated solution.
Algorithm C.4
1: Choose a convergence tolerance ε > 0; Let the iteration counter k = 1,
x0 ∈ X ∩XJR(α) be a feasible solution for some α and f0 = cTx0;
2: Solve the following subproblem with input xk−1
min
α
{J(x, α) | s.t. α ≥ δ1} (C.97)
where 1 denotes the all-one vector with a compatible dimension, and
δ > 0 is a small constant; the worst-case CVaR functional is defined in
(C.93). The optimal solution is αk;
3: Solve the following master problem with input αk
min
x
{
cTx | s.t. x ∈ X, J(x, αk) ≤ 0} (C.98)
The optimal solution is xk and the optimal value is fk;
4: If |fk − fk−1|/|fk−1| ≤ ε, terminate and report the optimal solution xk;
otherwise, update k ← k + 1, and go to step 2.
The main idea of this algorithm is to identify the best feasible regionXJR(α)
through successively solving the subproblem (C.97), and therefore improving
the objective value. The performance of Algorithm C.4 is intuitively explained
below.
Because parameter α is optimized in the subproblem (C.97) given the
value xk, there must be J(xk, αk+1) ≤ J(xk, αk) ≤ 0, ∀k, demonstrating
that xk is a feasible solution of the master problem (C.98) in iteration k+ 1;
therefore, the optimal values of (C.98) in two consecutive iterations satisfy
cTxk+1 ≤ cTxk, as the objective evaluated at the optimal solution xk+1
in iteration k + 1 deserves a value no greater than that is incurred at any
feasible solution. In this regard, the optimal value sequence fk, k = 1, 2, · · ·
is monotonically decreasing. If X is bounded, the optimal solution sequence
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xk is also bounded, and the optimal value converges. Algorithm C.4 does
not necessarily find the global optimum of problem (C.96). Nevertheless, it
is desired by practical problems due to its robustness since it involves only
convex optimization.
In many practical applications, the uncertain data ξ is known to be within
a strict subset of Rk, which is called the support set. We briefly outline how to
incorporate the support set in the distributionally robust chance constraints.
We assume the support set Ξ is the intersection of a finite number of ellipsoids,
i.e.
Ξ =
{
ξ ∈ Rk ∣∣ ξTWiξ ≤ 1, i = 1, · · · , l} (C.99)
where Wi ∈ Sk+, i = 1, · · · , l, and we have Pr(ξ ∈ Ξ) = 1. Let PΞ be the set of
all candidate probability distributions supported on Ξ which have identical
first- and second-order moments.
Consider the worst-case expectation problem (C.79). If we replace P with
PΞ, the constraints of the dual problem (C.80) become[
ξT 1
]
M
[
ξT 1
]T ≥ 0, ∀ξ ∈ Ξ (C.100)[
ξT 1
]
M
[
ξT 1
]T ≥ g(ξ), ∀ξ ∈ Ξ (C.101)
According to (C.99), 1−ξTWiξ must be non-negative if and only if ξ ∈ Ξ, and
hence a sufficient condition for (C.100) is the existence of constants τi ≥ 0,
i = 1, · · · , l, such that
[
ξT 1
]
M
[
ξT 1
]T − l∑
i=1
τi
(
1− ξTWiξ
) ≥ 0 (C.102)
Under this condition, as long as ξ ∈ Ξ, we have
[
ξT 1
]
M
[
ξT 1
]T ≥ l∑
i=1
τi
(
1− ξTWiξ
) ≥ 0
Arrange (C.102) as a matrix quadratic form
[
ξT 1
](
M −
l∑
i=1
τi
[−Wi 0
0T 1
])[
ξ
1
]
≥ 0, ∀ξ ∈ Rk
As a result, (C.100) can be reduced to an LMI in variables M and τ
M −
l∑
i=1
τi
[−Wi 0
0T 1
]
 0 (C.103)
For similar reasons, by letting g(ξ) = y0(x) + y(x)T ξ − β, (C.101) can be
conservatively approximated by the following LMI
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M −
l∑
i=1
τi
[−Wi 0
0T 1
]

[
0 12y(x)
1
2y(x)
T y0(x)− β
]
(C.104)
In fact, (C.103) and (C.104) are special cases of S-Lemma. Based upon these
outcomes, most formulations in this section can be extended to consider the
bounded support set Ξ in the form of (C.99). For polyhedral and some special
classes of convex support sets, one may utilize the nonlinear Farkas lemma
(Lemma 2.2 in [38]) to derive tractable reformulations.
C.3.2 Adjustable Distributionally Robust Optimization
As explained in Appendix C.1, the traditional static RO encounters difficul-
ties in dealing with equality constraints. This plight remains in the DRO
approach following a static setting. Consider x + ξ = 1 where ξ ∈ [0, 0.1]
is uncertain, while its mean and variance are known. For any given x∗, the
worst-case probability inff(ξ)∈P Pr[x∗ + ξ = 1] = 0, because one can always
find a feasible probability distribution function f(ξ) that satisfies the first-
and second-order moment constraints, whereas f(1− x∗) = 0.
To vanquish this difficulty, it is necessary to incorporate wait-and-see deci-
sions. A simple remedy is to impose an affine recourse policy without involv-
ing optimization in the second stage, giving rise to an affine-adjustable RO
with distributional uncertainty and linear decision rule, which can be solved
by the method in Appendix C.3.1.
This section aims to investigate the following adjustable DRO with com-
pletely flexible wait-and-see decisions
min
x∈X
{
cTx+ sup
f(w)∈P
Ef(w)Q(x,w)
}
(C.105)
where x is the first-stage (here-and-now) decision, and X is its feasible set;
the uncertain parameter is denoted by w; the probability distribution f(w)
belongs to the Chebyshev ambiguity set (whose first- and second-order mo-
ments are known)
P =

f(w)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f(w) ≥ 0, ∀w ∈W∫
w∈W
f(w)dw = 1∫
w∈W
wf(w)dw = µ∫
w∈W
wwT f(w)dw = Θ

(C.106)
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supported on W = {w | (w − µ)TQ(w − µ) ≤ Γ}, where matrix Θ = Σ +
µµT represents the second-order moment; µ is the mean value and Σ is the
covariance matrix. The expectation in (C.105) is taken over the worst-case
f(w) in P, and the second-stage problem under fixed x and w is an LP
Q(x,w) = min
y∈Y (x,w)
dT y (C.107)
Q(x,w) is its optimal value function under fixed x and w. The feasible set of
the second-stage problem is
Y (x,w) = {y | By ≤ b−Ax− Cw}
Matrices A, B, C and vectors b, c, d are constant coefficients in the model. We
assume that the second-stage problem is always feasible, i.e., ∀x ∈ X, ∀w ∈
W : Y (x,w) 6= ∅ and is bounded, and thus Q(x,w) has a finite optimal value.
This can be implemented by introducing wait-and-see type slack variables and
adding penalties in the objective of (C.107).
The difference between problems (C.42) and (C.105) stems from the de-
scriptions of uncertainty and the criteria in the objective function: more in-
formation of the dispersion effect, such as the covariance matrix, is taken into
account in the latter one, and the objective function in (C.105) is an expec-
tation reflecting the statistical behavior of the second-stage cost, rather than
the one in (C.42) which is associated with only a single worst-case scenario,
and leaves the performances in all other scenarios un-optimized. Because the
probability distribution is uncertain, it is prudent to investigate the worst-
case outcome in which the expected cost of the second stage is maximized.
This formulation is advantageous in several ways: first, the requirement on
the exact probability distribution is not necessary, and the optimal solution is
insensitive to the family of distributions with common mean and covariance;
second, the dispersion of the uncertainty is also taken into account, which
helps reduce model conservatism: since the variance is fixed, a scenario that
leaves far away from the forecast would have a low probability; finally, it is
often important to tackle the tail effect, which indicates that the occurrence
of a rare event may induce heavy losses in spite of its low probability. Such
phenomenon is naturally taken into account in (C.105). In what follows, we
outline the method proposed in [48] to solve the adjustable DRO problem
(C.105). A slight modification is that an ellipsoid support set is considered.
1. The worst-case expectation problem
We consider the following worst-case expectation problem with a fixed x
sup
f(w)∈P
Ef(w)Q(x,w) (C.108)
According to the discussions for problem (C.79), the dual problem of
(C.108) is
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min
H,h,h0
tr(HTΘ) + µTh+ h0
s.t. wTHw + hTw + h0 ≥ Q(x,w), ∀w ∈W
(C.109)
where H, h, h0 are dual variables. Nevertheless, the optimal value function
Q(x,w) is not given in a closed form. From the LP duality theory
Q(x,w) = max
u∈U
uT (b−Ax− Cw)
where u is the dual variable of LP (C.107), and its feasible set is given by
U = {u | BTu = d, u ≤ 0}
Because we have assumed that Q(x,w) is bounded, the optimal solution of
the dual problem can be found at one of the extreme points of U , i.e.,
∃u∗ ∈ vert(U) : Q(x,w) = (b−Ax− Cw)Tu∗ (C.110)
where vert(U) = {u1, u2, · · · , uNE} stands for the vertices of polyhedron
U , and NE = |vert(U)| is the cardinality of vert(U). In view of this, the
constraint of (C.109) can be expressed as
wTHw + hTw + h0 ≥ (b−Ax− Cw)Tui, ∀w ∈W, i = 1, · · · , NE
Recall the definition of W ; a certification for above condition is
wTHw + hTw + h0 − (b−Ax− Cw)Tui
≥ λ[Γ− (w − µ)TQ(w − µ)] ≥ 0, ∀w ∈ Rk, i = 1, · · · , NE
which has the following compact matrix form[
w
1
]T
M i
[
w
1
]
≥ 0,∀w ∈ Rk, i = 1, · · · , NE (C.111)
where
M i =
 H + λQ h− C
Tui
2
− λQµ
hT − (ui)TC
2
− λµTQ h0 − (b−Ax)Tui − λ(Γ− µTQµ)
 (C.112)
and (C.111) simply reduces to M i  0, i = 1, · · · , NE .
Finally, problem (C.109) comes down to the following SDP
min
H,h,h0,λ
tr(HTΘ) + µTh+ h0
s.t. M i(H,h, h0, λ)  0, i = 1, · · · , NE
λ ∈ R+
(C.113)
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where M i(H,h, h0, λ) is defined in (C.112). Above results can be readily
extended if the support set is the intersection of ellipsoids.
2. Adaptive constraint generation algorithm
Due to the positive semi-definiteness of the covariance matrix Σ, the dual-
ity gap between problems (C.108) and (C.109) is zero [48], and hence we can
replace the worst-case expectation in (C.105) with its dual form, yielding
min cTx+ tr(HTΘ) + µTh+ h0
s.t. M i(H,h, h0, λ)  0, i = 1, · · · , NE
x ∈ X, λ ∈ R+
(C.114)
Problem (C.114) is an SDP. However, the number of vertices in set U
(|vert(U)|) may increase exponentially in the dimension of U . It is non-trivial
to enumerate all of them. However, because of weak duality, only the one
which is optimal in the dual problem provides an active constraint, as shown
in (C.110), and the rest are redundant inequalities. To identify the critical
vertex in (C.110), we solve problem (C.114) in iterations: in the master prob-
lem, a subset of vert(U) is used to formulate a relaxation, then check whether
the following constraint
wTHw + hTw + h0 ≥ (b−Ax− Cw)Tu, ∀w ∈W, ∀u ∈ U (C.115)
is fulfilled. If yes, the relaxation is exact and the optimal solution is found;
otherwise, find a new vertex of U at which constraint (C.115) is violated,
and then add a cut to the master problem so as to tighten the relaxation,
till constraint (C.115) is satisfied. The flowchart is summarized in Algorithm
C.5.
Algorithm C.5 terminates in a finite number of iterations which is bounded
by |vert(U)|. Actually, it will converge within a few iterations, because the
sub-problem (C.117) in step 3 always identifies the most critical vertex in
vert(U). It is worth mentioning that the subproblem (C.117) is a non-convex
program. Despite that it can be solved by general NLP solvers, we suggest
three approaches with different computational complexity and optimality
guarantees.
1. If the support set W = Rk, it can be verified that matrix Mi becomes H h+ C
Tui
2
(h+ CTui)T
2
h0 − (b−Ax)Tui
  0
Then there must be H  0, and non-convexity appears in the bilinear term
uTCw. In such circumstance, problem (C.117) can be solved via a mountain
climbing method similar to Algorithm C.1 (but here the mountain is actually
a pit because the objective is to be minimized).
C.4 Data-driven Robust Stochastic Program 133
Algorithm C.5
1: Choose a convergence tolerance  > 0 and an initial vertex set VE ⊆
vert(U).
2: Solve the following master problem
min cTx+ tr(HTΘ) + µTh+ h0
s.t. M i(H,h, h0, λ)  0, ∀ui ∈ VE
x ∈ X, λ ∈ R+
(C.116)
The optimal value is R∗, and the optimal solution is (x∗, H, h, h0).
3: Solve the following sub-problem with obtained (x∗, H, h, h0)
min
w,u
wTHw + hTw + h0 − (b−Ax∗ − Cw)Tu
s.t. w ∈W, u ∈ U
(C.117)
The optimal value is r∗, and the optimal solution is u∗and w∗.
4: If r∗ ≥ −ε, terminate and report the optimal solution x∗and the optimal
value R∗; otherwise, VE = VE ∪ u∗, add an LMI cut M(H,h, h0, λ)  0
associated with the current u∗ to the master problem (C.116), and go to
step 2.
2. In the case that W is an ellipsoid, above iterative approach is still
applicable; however, the w-subproblem in which w is to be optimized may
become non-convex because H may be indefinite. Since u is fixed in the w-
subproblem, non-convex term wTHw can be decomposed as the difference of
two convex functions as wT (H + αI)w − αwTw, where α is a constant such
that H + αI is positive-definite, and the w-subproblem can be solved by the
convex-concave procedure elaborated in [47], or any existing NLP solver.
3. As a non-convex QP, problem (C.117) can be globally solved by the
MILP method presented in Appendix A.4. This method could be time con-
suming with the growth in problem sizes.
C.4 Data-driven Robust Stochastic Program
Most classical SO methods assume that the probability distribution of un-
certain factors is exactly known, which is an input of the problem. However,
such information heavily relies on historical data, and may not be available at
hand or accurate enough. Using an inaccurate distribution in a classical SO
model could lead to biased results. To cope with ambiguous probability distri-
butions, a natural way is to consider a set of possible candidates derived from
available data, instead of a single distribution, just as the moment-inspired
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ambiguity set used in DRO. In this section, we investigate some useful SO
models with distributional uncertainty described by divergence ambiguity
sets, which is referred to as robust SO. When the distribution is discrete, the
distributional uncertainty is interpreted by the perturbation of probability
value associated with each scenario; when the distribution is continuous, the
distance of two density functions should be specified first. In this section, we
consider Φ-divergence and Wasserstein metric based ambiguity sets.
C.4.1 Robust Chance Constrained Stochastic Program
We introduce robust chance-constrained stochastic programs with distribu-
tional robustness. The ambiguous PDF is modeled based on φ-divergence,
and the optimal solution provides constraint feasibility guarantee with de-
sired probability even in the worst-case distribution. In short, the underlying
problem possesses the following features:
1) The PDF is continuous and the constraint violation probability is a
functional.
2) Uncertain parameters do not explicitly appear in the objective function.
Main results of this section come from [49].
1. Problem formulation
In a traditional chance-constrained stochastic linear program, the decision
maker seeks a cost-minimum solution at which some certain constraints can
be met with a given probability, yielding:
min cTx
s.t. Pr[C(x, ξ)] ≥ 1− α
x ∈ X
(C.118)
where x is the vector of decision variables; ξ is the vector of uncertain parame-
ters, and the exact (joint) probability distribution is apparent to the decision
maker; vector c represents the cost coefficients; X is a polyhedron that is
independent of ξ; α is the risk level or the maximum allowed probability of
constraint violation; C(x, ξ) collects all uncertainty dependent constraints,
whose general form is given by
C(x, ξ) = {ξ | ∃y : A(ξ)x+B(ξ)y ≤ b(ξ)} (C.119)
where A, B, b are constant coefficient matrices that may contain uncertain
parameters; y is a recourse action that can be made after ξ is known. In the
presence of y, we call (C.118) a two-stage problem; otherwise, it is a single-
stage problem if y is null. We don’t consider the cost of recourse actions in
the objective function in its current form. In case of need, we can add the
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second-stage cost dT y(ξ) in the objective function, and ξ is a specific scenario
which y(ξ) corresponds to; for instance, robust optimization may consider a
max-min cost scenario or a max-min regret scenario; traditional SO often
tackles the expected second-stage cost E[dT y(ξ)]. We leave it to the end of
this section to discuss how to deal with the second-stage cost in the form
of worst-case expectation like (C.108), and show that the problem can be
convexified under some technical assumptions.
In the chance constraint, for a given x, the probability of constraint satis-
faction can be evaluated for a particular probability distribution of ξ. Tradi-
tional studies on chance-constrained programs often assume that the distri-
bution of ξ is perfectly known. However, this assumption can be very strong
because it requires a lot of historical data. Moreover, the optimal solution
may be sensitive to the true distribution and thus highly suboptimal in prac-
tice. To overcome these difficulties, a prudent method is to consider a set
of probability distributions belonging to a pre-specified ambiguity set D,
and require that the chance constraint should be satisfied under all possi-
ble distributions in D, resulting in the following robust chance-constrained
programming problem:
min cTx
s.t. inf
f(ξ)∈D
Pr[C(x, ξ)] ≥ 1− α
x ∈ X
(C.120)
where f(ξ) is the probability density function of random variable ξ.
The ambiguity set D in (C.120) which includes distributional information
can be constructed in a data-driven fashion, such as the moment based ones
used in Appendix C.3. Please see [57] for more information on establishing
D based on moment data and other structural properties, such as symmetry
and unimodality. The tractability of (C.120) largely depends on the form
of D. For example: if D is built on the mean value and covariance matrix
(which is called a Chebyshev ambiguity set), a single robust chance constraint
can be reformulated as an LMI and a set of joint robust chance constraints
can be approximated by BMIs [38]; probability of constraint violation under
more general moment based ambiguity sets can be evacuated by solving conic
optimization problems [57].
A shortcoming of moment description is that it does not provide a direct
measure on the distance between the candidate PDFs in D and a reference
distribution. Two PDFs with the same moments may differ a lot in other as-
pects. Furthermore, the worst-case distribution corresponding to a Chebyshev
ambiguity set always puts more weights away from the mean value, subject
to the variance. As such, the long-tail effect is a source of conservatism. In
this section, we consider the confidence set built around a reference distri-
bution. The motivation is: the decision maker may have some knowledge on
136 C Basics of Robust Optimization
what distribution the uncertainty follows, although such a distribution could
be inexact, and the true density function would not deviate far away from it.
To describe distributional ambiguity in term of a PDF, the first problem is
how to characterize the distance between two functions. One common mea-
sure on the distance between density functions is the φ-divergence, which is
defined as [58]
Dφ(f‖f0) =
∫
Ω
φ
(
f(ξ)
f0(ξ)
)
f0(ξ)dξ (C.121)
where f and f0 stand for the particular density function and the estimated
one (or the reference distribution), respectively; function φ satisfies:
(C1) φ(1) = 0
(C2) 0φ(x/0) =
{
x limp→+∞ φ(p)/p if x > 0
0 if x = 0
(C3) φ(x) = +∞ for x < 0
(C4) φ(x) is a convex function on R+
It is proposed in [58] that the ambiguity set can be built as:
D = {P : Dφ(f‖f0) ≤ d, f = dP/dξ} (C.122)
where the tolerance d can be adjusted by the decision maker according to
their attitudes towards risks. The ambiguity set in (C.122) can be denoted as
Dφ, without causing confusion with the definition of φ-divergence Dφ(f‖f0).
Compared to the moment-based ambiguity sets, especially the Chebyshev
ambiguity set, where only the first- and second-order moments are involved,
the density based description captures the overall profile of the ambiguous
distribution, so may hopefully provide less conservative solutions. However, it
hardly guarantees consistent moments. Which one is better depends on data
availability: if we are more confident on the reference distribution, (C.122)
may be better; otherwise, if we only have limited statistic information such as
mean and variance, then the moment-based ones are more straightforward.
Many commonly seen divergence measures are special cases of φ-divergence,
coinciding with a particular choice of function φ. Some examples are given in
Table C.2 [59]. In what follows, we will use the KL-divergence. According to
its corresponding function φ, the KL-divergence is given by
Dφ(f‖f0) =
∫
Ω
log
(
f(ξ)
f0(ξ)
)
f(ξ)dξ (C.123)
Before presenting the main results in [49], the definition of conjugate du-
ality is given. For a univariate function g : R → R ∪ {+∞}, its conjugate
function g∗ : R→ R ∪ {+∞} is defined as
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Table C.2 Instances of φ-divergences
Divergence function φ(x)
KL-divergence x log x− x+ 1
reverse KL-divergence − log x
Hellinger distance (
√
x− 1)2
Variation distance |x− 1|
J-divergence (x− 1) log x
χ2 divergence (x− 1)2
α-divergence

4
1− α2
(
1− x(1+α)/2) If α 6= ±1
x lnx If α = 1
− lnx If α = −1
g∗(t) = sup
x∈R
{tx− g(x)}
For a valid function φ for φ-divergence satisfying (C1)-(C4), its conjugate
function φ∗ is convex, nondecreasing, and the following condition holds [49]
φ∗(x) ≥ x (C.124)
Besides, if φ∗ is a finite constant on a closed interval [a, b], then it is a finite
constant on the interval (−∞, b].
2. Equivalent formulation
It is revealed in [49] that when the confidence set D is constructed based
on φ-divergence, robust chance constrained program (C.120) can be easily
transformed into a traditional chance-constrained program (C.118) at the
reference distribution by calibrating the confidence tolerance α.
Theorem C.1. [49] Let P0 be the cumulative distribution function generated
by density function f0, then the robust chance constraint
inf
P(ξ)∈{Dφ(f‖f0)≤d}
Pr[C(x, ξ)] ≥ 1− α (C.125)
constructed based on φ-divergence is equivalent to a traditional chance con-
straint
Pr0[C(x, ξ)] ≥ 1− α′+ (C.126)
where Pr0 means that the probability is evaluated at the reference distribution
P0, α′+ = max{α′, 0}, and α′ can be computed by
α′ = 1− inf
z∈Z
{
φ∗(z0 + z)− z0 − αz + d
φ∗(z0 + z)− φ∗(z0)
}
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where
Z =
{
z
∣∣∣∣∣ z > 0, z0 + piz ≤ lφm(φ∗) ≤ z + z0 ≤ m(φ∗)
}
In above formula, constants lφ = limx→+∞ φ(x)/x, m(φ∗) = inf{m : φ∗(m) =
+∞}, m(φ∗) = sup{m : φ∗ is a finite constant on (−∞,m]}, Table C.3
summarizes the values of these parameters for typical φ-divergence measures,
and
pi =

−∞ if Leb{[f0 = 0]} = 0
0 if Leb {[f0 = 0]} > 0 and Leb{[f0 = 0]\C(x, ξ)} = 0
1 otherwise
where Leb{·} is the Lebesgue measure on RDim(ξ).
Table C.3 Values of lφ, m(φ∗), and m(φ∗) for φ-divergences
φ-Divergence lφ m(φ∗) m(φ∗)
KL-divergence +∞ −∞ +∞
Hellinger distance 1 −∞ 1
Variation distance 1 −1 1
J-divergence +∞ −∞ +∞
χ2 divergence +∞ −2 +∞
The values of α′ for the Variation distance and the χ2 divergence have
analytical expressions; for the KL divergence, α′ can be computed from one-
dimensional line search. Results are shown in Table C.4.
Table C.4 Values of α′ for some φ-divergences
φ-Divergence α′
χ2 divergence α′ = α−
√
d2 + 4d(α− α2)− (1− 2α)d
2d+ 2
Variation distance α′ = α− 1
2
d
KL-divergence α′ = 1− infx∈(0,1)
{
e−dx1−α − 1
x− 1
}
For the KL divergence, calculating α′ entails solving infx∈(0,1) h(x) where
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h(x) =
e−dx1−α − 1
x− 1
Its first-order derivative is given by
h′(x) =
1− αe−dx1−α − (1− α)e−dx−α
(x− 1)2 , ∀x ∈ (0, 1)
To claim the convexity of h(x), we need to show that h′(x) is an increasing
function in x ∈ (0, 1). To this end, first notice that the denominator (x− 1)2
is a decreasing function in x on the open interval (0, 1); then we can show
the numerator is an increasing function in x, because its first-order derivative
gives
(1−αe−dx1−α−(1−α)e−dx−α)′x = α(1−α)e−d(x−α−1−x−α) > 0, ∀x ∈ (0, 1)
Hence h′(x) is monotonically increasing, and h(x) is a convex function in
x. Moreover, because h′(x) is continuous in (0, 1), and limx→0+ h′(x) = −∞,
limx→1− h′(x) = +∞, there must be some x∗ ∈ [δ, 1−δ] such that h′(x∗) = 0,
i.e., the infimum of h(x) is attainable. The minimum of h(x) can be calcu-
lated by solving a nonlinear equation h′(x) = 0 via Newton’s method, or a
derivative-free line search, such as the golden section search algorithm. Either
scheme is computationally inexpensive.
Finally, we discuss the connection between the modified tolerance α′ and
its original value α. Because a set of distributions are considered in (C.125),
the threshold in (C.126) should be greater than the original one, i.e., 1−α′ ≥
1− α must hold. To see this, recall inequality (C.124) of conjugate function,
we have
αφ∗(z0 + z) + (1− α)φ(z0) ≥ α(z0 + z) + (1− α)z0
The right-hand side gives αz + z0; in the ambiguity set (C.123), d is strictly
positive, therefore
αφ∗(z0 + z) + (1− α)φ(z0) ≥ αz + z0 − d
which gives
φ∗(z0 + z)− z0 − az + d ≥ (1− α)(φ(z0 + z)− φ(z0))
Recall the expression of α′ in Theorem C.1, we arrive at
1− α′ = φ
∗(z0 + z)− z0 − az + d
φ(z0 + z)− φ(z0) ≥ 1− α
which is the desired conclusion.
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Theorem C.1 concludes that the complexity of handling a robust chance
constraint is almost the same as that of tackling a traditional chance con-
straint associated with the reference distribution P0, except for the efforts
on computing α′. If P0 belongs to the family of log-concave distributions,
then the chance constraint is convex. As a special case, if P0 is the Gaussian
distribution or a uniform distribution on ellipsoidal support, a single chance
constraint can boil down to a second-order cone [60]. For more general cases,
the chance constraint is non-convex in x. In such circumstance, we will use
risk based reformulation and the sampling average approximation (SAA) ap-
proach.
3. Risk and SAA based reformulation
Owing to the different descriptions on dispersion ambiguity and presence
of the wait-and-see decision y, unlike DRO problem (C.76) with static robust
chance constraint (C.78) which can be transformed into an SDP, constraint
(C.125) is treated in a different way, as demonstrated in Theorem C.1: it
comes down to a traditional chance constraint (C.126) while the dispersion
ambiguity is taken into account by a modification in the confidence level. The
remaining task is to express (C.126) as a solver-compatible form.
1) Loss function
For given x and ξ, constraints in C(x, ξ) cannot be met if no y satisfy-
ing A(ξ)x + B(ξ)y ≤ b(ξ) exists. To quantify the constraint violation under
scenario ξ and first-stage decision x, define the following loss function L(x, ξ)
L(x, ξ) = min
y,σ
σ
s.t. A(ξ)x+B(ξ)y ≤ b(ξ) + σ1
(C.127)
where 1 is an all-one vector with compatible dimension. If L(x, ξ) ≥ 0, the
minimum of slackness σ under the joint efforts of the recourse action y is
defined as the loss; otherwise, demands are satisfiable after the uncertain
parameter is known. As we assume C(x, ξ) is a bounded polytope, problem
(C.127) is always feasible and bounded below. Therefore, the loss function
L(x, ξ) is well-defined, and the chance constraint (C.126) can be written as
Pr0[L(x, ξ) ≤ 0] ≥ 1− α′+ (C.128)
In this way, the joint chance constraints are consolidated into a single one,
just like what has been done in (C.90) and (C.91).
2) VaR based reformulation: An MILP
For a given probability tolerance β and a first-stage decision x, the β-VaR
for loss function L(x, ξ) under the reference distribution PDF P0 is defined
as
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β-VaR(x) = min
{
a ∈ R
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
L(x,ξ)≤a
f0(ξ)dξ ≥ β
}
(C.129)
which interprets the threshold a such that the loss is no greater than a will
hold with a probability no less than β. According to (C.129), an equivalent
expression of chance constraint (C.128) is
(1− α′+)-VaR(x) ≤ 0 (C.130)
So that probability evaluation is obviated. Furthermore, if SAA is used,
(C.128) and (C.130) indicate that the scenarios which will lead to L(x, ξ) > 0
account for a fraction of α1+ among all sampled data.
Let ξ1, ξ2, · · · , ξq be q scenarios sampled from random variable ξ. We use q
binary variables z1, z2, · · · , zq to identify possible infeasibility: zk = 1 implies
that constraints cannot be satisfied in scenario ξk. To this end, let M be a
large enough constant, consider inequality
A(ξk)x+B(ξk)yk ≤ b(ξk) +Mzk (C.131)
In (C.131), if zk = 0, recourse action yk will recover all constraints in scenario
ξk, and thus C(x, ξk) is non-empty; otherwise, if no such a recourse action
yk exists, then constraint violation will take place. To reconcile infeasibility,
zk = 1 so that (C.131) becomes redundant, and there is actually no constraint
for scenario ξk. The fraction of sampled scenarios which will incur inevitable
constraint violations is counted by
∑q
k=1 zk/q. So we can write out the fol-
lowing MILP reformulation for robust chance-constrained program (C.120)
based on VaR and SAA
min cTx
s.t. x ∈ X
A(ξk)x+B(ξk)yk ≤ b(ξk) +Mzk, k = 1, · · · , q
q∑
k=1
zk ≤ qα′+, zk ∈ {0, 1}, k = 1, · · · , q
(C.132)
In MILP (C.132), constraint violation can happen in at most qα1+ out of q
scenarios in the reference distribution, according to Theorem C.1, and the re-
liability requirement (C.125) under all possible distributions in ambiguity set
Dφ can be guaranteed by the selection of α
′
+. Improved MILP formulations
of chance constraints which do not rely on the specific big-M parameter are
comprehensively studied in [52], and some structure properties of the feasible
region are revealed.
3) CVaR based reformulation: An LP
The number of binary variables in MILP (C.132) is equal to the number
of sampled scenarios. To guarantee the accuracy of SAA, a large number of
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scenarios are required, preventing MILP (C.132) from being solved efficiently.
To ameliorate this plight, we provide a conservative LP approximation for
problem (C.120) based on the properties of CVaR revealed in [45].
The β-CVaR for the loss function L(x, ξ) is defined as
β-CVaR(x) =
1
1− β
∫
L(x,ξ)≥β-VaR(x)
L(x, ξ)f(ξ)dξ (C.133)
which interprets the conditional expectation of loss that is no less than β-
VaR; therefore, relation
β-VaR ≤ β-CVaR (C.134)
always holds, and a conservative approximation of constraint (C.130) is
(1− α′+)-CVaR(x) ≤ 0 (C.135)
Inequality (C.135) is a sufficient condition for (C.130) and (C.128). This
conservative replacement is apposite to the spirit of robust optimization. In
what follows, we will reformulate (C.135) in a solver-compatible form.
According to [45], the left-hand side of (C.135) is equal to the optimum of
the following minimization problem
min
γ
{
γ +
1
α′+
∫
ξ∈RK
max{L(x, ξ)− γ, 0}f(ξ)dξ
}
(C.136)
By performing SAA, the integral in (C.136) renders a summation over
discrete sampled scenarios ξ1, ξ2, · · · , ξq, resulting in
min
γ
{
γ +
1
qα′+
q∑
k=1
max {L(x, ξk)− γ, 0}
}
(C.137)
By introducing auxiliary variable sk, the feasible region defined by (C.135)
can be expressed via
∃γ ∈ R, sk ∈ R+, σk ∈ R, k = 1, · · · , q
σk − γ ≤ sk, k = 1, · · · , q
A(ξk)x+B(ξk)yk ≤ b(ξk) + σk1, k = 1, · · · , q
γ +
1
qα′+
q∑
k=1
sk ≤ 0
Now we can write out the the conservative LP reformulation for robust
chance constrained program (C.120) based on CVaR and SAA
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min
x,y,s,γ
cTx
s.t. x ∈ X, γ + 1
qα′+
q∑
k=1
sk ≤ 0, sk ≥ 0, k = 1, · · · , q
A(ξk)x+B(ξk)yk − b(ξk) ≤ (γ + sk)1, k = 1, · · · , q
(C.138)
where σk is eliminated.
According to (C.134), condition (C.135) guarantees (C.130) as well as
(C.128), so chance constraint in (C.125) holds with a probability no less
(usually higher) than 1−α, regardless of the true distributions in confidence
set Dφ. Since (C.134) is usually a strict inequality, this fact will introduce
some extent of conservatism in the CVaR based LP model (C.138).
Relations among different mathematical models discussed in this section
are summarized in Fig. C.1.
濩濴濥
濶瀂瀁瀆瀇瀅濴濼瀁瀇 濠濜濟濣澳瀀瀂濷濸濿
濖濩濴濥
濶瀂瀁瀆瀇瀅濴濼瀁瀇 濟濣澳瀀瀂濷濸濿
濖濻濴瀁濶濸澳
濶瀂瀁瀆瀇瀅濴濼瀁瀇
濦濔濔
濦濔濔
濘瀄瀈濼瀉濴濿濸瀁瀇
濖瀂瀁瀆濸瀅瀉濴瀇濼瀉濸
Fig. C.1 Relations of the models discussed in this section.
4. Considering second-stage cost
Finally, we elaborate how to solve problem (C.120) with a second-stage
cost in the sense of worst-case expectation, i.e.
min
x
{
cTx+ max
P (ξ)∈DKL
EP [Q(x, ξ)]
}
s.t. x ∈ X
sup
P (ξ)∈D′
Pr[C(x, ξ)] ≥ 1− α
(C.139)
where Q(x, ξ) is the optimal value function of the second-stage problem
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Q(x, ξ) = min qT y
s.t. B(ξ)y ≤ b(ξ)−A(ξ)x
which is an LP for a fixed first-stage decision x and a given parameter ξ;
DKL = {P (ξ) | DKLφ (f‖f0) ≤ dKL(α∗), f = dP/dξ}
is the KL-divergence based ambiguity set, and dKL is an α-dependent thresh-
old which determines the size of the ambiguity set, and α∗ reflects the con-
fidence level: the real distribution is contained in DKL with a probability no
less than α∗. For discrete distributions, the KL-divergence measure has the
form of
DKLφ (f ‖ f0) =
∑
s
ρs log
ρs
ρ0s
In either case, there are infinitely many PDFs satisfying the inequality in the
ambiguity set DKL when dKL > 0. Otherwise, when dKL = 0, the ambigu-
ity set DKL becomes a singleton, and the model (C.139) degenerates to a
traditional SO problem. In practice, the user can specify the value of dKL
according to the attitude towards risks. Nevertheless, the proper value of dKL
can be obtained from probability theory. Intuitively, the more historical data
we possess, the closer the reference PDF f0 leaves from the true one, and the
smaller dKL should be set.
Suppose we have totally M samples with equal probabilities to fit in N
bins, and there are M1, M2, · · · , MN samples fall into each bin, then the
discrete reference PDF for the histogram is {pi1, · · · , piN}, where pii = Mi/M ,
i = 1, · · · , N . Let pir1, · · · , pirN be the real probability of each bin, according
to the discussions in [58], random variable 2M
∑N
i=1 pi
r
i log(pi
r
i /pii) follows
χ2 distribution with N − 1 degrees of freedom. Therefore, the confidence
threshold can be calculated from
dKL(α
∗) =
1
2M
χ2N−1,α∗
where χ2N−1,α∗ stands for the α
∗ upper quantile of χ2 distribution with N−1
degrees of freedom. For other divergence based ambiguity sets, please see more
discussions in [58]. Robust chance constraints in (C.139) are tackled using
the method presented previously, and the objective function will be treated
independently. The ambiguity sets in the objective function and chance con-
straints could be the same one or different ones, and thus are distinguished
by DKL and D
′.
Sometimes, it is imperative to coordinately optimize the costs in both
stages. For example, in the facility planning problem, the first stage repre-
sents the investment decision and the second stage describes the operation
management. If we only optimize the first-stage cost, then the facilities with
lower investment costs will be preferred, but they may suffer from higher
operating costs, and not be the optimal choice from the long-term aspect.
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To solve (C.139), we need a tractable reformulation for the worst-case
expectation problem under KL-divergence ambiguity set
max
P (ξ)∈DKL
EP [Q(x, ξ)] (C.140)
under fixed x. It is proved in [50, 58] that problem (C.140) is equivalent to
min
α≥0
α logEP0 [eQ(x,ξ)/α] + αdKL (C.141)
where α is the dual variable. Formulation (C.141) has two advantages: first,
the expectation is evaluated associated with the reference distribution P0,
which is much easier than optimizing over the ambiguity set DKL; second,
the maximum operator switches to a minimum operator, which is consistent
with the objective function of the decision making problem. We will use
SAA to express the expectation, giving rise to a discrete version of problem
(C.141). In fact, in discrete cases, (C.141) can be derived from (C.140) using
Lagrange duality. The following interpretation is given in [51].
Denote by ξ1, · · · , ξs the representative scenarios in the discrete distribu-
tion; their corresponding probabilities in the reference PDF and the actual
PDF are given by P0 = {p01, · · · , p0s} and P = {p1, · · · , ps}, respectively. Then
problem (C.140) can be written in a discrete form as
max
p
s∑
i=1
piQ(x, ξi)
s.t.
s∑
i=1
pi log
(
pi
p0i
)
≤ dKL
p ≥ 0, 1T p = 1
(C.142)
where vector p = [p1, · · · , ps]T is the decision variable. According to Lagrange
duality theory, the objective function of the dual problem is
g(α, µ) = αdKL + µ+
s∑
i=1
max
pi≥0
pi
(
Q(x, ξi)− µ− α log
(
pi
p0i
))
(C.143)
where µ is the dual variable associated with equality constraint 1T p = 1, and
α with the KL-divergence inequality. Substituting ti = pi/p
0
i into (C.143)
and eliminating pi, we get
g(α, µ) = αdKL + µ+
s∑
i=1
max
ti≥0
p0i ti (Q(x, ξi)− µ− α log ti)
Calulating the first-order derivative of ti(Q(x, ξi)−µ−α log ti) with respect
to ti, the optimal solution is
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ti = e
Q(x,ξi)−µ−α
α > 0
and the maximum is
αe
Q(x,ξi)−µ−α
α
As a result, the dual objective reduces to
g(α, µ) = αdKL + µ+ α
s∑
i=1
p0i e
Q(x,ξi)−µ−α
α (C.144)
and the dual problem of (C.142) can be rewritten as
min
α≥0,µ
g(α, µ) (C.145)
The optimal solution µ∗ must satisfy ∂g/∂µ = 0, yielding
s∑
i=1
p0i e
Q(x,ξi)−µ∗−α
α = 1
or
µ∗ = α log
s∑
i=1
p0i e
Q(x,ξi)/α − α
Substituting above relations into g(α, µ) results in the following dual problem
min
α≥0
{
αdKL + α log
s∑
i=1
p0i e
Q(x,ξi)/α
}
(C.146)
which is a discrete form of (C.141).
In (C.139), replacing the inner problem (C.140) with its Lagrangian dual
form (C.146), we can obtain an equivalent mathematical program
min
{
cTx+ αdKL + α log
s∑
i=1
p0i e
θi/α
}
s.t. x ∈ X, α ≥ 0, θi = qT yi, ∀i
A(ξi)x+B(ξi)yi ≤ b(ξi), ∀i
Cons-RCC
(C.147)
where Cons-RCC stands for the LP based formulation of robust chance con-
straints, so the constraints in problem (C.147) are all linear, and the only
nonlinearity rests in the last term of the objective function. In what follows,
we will show it is actually a convex function in θi and α.
In the first step, we claim that the following function is convex ([8], page
87, in Example 3.14)
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h1(θ) = log
(
s∑
i=1
eθi
)
Since the composition with an affine mapping preserves convexity ([8], Sect.
3.2.2), a new function
h2(θ) = h1(Aθ + b)
remains convex under linear mapping θ → Aθ + b. Let A be an identity
matrix, and
b =
log p
0
1
...
log p0s

then we have
h2(θ) = log
(
s∑
i=1
p0i e
θi
)
is a convex function; at last, function
h3(α, θ) = αh2(θ/α)
is the perspective of h2(θ), so is also convex ([8], page 89, Sect. 3.2.6).
In view of this convex structure, (C.147) essentially gives rise to a convex
program, and the local minimum is also the global one. However, according
to our experiments, general purpose NLP solvers still have difficulty to solve
(C.147). Therefore, we employ the outer approximation method [53, 54]. The
motivation is to solve the epigraph form of (C.147), in which nonlinearity
is moved into the constraints; then linearize the feasible region with an in-
creasing number of cutting planes generated in an iteration algorithm, until
certain convergence criterion is met. In this way, the hard problem (C.147)
can be solved via a sequence of LPs. The outer approximation algorithm is
outlined in Algorithm C.6. Because (C.147) is a convex program, the cutting
planes will not remove any feasible point, and Algorithm C.6 finds the global
optimal solution in finite steps, regardless of the initial point. But for sure,
the number of iterations is affected by the quality of initial guess. A proper
initiation could be obtained by solving a traditional SO problem without
considering distribution uncertainty.
The motivation of Algorithm C.6 is illustrated in C.2. The original ob-
jective function is nonlinear but convex. In the epigraph form (C.148), we
generate a set of linear cuts (C.149) dynamically according to the optimal
solution found in step 2, then the convex region can be approximated with
arbitrarily high accuracy around the optimal solution. The convergence of
the very basic version of outer approximation method has been analyzed in
[55, 56]. In fact, Algorithm C.6 is very efficient to solve problem (C.147),
because problem (C.148) is an LP, the objective function is smooth, and the
algorithm often converges in a few number of iterations.
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Algorithm C.6 Outer Approximation
1: Choose an initial point (θ1, α1) and convergence tolerance  > 0, the
initial objective value is R1 = 0, and iteration index k = 1.
2: Solve the following master problem which is an LP
min
α,θ,γ,x
cTx+ αdKL + γ
s.t. h3(α
j , θj) +∇h3(αj , θj)
[
α− αj
θ − θj
]
≤ γ, j = 1, · · · , k
x ∈ X, α ≥ 0, θi = qT yi, ∀i
A(ξi)x+B(ξi)yi ≤ b(ξi), ∀i
Cons-RCC
(C.148)
The optimal value is Rk+1, and the optimal solution is (xk+1, θk+1, αk+1).
3: If Rk+1 − Rk ≤ ε, terminate and report the optimal solution
(xk+1, θk+1, αk+1); otherwise, update k ← k + 1, calculate the gradient
∇h3 at the obtained solution (αk, θk), add the following cut to problem
(C.148), and go to step 2.
h3(α
k, θk) +∇h3(αk, θk)
[
α− αk
θ − θk
]
≤ γ (C.149)
1D
2D
3D
Fig. C.2 Illustration of the outer approximation algorithm.
C.4.2 Stochastic Program with Discrete Distributions
In ARO discussed in Appendix C.2, the uncertain parameter is assumed to
reside in the so-called uncertainty set. Every element in this set is treated
equally, so the scenario in the worst case must be one of the extreme points of
the uncertainty set, which is the main source of conservatism in the traditional
RO paradigm. In contrast, in the classic two-stage SO, uncertain parameter
ξ is modeled through a certain probability distribution P , and the expected
cost is minimized, giving rise to
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min cTx+ EP [Q(x, ξ)]
s.t. x ∈ X (C.150)
where the bounded polyhedron X is the feasible region of first-stage decision
x, ξ is the uncertain parameter, and Q(x, ξ) is the optimal value function of
the second-stage problem, which is an LP for fixed x and ξ
Q(x, ξ) = min qT y
s.t. B(ξ)y ≤ b(ξ)−A(ξ)x (C.151)
where q is the cost coefficients, A(ξ), B(ξ), and b(ξ) are constant matrices
affected by uncertain data, y(ξ) is the second-stage decision, which is the
reaction to the realization of uncertainty.
Since the true PDF of ξ is difficult to obtain in some circumstances, in this
section, we do not require perfect knowledge on the probability distribution
P of random variable ξ, and let it be ambiguous around a reference distri-
bution and reside in an ambiguity set D, which can be constructed from
limited historical data. We take all possible distributions in the ambiguity
set into consideration, so as to minimize the expected cost in the worst-case
distribution, resulting in the following model
min cTx+ max
P (ξ)∈D
EP [Q(x, ξ)]
s.t. x ∈ X
(C.152)
Compared with (C.120), constraint violation is not allowed in problem
(C.152), and the second-stage expected cost in the worst-case distribution
is considered. It is a particular case of (C.139) without chance constraints.
Specifically, we will utilize discrete distributions in this section. This for-
mulation enjoys several benefits. One is the easy exposition of the density
function. In previous sections, the candidate in the moment or divergence
based ambiguity sets is not given in an analytical form, and vanishes during
the dual transformation. As a result, we don’t have clear knowledge on the
worst-case distribution. For discrete distributions, the density function is a
vector of real entries associated with the probability of each representative
scenario. We can easily construct the ambiguity set and optimize an expecta-
tion over discrete distributions. The other originates from the computational
perspective, which can be seen later. Main results in this section come from
[61, 62].
1. Modeling the confidence set
For a given set of historical data with M elements, which can be regarded
as M samples of the random variable, we can draw a histogram with K bins
as an estimation of the reference distribution. Suppose that the numbers
of samples fall in each bin is M1,M2, · · · ,MK , where
∑K
i=1Mi = M , then
the reference (empirical) distribution of the uncertain data is given by P0 =
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[p01, · · · , p0K ], where p0i = Mi/M , i = 1, · · · ,K. Since the data may not be
enough to fit a PDF with high accuracy, the actual distribution should be
close to but might be different from its reference. It is proposed in [61] to
construct the ambiguity set using statistical inference corresponding to a
given tolerance. Two types of ambiguity sets are suggested based on L1 norm
and L∞ norm
D1 =
{
P ∈ RK+
∣∣‖P− P0‖1 ≤ θ} = {p ∈ ∆K
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
i=1
∣∣pi − p0i ∣∣ ≤ θ
}
(C.153)
D∞ =
{
P ∈ RK+
∣∣‖P− P0‖∞ ≤ θ} = {p ∈ ∆K∣∣∣∣ max1≤i≤K ∣∣pi − p0i ∣∣ ≤ θ
}
(C.154)
where ∆K = {p ∈ [0, 1]K : 1T p = 1}. These two ambiguity sets can be easily
expressed by polyhedral sets as follows
D1 =
p ∈ ∆K
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∃t ∈ RK+ :
∑K
k=1
tk ≤ θ
tk ≥ pk − p0k, k = 1, · · · ,K
tk ≥ p0k − pk, k = 1, · · · ,K
 (C.155)
D∞ =
{
p ∈ ∆K
∣∣∣∣∣ θ ≥ pk − p
0
k, k = 1, · · · ,K
θ ≥ p0k − pk, k = 1, · · · ,K
}
(C.156)
where p = [p1, · · · , pK ]T is the variable in the ambiguity set; t = [t1, · · · , tK ]T
is the lifting (auxiliary) variable in D1; parameter θ reflects decision maker’s
confidence level on the distance between the reference distribution and the
true one. Apparently, the more historical data we utilize, the smaller their
distance will be. Provided with M observations and K bins, the quantitative
relation between the value of θ and the number of samples are given by [61]
Pr{‖P− P0‖1 ≤ θ} ≥ 1− 2Ke−2Mθ/K (C.157)
Pr{‖P− P0‖∞ ≤ θ} ≥ 1− 2Ke−2Mθ (C.158)
According to (C.157) and (C.158), if we want to maintain (C.153) and
(C.154) with a confidence level of β, parameter θ should be selected as
For D1 : θ1 =
K
2M
ln
2K
1− β (C.159)
For D∞ : θ∞ =
1
2M
ln
2K
1− β (C.160)
As the size of sampled data approaches infinity, θ1 and θ∞ decrease to 0,
and the reference distribution converges to the true one. Accordingly, problem
(C.152) becomes a traditional two-stage SO.
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2. CCG based decomposition algorithm
Let ξk denote the representative scenario of the k-th bin, pk be the corre-
sponding probability, and P = [p1, · · · , pK ] belongs to the ambiguity set in
form of (C.153) or (C.154), then problem (C.152) can be written as
min cTx+ max
P
K∑
k=1
pk min q
T yk
s.t. x ∈ X, P ∈ D
A(ξk)x+B(ξk)yk ≤ b(ξk),∀k
(C.161)
Problem (C.161) has a min-max-min structure and can be solved by the
Benders decomposition method [61] or the CCG method [62]. The latter one
will be introduced in the rest of this section. It decomposes problem (C.161)
into a lower bounding master problem and an upper bounding subproblem,
which are solved iteratively until the gap between the upper bound and lower
bound gets smaller than a convergence tolerance. The basic idea has been
explained in Appendix C.2.3. As we can see in [62], the second-stage problem
can be a broader class of convex programs, such as an SOCP.
1) Subproblem
For a given first-stage decision x, the subproblem aims to find the worst-
case distribution, which comes down to a max-min program shown below
max
P∈D
K∑
k=1
pk min
yk∈Yk(x)
qT yk (C.162)
where
Yk = {yk | B(ξk)yk ≤ b(ξk)−A(ξk)x}, ∀k (C.163)
Problem (C.162) has some unique features that facilitate the computation:
(1) Feasible sets Yk are decoupled.
(2) The probability variables pk do not affect feasible sets Yk.
(3) The ambiguity set D and feasible sets Yk are decoupled.
Although (C.162) seems nonlinear due to the production of scalar variable
pk and vector variable y
k in the objective function, as we can see in the
following discussion, it is equivalent to an LP or can be decomposed into
several LPs, and thus can be solved efficiently.
An equivalent LP
Because pk ≥ 0, we can exchange the summation operator and the mini-
mization operator, and problem (C.162) can be written as
max
P∈D
min
yk∈Yk(x)
K∑
k=1
pkq
T yk (C.164)
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For the inner minimization problem, pk is constant, so it is an LP, whose
dual problem is
max
µk
K∑
k=1
(
b(ξk)−A(ξk)x)T µk
s.t. µk ≤ 0, BT (ξk)µk = pkq, ∀k
where µk are dual variables. Substituting it into (C.164), and combining two
maximization operators, we obtain
max
pk,µk
K∑
k=1
(
b(ξk)−A(ξk)x)T µk
s.t. µk ≤ 0, BT (ξk)µk = pkq, ∀k
(p1, · · · , pk) ∈ D
(C.165)
Since D is polyhedral, problem (C.165) is in fact an LP. The optimal solution
offers the worst-case distribution [p∗1, · · · , p∗K ], which will be used to generate
cuts in the master problem. The recourse actions yk in each scenario will be
provided by the optimal solution of the master problem.
Despite of the fact that LP is acknowledged as the most tractable math-
ematical programming problem, however, when K is extremely large, it is
still challenging to solve (C.165) or even store it in a computer. Nevertheless,
the separability of feasible regions allows solving (C.162) in a decomposition
manner.
A decomposition method
As mentioned above, pk has no impact on Yk, which are decoupled; more-
over, because pk is a scalar in the objective function of each inner mini-
mization problem, it does not affect the optimal solution yk. In view of this
convenience, problem (C.162) can be decomposed into K + 1 smaller LPs,
and can be solved in parallel. To this end, for each ξk, solve the following LP:
h∗k = min
yk∈Yk(x)
qT yk, k = 1, · · · ,K
The optimal value is h∗k; after obtaining optimal values (h
∗
1, · · · , h∗K) of the K
LPs, we can retrieve the worst-case distribution through solving an additional
LP
max
P∈D
K∑
k=1
pkh
∗
k
In fact, if the second-stage problem is a conic program (in [62], it is an
SOCP), above discussions are still valid, as long as the strong duality holds.
It is interesting to notice that in the ARO problem in Sect. C.2.3, the
subproblem comes down to a non-convex bilinear program after dualizing
the inner minimization problem, and is generally NP-hard; in this section,
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the subproblem actually gives rise to LPs, whose complexity is polynomial in
problem sizes. The reason accounting for this difference is that the uncertain
parameter in (C.161) is expressed by sampled scenarios and thus is constant;
the distributional uncertainty appearing in the objective function does not
influence the constraints of the second stage problem, and thus the linear
max-min problem (C.164) reduces to an LP after a dual transformation.
2) The CCG algorithm
The motivation of CCG algorithm has been thoroughly discussed in Ap-
pendix C.2.3. In this section, for a fixed x, the optimal value of subproblem
(C.162) is denoted by Q(x), and cTx + Q(x) gives an upper bound of the
optimal solution of (C.161), because the first-stage variable is un-optimized.
Then a set of new variables and optimality cuts are generated and added into
master problem. If the subproblem is infeasible in some scenario, then a set
of feasibility cuts are assigned to the master problem. The master problem
starts from a subset of D, which is updated by including the worst-case dis-
tribution identified by the subproblem. Forasmuch, the master problem is a
relax version of the original problem (C.161), and provides a lower bound on
the optimal value. The flowchart of the CCG procedure for problem (C.161)
is given in Algorithm C.7. This algorithm will terminate in a finite number
of iterations, as the confidence set D has finite extreme points.
C.4.3 Formulations based on Wasserstein Metric
Up to now, the KL-divergence based ambiguity set based formulations have
received plenty of research, because it enjoys some convenience when de-
riving the robust counterpart. For example, it has already known in Sect.
C.4.1 that robust chance constraints under KL-divergence ambiguity set can
reduce to a traditional chance constraints under the empirical distribution
with a rescaled confidence level, and the worst-case expectation problem un-
der KL-divergence ambiguity set is equivalent to a convex program. However,
according to its definition, KL-divergence ambiguity set may encounter theo-
retical difficulty to represent confidence sets for continuous distribution [72],
because the empirical distribution calibrated from finite data must be dis-
crete, and any distribution in the KL-divergence ambiguity set must assign
positive probability mass to each sampled scenario. As a continuous distribu-
tion has a density function, it must reside outside the KL-divergence ambi-
guity set regardless of the sampled scenarios. In contrast, Wasserstein metric
based ambiguity sets contain both discrete and continuous distributions. It
offers an explicit confidence level for the unknown distribution belonging to
the set, and enables the decision maker more informative guidance to control
the model conservativeness. This section introduces state-of-the-art results in
robust SO with Wasserstein metric based ambiguity sets. The most critical
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Algorithm C.7
1: Choose a convergence tolerance ε > 0, and an initial probability vector
p0 ∈ D; Set LB = −∞, UB = +∞, and iteration index s = 0.
2: Solve the master problem
min
x,η,yk,m
cTx+ η
s.t. x ∈ X, η ≥
K∑
k=1
pmk q
T yk,m, m ∈ Opt{0, 1, · · · , s}
A(ξk)x+B(ξk)yk,m ≤ b(ξk), m ∈ Opt{0, 1, · · · , s}, ∀k
A(ξk)x+B(ξk)yk,m ≤ b(ξk), m ∈ Fea{0, 1, · · · , s}, k ∈ I(s)
(C.166)
where Opt{∗}/Fea{∗} selects the iterations in which an optimality (fea-
sibility) cut is generated; I(s) depicts the index of scenarios in which the
second-stage problem is infeasible in iteration s. The optimal solution is
(x∗, η∗); update LB = cTx∗ + η∗;
3: Solve subproblem (C.162) with current x∗. If there exists some ξk such
that Yk(x
∗) = ∅, then generate new variable yk,s, update I(s), and add
the following feasibility cut to the master problem
A(ξk)x+B(ξk)yk,s ≤ b(ξk), k ∈ I(s) (C.167)
Otherwise, if Yk(x
∗) 6= ∅,∀k, subproblem (C.162) can be solved. The
optimal solution is ps+1, and the optimal value is Q(x∗); update UB =
min{UB, cTx∗ + Q(x∗)}, create new variables (y1,s+1, · · · , yk,s+1), and
add the following optimality cut to the master problem
η ≥
K∑
k=1
ps+1k q
T yk,s+1
A(ξk)x+B(ξk)yk,s+1 ≤ b(ξk), ∀k
(C.168)
4: If UB−LB< ε, terminate and report the optimal first-stage solution x∗
as well as the worst-case distribution ps+1; otherwise, update s← s+ 1,
and go to step 2.
problem is the robust counterparts of the worst-case expectation problem and
robust chance constraints, which will be discussed respectively. They can be
embedded in single- and two-stage robust SO problems without substantial
barriers. The materials in this section mainly come from [72].
1. Wasserstein metric based ambiguity set
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Let Ξ be the support set of multi-dimensional random variable ξ ∈ Rm.
M(Ξ) represent all probability distributionsQ supported on Ξ, and EQ[‖ξ‖] =∫
Ξ
‖ξ‖Q(dξ) <∞, where ‖ · ‖ stands for an arbitrary norm on Rm.
Definition C.8. Wasserstein metric dW : M(Ξ)×M(Ξ)→ R+ is defined as
dW (Q,Q0) = inf
(∫
Ξ2
∥∥ξ − ξ0∥∥Π(dξ,dξ0)∣∣∣∣∣ Π is a joint distribution of ξ andξ0 with marginals Q and Q0
)
for two probability distributions Q,Q0 ∈M(Ξ).
As a special case, for two discrete distributions, Wasserstein metric is given
by
dW (Q,Q0) = inf
pi≥0
∑
i
∑
j
piij
∥∥ξj − ξ0i ∥∥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j
piij = p
0
i , ∀i∑
i
piij = pj , ∀j
 (C.169)
where p0i and pj denote the probability of representative scenario ξ
0
i and ξj .
In either case, the decision variable Π (or piij) represents the probability
mass transported from ξ0i to ξj , therefore, the Wasserstein metric can be
viewed as the minimal cost of a transportation plan, where the distance
‖ξj − ξ0i ‖ encodes the transportation cost of unit mass.
Sometimes, the Wasserstein metric can be represented in the dual form
dW (Q,Q0) = sup
f∈L
(∫
Ξ
f(ξ)Q(dξ)−
∫
Ξ
f(ξ)Q0(dξ)
)
(C.170)
where L = {f : |f(ξ)−f(ξ0)| ≤ ‖ξ−ξ0‖,∀ξ, ξ0 ∈ Ξ} (Theorem 3.2, [72], which
was firstly discovered by Kantorovich and Rubinstein [73] for distributions
with a bounded support).
With above definition, the Wasserstein ambiguity set is the ball of radius
 centered at the empirical distribution Q0
DW = {Q ∈M(Ξ) : dW (Q,Q0) ≤ } (C.171)
where Q0 is constructed with N independent data samples
Q0 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δξ0i
where δξ0i stands for Dirac distribution concentrating unit mass at ξ
0
i .
Particularly, we require the unknown distribution Q follow a light tail
assumption, i.e., there exists a > 1 such that∫
Ξ
e‖ξ‖
a
Q(dξ) <∞
156 C Basics of Robust Optimization
This assumption indicates that the tail of distribution Q decays at an
exponential rate. If Ξ is bounded and compact, this assumption trivially
holds. Under this assumption, modern measure concentration theory provides
the following finite sample guarantee for the unknown distribution belonging
to Wasserstein ambiguity set
Pr [dW (Q,Q0) ≥ ] ≤
{
c1e
−c2Nmax{m,2} if  ≤ 1
c1e
−c2Na if  > 1
(C.172)
where c1, c2 are positive constants depending on a, A, and m and m 6= 2.
Equation (C.172) provides a priori estimate of the confidence level for
Q /∈ DW . On the other hand, we can utilize (C.172) to select parameter
 of the Wasserstein ambiguity set such that DW contains the uncertain
distribution Q with probability 1 − β for some prescribed β. This requires
solving  from the right-hand side of (C.172) with a given left-hand side β,
resulting in
 =

(
ln(c1β
−1)
c2N
)1/max{m,2}
if N ≥ ln(c1β
−1)
c2(
ln(c1β
−1)
c2N
)1/a
if N <
ln(c1β
−1)
c2
(C.173)
Wasserstein ambiguity set with above radius can be regarded as a confidence
set for the unknown distribution Q as in statistical testing.
2. Worst-case expectation problem
A robust SO problem under Wasserstein metric naturally requests to min-
imize the worst-case expected cost:
inf
x∈X
sup
Q∈DW
EQ[h(x, ξ)] (C.174)
We demonstrate how to solve the core problem: the worst-case expectation
sup
Q∈DW
EQ[l(ξ)] (C.175)
where l(ξ) = max1≤k≤K lk(ξ) is the payoff function, consisting of the point-
wise maximum of K elementary functions. For notation brevity, the depen-
dence on x is suppressed and will be recovered later on when necessary. We
further assume that the support set Ξ is closed and convex, and specific l(ξ)
will be discussed.
Problem (C.175) renders an infinite-dimensional optimization problem for
continuous distribution. Nonetheless, the inspiring work in [72] show that
(C.175) can be reformulated as a finite-dimensional convex program for var-
ious payoff functions. To see this, expand the worst-case expectation as
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sup
Q∈DW
EQ[l(ξ)] =

sup
Π
∫
Ξ
l(ξ)Q(dξ)
s.t.
∫
Ξ2
∥∥ξ − ξ0∥∥Π(dξ,dξ0) ≤ 
Π is a joint distribution of ξ
ξ0 with marginals Q and Q0
According to the law of total probability, Π can be decomposed as the
marginal distribution Q0 of ξ0 and the conditional distributions Qi of ξ given
ξ0 = ξ0i :
Π =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δξ0i ⊗Qi
and the worst-case expectation evolves into a generalized moment problem
in conditional distributions Qi, i ≤ N
sup
Q∈DW
EQ[l(ξ)] =

sup
Qi∈M(Ξ)
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫
Ξ
l(ξ)Qi(dξ)
s.t.
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫
Ξ
∥∥ξ − ξ0i ∥∥Qi(dξ) ≤ 
Using standard Lagrangian duality, we obtain
sup
Q∈DW
EQ[l(ξ)] = sup
Qi∈M(Ξ)
inf
λ≥0
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫
Ξ
l(ξ)Qi(dξ)
+ λ
(
− 1
N
N∑
i=1
∫
Ξ
∥∥ξ − ξ0i ∥∥Qi(dξ)
)
≤ inf
λ≥0
sup
Qi∈M(Ξ)
λ+
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫
Ξ
(
l(ξ)− λ ∥∥ξ − ξ0i ∥∥)Qi(dξ)
= inf
λ≥0
λ+
1
N
N∑
i=1
sup
ξ∈Ξ
(
l(ξ)− λ ∥∥ξ − ξ0i ∥∥)
Decision variables λ and ξ have finite dimensions. The last problem can be
reformulated as
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inf
λ,si
λ+
1
N
N∑
i=1
si
s.t. sup
ξ∈Ξ
(
lk(ξ)− λ
∥∥ξ − ξ0i ∥∥) ≤ si
i = 1, · · · , N, k = 1, · · · ,K
λ ≥ 0
(C.176)
From the definition of dual norm, we know λ
∥∥ξ − ξ0i ∥∥ = max‖zik‖∗≤λ〈zik, ξ−
ξ0i 〉, so the constraints give rise to
sup
ξ∈Ξ
(
lk(ξ)− λ
∥∥ξ − ξ0i ∥∥) = sup
ξ∈Ξ
(
lk(ξ)− max‖zik‖∗≤λ〈zik, ξ − ξ
0
i 〉
)
= sup
ξ∈Ξ
min
‖zik‖∗≤λ
lk(ξ)− 〈zik, ξ − ξ0i 〉
≤ min
‖zik‖∗≤λ
sup
ξ∈Ξ
lk(ξ)− 〈zik, ξ − ξ0i 〉
Substituting it into problem (C.176) leads to a more restricted feasible set
and a larger objective value, yielding
inf
λ,si
λ+
1
N
N∑
i=1
si
s.t. min
‖zik‖∗≤λ
sup
ξ∈Ξ
lk(ξ)− 〈zik, ξ − ξ0i 〉 ≤ si
i = 1, · · · , N, k = 1, · · · ,K
λ ≥ 0
(C.177)
The constraints of (C.177) trivially suggests the feasible set of λ is λ ≥ ‖zik‖∗,
and the min operator in constraints can be omitted because it is in compliance
with the objective function. Therefore, we arrive at
inf
λ,si
λ+
1
N
N∑
i=1
si
s.t. sup
ξ∈Ξ
(lk(ξ)− 〈zik, ξ〉) + 〈zik, ξ0i 〉 ≤ si, λ ≥ ‖zik‖∗
i = 1, · · · , N, k = 1, · · ·K
(C.178)
It is proved in [72] that problems (C.175) and (C.178) are actually equiva-
lent. Next, we will derive the concrete forms of (C.178) under specific payoff
function l(ξ) and uncertainty set Ξ. Unlike [72] which relies on conjugate
functions in convex analysis, we mainly exploit LP duality theory, which is
more friendly to readers with engineering background.
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Case 1: Convex PWL payoff function l(ξ) = max1≤k≤K{aTk ξ + bk} and
bounded polyhedral uncertainty set Ξ = {ξ ∈ Rm : Cξ ≤ d}. The key point
is the supremum regarding ξ in the following constraint
sup
ξ∈Ξ
(
aTk ξ − 〈zik, ξ〉
)
+ bk + 〈zik, ξ0i 〉 ≤ si
For each k, the supremum is an LP
max (ak − zik)T ξ
s.t. Cξ ≤ d
Its dual LP reads
min dT γik
s.t. CT γik = ak − zik
γik ≥ 0
Therefore, zik = ak − CT γik. Because of strong duality, we can replace the
supremum by the objective of the dual LP, which gives rise to:
dT γik + bk + 〈ak − CT γik, ξ0i 〉 ≤ si, i = 1, · · · , N, k = 1, · · · ,K
Arrange all constraints together, we obtain a convex program which is equiv-
alent to problem (C.178) in Case 1:
inf
λ,si
λ+
1
N
N∑
i=1
si
s.t. bk + a
T
k ξ
0
i + γ
T
ik(d− CT ξ0i ) ≤ si, i = 1, · · · , N, k = 1, · · · ,K
λ ≥ ‖ak − CT γik‖∗, γik ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · , N, k = 1, · · · ,K
(C.179)
In the absence of distributional uncertainty, or  = 0 which implies that
Wasserstein ambiguity set DW is a singleton, λ can take any non-negative
value without changing the objective function. Because all sampled scenarios
must belong to the support set, i.e. d−CT ξ0i ≥ 0, ∀i holds, so there must be
γik = 0 at the optimal solution, leading to an optimal value of
∑N
i=1 si/N ,
where si = max1≤k≤K{aTk ξ0i + bk}, which represents the sample average of
the payoff function under the empirical distribution.
Case 2: Concave PWL payoff function l(ξ) = min1≤k≤K{aTk ξ + bk} and
bounded polyhedral uncertainty set Ξ = {ξ ∈ Rm : Cξ ≤ d}. In such circum-
stance, the supremum regarding ξ in the constraint becomes
max
ξ∈Ξ
{
−zTi ξ + min
1≤k≤L
{
aTk ξ + bk
}}
which is equivalent to an LP
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max − zTi ξ + τi
s.t. Aξ + b ≥ τi1
Cξ ≤ d
where the k-th row of A is aTk ; the k-th entry of b is bk; 1 is all-one vector
with a compatible dimension. Its dual LP reads
min bT θi + d
T γi
s.t. −AT θi + CT γi = −zi
1T θi = 1, θi ≥ 0, γi ≥ 0
Therefore, zi = A
T θi − CT γi. Because of strong duality, we can replace the
supremum by the objective of the dual LP, which gives rise to:
bT θi + d
T γi + 〈AT θi − CT γi, ξ0i 〉 ≤ si, i = 1, · · · , N
Arrange all constraints together, we obtain a convex program which is equiv-
alent to problem (C.178) in Case 2:
inf
λ,si
λ+
1
N
N∑
i=1
si
s.t. θTi (b+Aξ
0
i ) + γ
T
i (d− Cξ0i ) ≤ si, i = 1, · · · , N
λ ≥ ‖AT θi − CT γi‖∗, i = 1, · · · , N
γi ≥ 0, θi ≥ 0, 1T θi = 1, i = 1, · · · , N
(C.180)
There will be no k index for the constraints, because it is packaged in A and
b.
An analogous analysis shows that if  = 0, there must be γi = 0 and
si = min{θTi (b+Aξ0i ) : θi ≥ 0, 1T θi = 1} = min
1≤k≤K
{aTk ξ + bk}
implying
∑N
i=1 si/N is the sample average of the payoff function under the
empirical distribution.
Now we focus our attention on the min-max problem (C.174) which fre-
quently arises in two-stage robust SO, which entails evaluation of the expected
recourse cost from an LP parameterized in ξ. We investigate two cases de-
pending on where ξ appears.
Case 3: Uncertain cost coefficients: l(ξ) = miny{yTQξ : Wy ≥ h − Ax}
where x is the first-stage decision variable, y represents the recourse action,
and the feasible region is always non-empty. In this case, the supremum
regarding ξ in the constraint becomes
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max
ξ∈Ξ
{
−zTi ξ + min
y
{
yTQξ : Wy ≥ h−Ax}}
= min
y
{
max
ξ∈Ξ
{(
QT y − zi
)T
ξ
}
: Wy ≥ h−Ax
}
Replace the inner LP with its dual, we get an equivalent LP
min
γi,yi
dT γi
s.t. CT γi = Q
T yi − zi, γi ≥ 0
Wyi ≥ h−Ax
Here we associated variable y with a subscript i to highlight its dependence
on the value of ξ. Therefore, zi = Q
T yi − CT γi, and we can replace the
supremum by the objective of the dual LP, which gives rise to:
dT γi + 〈QT yi − CT γi, ξ0i 〉 ≤ si, i = 1, · · · , N
Arrange all constraints together, we obtain a convex program which is equiv-
alent to problem (C.178) in Case 3:
inf
λ,si
λ+
1
N
N∑
i=1
si
s.t. yTi Qξ
0
i + γ
T
i (d− CT ξ0i ) ≤ si, i = 1, · · · , N
λ ≥ ‖QT yi − CT γi‖∗, γi ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · , N
Wyi ≥ h−Ax, i = 1, · · · , N
(C.181)
Without distributional uncertainty,  = 0, λ can be arbitrary nonnegative
value; for similar reason, we have γi = 0 and si = y
T
i Qξ
0
i at optimum.
So problem (C.181) is equivalent to the SAA problem under the empirical
distribution
min
yi
{
1
N
N∑
i=1
yTi Qξ
0
i : Wyi ≥ h−Ax
}
Case 4: Uncertain constraint right-hand side:
l(ξ) = min
y
{qT y : Wy ≥ Hξ + h−Ax}
= max
θ
{
θT (Hξ + h−Ax) : WT θ = q, θ ≥ 0}
= max
k
vTk (Hξ + h−Ax) = max
k
{
vTkHξ + v
T
k (h−Ax)
}
where vk is the vertices of polyhedron {θ : WT θ = q, θ ≥ 0}. In this way, l(ξ)
is expressed as a convex PWL function. Applying the result in Case 1, we
obtain a convex program which is equivalent to problem (C.178) in Case 4:
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inf
λ,si
λ+
1
N
N∑
i=1
si
s.t. vTk (h−Ax) + vTkHξ0i + γTik(d− CT ξ0i ) ≤ si, i = 1, · · · , N, ∀k
λ ≥ ‖HT vk − CT γik‖∗, γik ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · , N, ∀k
(C.182)
For similar reason, without distributional uncertainty, we have γik = 0
and si = v
T
k (h − Ax) + vTkHξ0i = qT yi at optimum, where the last equality
is because of strong duality. So problem (C.181) is equivalent to the SAA
problem under the empirical distribution
min
yi
{
1
N
N∑
i=1
qT yi : Wyi ≥ Hξ + h−Ax
}
The following discussions are devoted to the computational tractability.
• If the 1-norm or ∞-norm is used to define Wasserstein metric, their
dual norms are ∞-norm and 1-norm respectively, then problems (C.179)-
(C.182) reduce to LPs whose sizes grow with the number N of sampled
data. If the Euclidean norm is used, the resulting problems will be SOCP.
• For Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3, the remaining equivalent LPs scale poly-
nomially and can be therefore readily solved. As for Case 4, the number
of vertices may grow exponential in the problem size. However, one can
adopt a decomposition algorithm similar to CCG which iteratively identi-
fies critical vertices without enumerating all of them.
• The computational complexity of all equivalent convex programs is inde-
pendent of the size of the Wasserstein ambiguity set.
• It is shown in [72] that the worst-case expectation can also be computed
from the following problem
sup
αik,qik
1
N
N∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
αij lk
(
ξ0i −
qik
αik
)
s.t.
1
N
N∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
‖qik‖ ≤ 
αik ≥ 0,∀i,∀k,
K∑
k=1
αik = 1,∀i
ξ0i −
qik
αik
∈ Ξ, ∀i,∀k
(C.183)
Non-convex term arise from the fraction qik/αik. In fact, problem (C.183)
is convex following the definition of extended perspective function [72].
Moreover, if [αik(r), qik(r)]r∈N is a sequence of feasible solutions and the
corresponding objective values converge to the supremum of (C.183), then
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the discrete distribution
Qr =
1
N
N∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
αik(r)δξik(r), ξik(r) = ξ
0
i −
qik(r)
αik(r)
approaches the worst-case distribution in DW [72].
3. Static robust chance constraints
Another important issue in SO is chance constraint. Here we discuss robust
joint chance constraints in the following form
inf
Q∈DW
Pr[a(x)T ξi ≤ bi(x), i = 1, · · · , I] ≥ 1− β (C.184)
where x is the decision variable; the chance constraint involves I inequalities
with uncertain parameter ξi supported on set Ξi ⊆ Rn for each i. The joint
probability distribution Q belongs to the Wasserstein ambiguity set. a(x) ∈
Rn and b(x) ∈ R are affine mappings of x, where a(x) = ηx + (1 − η)1, η ∈
{0, 1}, and bi(x) = BTi x+ b0i . When η = 1 (η = 0), (C.184) involves left-hand
(right-hand) uncertainty. Ξ =
∏
i Ξi is the support set of ξ = [ξ
T
1 , · · · , ξTI ]T .
The robust chance constraint (C.184) requires that all inequalities be met for
all possible distributions in Wasserstein ambiguity set DW with a probability
of at least 1 − β, where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes a prescribed risk tolerance. The
feasible region stipulated by (C.184) is X. We will introduce main results
from [74] while avoiding rigorous mathematical proofs.
Assumption C.6 The support set Ξ is an n × I-dimensional vector space,
and the distance metric in Wasserstein ambiguity set is d(ξ, ζ) = ‖ξ − ζ‖.
Theorem C.2. [74] Under Assumption (C.6), X = Z1 ∪ Z2, where
Z1 =

x ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
v − βγ ≤ 1
N
N∑
j=1
zj
zj + γ ≤ max
{
bi(x)− a(x)T ζji , 0
}
i = 1, · · · I, j = 1, · · · , N
zj ≤ 0, j = 1, · · · , N
‖a(x)‖∗ ≤ v, γ ≥ 0

(C.185)
where  is the radius of the Wasserstein ambiguity set, N is the number of
sampled scenarios in the empirical distribution, and
Z2 = {x ∈ Rn | a(x) = 0, bi(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · I} (C.186)
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In Theorem C.2, Z2 is trivial: If η = 1, then Z2 = {x ∈ Rn | x = 0, bi ≥
0, ∀i}; If η = 0, then Z2 = ∅. Z1 can be reformulated as an MILP compatible
form if it is bounded. By linearizing the second constraint, we have
Z1 =

x ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
v − βγ ≤ 1
N
N∑
j=1
zj
zj + γ ≤ sij , ∀i,∀j
bi(x)− a(x)T ζji ≤ sij ≤Mijyij , ∀i, ∀j
sij ≤ bi(x)− a(x)T ζji +Mij(1− yij), ∀i,∀j
‖a(x)‖∗ ≤ v, γ ≥ 0, zj ≤ 0, ∀j
sij ≥ 0, yij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, ∀j

(C.187)
where ∀i and ∀j are short for i = 1, · · · , I and j = 1, · · · , N , respectively;
Mij ≥ max
x∈Z1
∣∣∣bi(x)− a(x)T ζji ∣∣∣
It is easy to see that if bi(x) − a(x)T ζji < 0, then yij = 0 (otherwise
sij ≤ bi(x) − a(x)T ζji < 0), hence sij = 0 = max{bi(x) − a(x)T ζji , 0}. If
bi(x)− a(x)T ζji > 0, then yij = 1 (otherwise bi(x)− a(x)T ζji ≤Mijyij = 0),
hence sij = bi(x)−a(x)T ζji = max{bi(x)−a(x)T ζji , 0}. If bi(x)−a(x)T ζji = 0,
then we have sij = 0 regardless of the value of yij . In conclusion, (C.185)
and (C.187) are equivalent.
For right-hand uncertainty in which η = 0, a(x) = 1, X = Z1 because
Z2 = ∅. Moreover, variable v in (C.187) is equal to 1 if 1-norm is used in
Wasserstein ambiguity set DW , indicating v ≥ ‖1‖∞ = 1 in Z1.
In (C.187), a total number of I × N binary variables are introduced to
linearize the max{a, b} function, making the problem challenging to solve.
An inner approximation of Z is to simply replace max{bi(x) − a(x)T ζji , 0}
with its first input, yielding a parameter-free approximation
Z =
x ∈ R
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
v − βγ ≤ 1
N
N∑
j=1
zj
zj + γ ≤ bi(x)− a(x)T ζji , ∀i,∀j
zj ≤ 0, ∀j, ‖a(x)‖∗ ≤ v, γ ≥ 0
 (C.188)
This formulation can be derived from CVaR model, and enjoys better com-
putational tractability.
4. Adaptive robust chance constraints
Robust chance constraint program with Wasserstein metric is studied in
[82] in a different but more general form. The problem is as follows
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min
x∈X
cTx
s.t. inf
Q∈DW
Pr[F (x, ξ) ≤ 0] ≥ 1− β (C.189)
where X is a bounded polyhedron, F : Rn × Ξ→ R is a scalar function that
is convex in x for every ξ. This formulation is general enough to capture joint
chance constraints. To see this, suppose F contains K individual constraints,
then F can be defined as the component-wise maximum as in (C.91).
Here we develop a technique to solve two-stage problems where F (x, ξ) is
the optimal value of another LP parameterized in x and ξ. More precisely,
we consider
min
x∈X
cT1 x
s.t. sup
Q∈DW
Pr[f(x, ξ) ≥ cT2 ξ] ≤ β
(C.190a)
f(x, ξ) = min cT3 y
s.t. Ax+By + Cξ ≤ d (C.190b)
where in (C.190a), the robust chance constraint can be regarded a risk lim-
iting requirement, and the threshold value depends on uncertain parameter
ξ. We assume LP (C.190b) is always feasible (relatively complete recourse)
and has finite optimum. Second-stage cost can be considered in the objective
function of (C.190a) in form of worst-case expectation which has been dis-
cussed in previous sections and is omitted here for the sake of brevity. Here
we focus on coping with second-stage LP in robust chance constraint.
Define loss function
g(x, ξ) = f(x, ξ)− cT2 ξ (C.191)
Recall the relation between chance constraint and CVaR discussed in
Sect. C.3.1, a sufficient condition of robust chance constraint in (C.190a)
is CVaR(g(x, ξ), β) ≤ 0, ∀Q ∈ DW , or equivalently
sup
Q∈DW
inf
γ∈R
βγ + EQ(max{g(x, ξ)− γ, 0}) ≤ 0 (C.192)
According to [82], constraint (C.192) can be conservatively approximated by
L+ inf
γ∈R
{
βγ +
1
N
N∑
i=1
max{g(x, ξi)− γ, 0}
}
≤ 0 (C.193)
where  is the parameter in Wasserstein ambiguity set DW , L is a constant
satisfying g(x, ξ) ≤ L‖ξ‖1, and ξi, i = 1, · · · , N are samples of uncertain
data. Substituting (C.190b) and (C.191) into (C.193), we obtain an LP that
is equivalent to problem (C.190)
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min cT1 x
s.t. x ∈ X, L+ βγ + 1
N
N∑
i=1
si ≤ 0
si ≥ 0, si ≥ cT3 yi − cT2 ξi − γ, i = 1, · · · , N
Ax+Byi + Cξi ≤ d, i = 1, · · · , N
(C.194)
where yi is the second-stage decision associated with ξi. This formulation
could be very conservative due to three reasons. First, worst-case distribution
is considered; second, CVaR constraint (C.192) is a pessimistic approximation
of chance constraints; finally, sampling constraint (C.193) is a pessimistic
approximation of (C.192).
More discussions on robust chance constraints with Wasserstein metric
under various settings can be found in [82].
5. Use of forecast data
Wasserstein metric enjoys many advantages, such as finite-sample perfor-
mance guarantee and existence of tractable reformulation. However, moment
information is not used, especially the first-order moment reflecting the pre-
diction, which can be updated with time rolling on, so the worst-case distri-
bution generally has a mean value different from the forecast (if available).
To incorporate forecast data, we propose the following Wasserstein ambiguity
set with fixed-mean
DMW =
{
Q ∈ DW
∣∣∣EQ[ξ] = ξˆ} (C.195)
and the worst-case expectation problem can be expressed as
sup
Q∈DMW
EQ[l(ξ)] (C.196a)
= sup
fn(ξ)
1
N
N∑
n=1
∫
Ξ
l(ξ)fn(ξ)dξ (C.196b)
s.t.
1
N
N∑
n=1
∫
Ξ
‖ξ − ξn‖pfn(ξ)dξ ≤  : λ (C.196c)∫
Ξ
fn(ξ)dξ = 1 : θn, n = 1, · · · , N (C.196d)
1
N
N∑
n=1
∫
Ξ
ξfn(ξ)dξ = ξˆ : ρ (C.196e)
where l(ξ) is a loss function similar to that in (C.175), fn(ξ) is the conditional
density function under historical data sample ξn, dual variables λ, θn, and
ρ are listed following a colon. Similar to the discussions for problem (C.79),
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the dual problem of (C.196) is
min
λ≥0,θn,ρ
(λ+ ρT ξˆ)N +
N∑
n=1
θn (C.197a)
s.t. θn + λ‖ξ − ξn‖p + ρT ξ ≥ l(ξ),∀ξ ∈ Ξ, ∀n (C.197b)
For p = 2, polyhedral Ξ and PWL l(ξ), constraint (C.197b) can be trans-
formed into the intersection of PSD cones, and problem (C.197) gives rise to
an SDP; some examples can be found in Sect. C.3.1. If Ξ is described by a
single quadratic constraint, constraint (C.197b) can be reformulated by using
the well-known S-Lemma, which has been discussed in Sect. A.2.4, and prob-
lem (C.197) still comes down to an SDP. For p = 1 or p = +∞, polyhedral
Ξ and PWL l(ξ), constraint (C.197b) can be transformed into a polyhedron
using duality theory, and problem (C.197) gives rise to an LP. Because the
ambiguity set is more restrictive, problem (C.197) would be less conservative
than problem (C.178) in which the mean value of uncertain data is free.
A Wasserstein-moment metric with variance is exploited in [83] and applied
to wind power dispatch. Nevertheless, the ambiguity set neglects first-order
moment and considers second-order moment. This formulation is useful when
little historical data is available at hand.
As a short conclusion, distributionally robust optimization and data-driven
robust stochastic optimization leverage statistical information on the uncer-
tain data and overcome the conservatism of traditional robust optimization
approaches which are built upon the worst-case scenario. The core issue is the
equivalent convex reformulation of the worst-case expectation problem or the
robust chance constraint over the uncertain probability distribution restricted
in the ambiguity set. Optimization over a moment based ambiguity set can
be formulated as a semi-infinite LP, whose dual problem gives rise to SDPs,
and hence can be readily solved. When additional structure property is taken
into account, such as unimodality, more sophisticated treatment is need. As
for the robust stochastic programming, tractable reformulation of the worst-
case expectation and robust chance constraints is the central issue. Robust
chance constraint under a φ-divergence based ambiguity set are equivalent
to traditional chance constraint under the empirical distribution but with a
modified confidence level, and it can be transformed into an MILP or ap-
proximated by LP based on risk theory under the help of sampling average
approximation technique, so does a robust chance constraint under a Wasser-
stein metric based ambiguity set, following somewhat different expressions.
The worst-case expectation under φ-divergence based ambiguity set boils
down to a convex program with linear constraints and a nonlinear objective
function, which can be efficiently solved via outer approximation algorithm.
The worst-case expectation under Wasserstein ambiguity set comes down to
a conic program which is convex and readily solvable. Unlike the max-min
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problem in traditional robust optimization method identifying the worst-case
scenario which the decision maker wishes to avoid, the worst-case expecta-
tion problem in distributionally robust optimization and robust stochastic
programming is solved in its dual form, whose solution is less intuitive to the
decision maker; moreover, it may not be easy to recover the primal optimal
solution, i.e., the worst-case probability. The worst-case distribution in the
robust chance constrained stochastic programming is discussed in [49, 72];
the worst-case discrete distribution in a two-stage stochastic program with
min-max expectation can be computed via a polynomial complexity algo-
rithm. Nonetheless, from a practical perspective, what the human decision
makers actually need to deploy is merely the here-and-now decision, and the
worst probability distribution is usually not very important, since corrective
actions can be postponed to a later stage when the uncertain data have been
observed or can be predicted with high accuracy.
C.5 Further Reading
Uncertainty is ubiquitous in real-life decision-making problems, and the deci-
sion maker usually has limited information and statistic data on the uncertain
factors, which makes robust optimization very attractive in practice, as it is
tailored to the available information at hand, and often gives rise to compu-
tationally tractable reformulations. Although the original idea can date back
to [63] in 1970s, it is during the past two decades that the fundamental theory
of robust optimization has been systematically developed. This research field
is even more active during the past five years. This chapter aims to help be-
ginners get an overview on this method and understand how to apply robust
optimization in practice. We provide basic models and tractable reformula-
tions, called the robust counterparts, for various robust optimization models
under different assumptions on the uncertainty and decision-making manner.
Basic theory of robust optimization is provided in [1, 3]. Comprehensive sur-
veys can be found in [4, 6]. Here we shed more light on several important
topics in robust optimization.
Uncertainty sets play a decisive role on the performance of a robust solu-
tion. A larger set could protect the system against a higher level of uncer-
tainty, and increase the cost as well. However, the probability that uncertain
data take their wort-case values is usually small. The decision-maker needs
to make a trade-off between reliability and economy. Ambiguous chance con-
straints and their approximations are discussed in Chapter 2 of [1], based on
which the parameter in the uncertainty set can be selected. It is proposed in
[64] to construct uncertainty sets from historical data and statistical tests.
The connection of uncertainty sets and coherent risk measures are revealed
in [65]. It is shown that the distortion risk measure leads to a polyhedral
uncertainty set. Specifically, the connection of CVaR and uncertainty sets is
C.5 Further Reading 169
discussed in [66]. A reverse correspondence is reported in [67], demonstrat-
ing that robust optimization could generalize the concepts of risk measures.
A data-driven approach is proposed in [64] to construct uncertainty sets for
robust optimization based on statistical hypothesis tests. The counterpart
problems are shown to be tractable, and optimal solutions satisfy constraints
with finite-sample probabilistic guarantee.
Distributionally robust optimization integrates statistic information, worst-
case expectation, and robust probability guarantee in a holistic optimization
framework, in which the uncertainty is modeled via an ambiguous probability
distribution. The choice of ambiguity sets for candidate distributions affects
not only the model conservatism, but also the existence of tractable reformu-
lations. Various ambiguity sets have been proposed in the literature, which
can be roughly classified into two categories:
1) Moment ambiguity sets. All PDFs share the same moment data, usu-
ally the first- and second-order moments, and structured properties, such as
symmetry and unimodality. For example, Markov ambiguity set contains all
distributions with the same mean and support, and the worst-case expec-
tation is shown to be equivalent to LPs [68]. Chebyshev ambiguity set is
composed of all distributions with known expectation and covariance matrix,
and usually leads to SDP counterparts [38, 69, 70]; the Gauss ambiguity set
contains all unimodal distributions in the Chebyshev ambiguity set, and also
gives rise to SDP reformulations [71].
2) Divergence ambiguity sets. All PDFs are close to a reference distribu-
tion in term of a specified measure. For example, the Wasserstein ambiguity
quantifies the divergence via Wasserstein metric [72, 74, 75]; the φ-divergence
ambiguity [58, 76] characterizes the divergence of two probability density
functions through the distance of special non-negative weights (for discrete
distributions) or integrals (for continuous distributions).
More information on the types of ambiguity sets and reformulations of
their distributionally robust counterparts can be found in [57]. According
to the latest research progress, the moment based distributionally robust
optimization is relatively mature and has been widely adopted in engineer-
ing, because the semi-infinite LP formulation and its dual for the worst-case
expectation problem offer a systematic approach to analyze the impact of
uncertain distributions. However, when more complicated ambiguity sets are
involved, such as the Gauss ambiguity set, deriving a tractable reformulation
needs more sophisticated approaches. The study on the latter category, which
directly imposes uncertainty on the distributions is attracting growing atten-
tions in the past two or three years, because it makes full use of historical
data, which can better capture the unique feature of uncertain factors under
investigation.
Data-driven robust stochastic programming, conceptually the same as dis-
tributionally robust optimization but preferred by some researchers, has
been studied using φ-divergence in [77, 78], and Wasserstein metric in
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[72, 74, 75, 79, 80, 81, 82], because a tractable counterpart problem can
be derived under such ambiguity sets.
Many decision-making problems in engineering and finance often require
that a certain risk measure associated with random variables should be lim-
ited below a threshold. However, the probability distribution of random vari-
ables is not exactly known; therefore, the risk limiting constraint must be
able to withstand perturbations of distribution in a reasonable range. This
entails a tractable reformulation of a risk measure under distributional un-
certainty. This problem has been comprehensively discussed in [75]. In more
recent publications, CVaR under moment ambiguity set with unimodality is
studied in [84]; VaR and CVaR under moment ambiguity set are discussed in
[85]; distortion risk measure under Wasserstein ambiguity set is considered
in [86].
In multi-stage decision making, causality is a pivotal issue for practical
implementation, which means that the wait-and-see decisions in the current
stage cannot depend on the information of uncertainty in future stages. For
example, in a unit commitment problem with 24 periods, the wind power
output is observed period-by-period. It is shown in [87] that the two-stage
robust model in [29] offers non-causal dispatch strategies, which are in fact not
robust. A multi-stage causal unit commitment model is suggested in [87, 88]
based on affine policy. Causality is put to effect by imposing block diagonal
constraints on the gain matrix of affine policy. Causality is also called non-
anticipativity in some literature, such as [89], which is attracting attention
from practitioners [90, 91].
For some other interesting topics on robust optimization, such as the con-
nection with stochastic optimization, connection with risk theory, and appli-
cations in engineering problems other than those in power systems, readers
can refer to [6]. Nonlinear issues have been addressed in [11, 92]. Optimization
models with uncertain SOC and SDP constraints are discussed in [93, 94].
The connection among robust optimization, data utilization, and machine
learning has been reviewed in [95].
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Appendix D
Equilibrium Problems
Life is not a game. Still, in this life, we choose the
games we live to play.
The concept of an equilibrium describes a state that the system has no incen-
tive to change. These incentives can be profit-driven in the case of competitive
markets or a reflection of physical laws such as energy flow equations. In this
sense, equilibrium is encompasses broader concepts than the solution of a
game. Equilibrium is a fundamental notation appearing in various disciplines
in economics and engineering. Identifying the equilibria allows eligible author-
ities to predict the system state at a future time or design reasonable policies
for regulating a system or a market. This is not saying that an equilibrium
state must appear sooner or later, partly because decision makers in reality
have only limited rationality and information. Nevertheless, the awareness of
such an equilibrium could be helpful for system design and operation. In this
chapter, we restrict our attention in the field of game theory, which entails si-
multaneously solving multiple interactive optimization problems. We review
the notions of some quintessential equilibrium problems and show how they
can be solved via traditional optimization methods. These problems can be
roughly categorized into two classes: the first one contains only one level:
all players must make a decision simultaneously, which is referred to as a
Nash-type game; the second one has two levels: decisions are made sequen-
tially by two groups of players, called the leaders and the followers. This
category is widely known as Stackelberg-type games, or multi-leader-follower
games, or equilibrium programs with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). Unlike
a traditional mathematical programming problem where the decision maker
is unique, in an equilibrium problem or a game, multiple decision makers seek
optimums of individual optimization problems parameterized in the optimal
solutions of others.
General notations used throughout this chapter are defined as follows.
Specific symbols are explained in the individual sections. In the game theo-
retic language, a decision maker is called a player. Vector x = (x1, · · · , xn)
refers to the joint decisions of all upper-level players or the so-called lead-
ers in a bilevel setting, where xi stands for the decisions of leader i;
x−i = (x1, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xn) refers to the rivals’ actions for leader i.
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Similarly, y = (y1, · · · , ym) refers to the joint decisions of all lower-level play-
ers or the so-called followers, where yj stands for the decisions of follower
j; y−j = (y1, · · · , yj−1, yj+1, · · · , ym) refers to the rivals’ actions for follower
j. λ and µ are Lagrangian dual multipliers associated with inequality and
equality constraints.
D.1 Standard Nash Equilibrium Problem
After J. F. Nash published his work on the equilibrium of n-person non-
cooperative games in early 1950s [1, 2], game theory quickly became a new
branch of operational research. Nash equilibrium problem (NEP) captures
the interactive behaviors of strategic players, in which each player’s utility
depends on the actions of other players. During decades of wonderful research,
a variety of new concepts and algorithms of Nash equilibriums have been
proposed and applied to almost every area of knowledge. This section just
reviews some basic concepts and the most prevalent best-response algorithms.
D.1.1 Formulation and Optimality Condition
In a standard n-person non-cooperative game, each player minimizes his pay-
off function fi(xi, x−i) which depends on all players’ actions. The strategy
set Xi = {xi ∈ Rki | gi(xi) ≤ 0} of player i is independent of x−i. The joint
strategy set of the game is the Cartesian product of Xi, i.e., X =
∏n
i=1Xi,
and X−i =
∏
j 6=iXj . Roughly speaking, the non-cooperative game is a collec-
tion of coupled optimization problems, where player i chooses xi ∈ Xi that
minimizes his payoff fi(xi, x−i) given his rivals’ strategies x−i, or mathemat-
ically
min
xi
fi(xi, x−i)
s.t. gi(xi) ≤ 0 : λi
}
, i = 1, · · · , n (D.1)
In the problem of player i, the decision variable is xi, and x−i is regarded as
parameters; λi is the dual variable.
The Nash equilibrium consists of a strategy profile such that every player’s
strategy constitutes the best response to all other players’ strategies, or in
other words, no player can further reduce his payoff by changing his action
unilaterally. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is a stable state which can sus-
tain spontaneously. The mathematical definition is formally given below.
Definition D.1. A strategy vector x∗ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium if the con-
dition
fi(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≤ fi(xi, x∗−i), ∀xi ∈ Xi (D.2)
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holds for all players.
Condition (D.2) naturally interprets the fact that at a Nash equilibrium,
if any player choose an alternative strategy, his payoff may grow, which is un-
desired. To depict a Nash equilibrium, a usual approach is the fixed-point of
best-response mapping. Let Bi(x−i) be the set of optimal strategies of player
i given the strategies x−i of others, then set B(x) =
∏n
i=1Bi(x−i) is the
best-response mapping of the game. It is clear that x∗ is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if x∗ ∈ B(x∗), i.e., x∗ is a fixed point of B(x). This fact estab-
lishes the foundation for analyzing Nash equilibria using the well-developed
fixed-point theory. However, conducting the fixed-point analysis usually re-
quires the best-response mapping B(x) in a closed form. Moreover, to declare
the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium, the mapping should be
contractive [3]. These strong assumptions inevitably limit the applicability of
fixed-point method. For example, in many instances, the best-response map-
ping B(x) is neither contractive nor continuous, but Nash equilibria may still
exist.
Another way to characterize the Nash equilibrium is the KKT system
approach. Generally speaking, in a standard Nash game, each player is facing
an NLP parameterized in the rivals’ strategies. If we consolidate the KKT
optimality conditions of all these NLPs in (D.1), we get the following KKT
system
∇xifi(xi, x−i) + λTi ∇xigi(xi) = 0
λi ≥ 0, g(xi) ≤ 0, λTi gi(xi) = 0
}
i = 1, · · · , n (D.3)
If x∗ is a Nash equilibrium that satisfies (D.2), and any standard constraint
qualification holds for every player’s problem in (D.1), then x∗ must be a
stationary point of the concentrated KKT system (D.3) [4]; and vice versa:
if all problems in (D.1) meet a standard constraint qualification, and a point
x∗ together with a proper vector of dual multipliers λ = (λ1, · · · , λn) solves
KKT system (D.3), then x∗ is also a Nash equilibrium that satisfies (D.2).
Problem (D.3) is an NCP and is the optimality condition of Nash equilib-
rium. It is a natural attempt to retrieve an equilibrium by solving NCP (D.3)
without deploying an iterative algorithm, which may suffer from divergence.
To obviate the computational challenges brought by the complementarity and
slackness constraints in KKT system (D.3), a merit function approach and
an interior-point method are comprehensively discussed in [4].
D.1.2 Variational Inequality Formulation
An alternative perspective to study the NEP is to formulate it as a variational
inequality (VI) problem. This approach is pursued in [5]. The advantage of
variational inequality approach is that it permits an easy access to existence
and uniqueness results without the best-response mapping. From a compu-
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tational point of view, it naturally leads to easily implementable algorithms
along with provable convergence performances.
Given a closed and convex set X ∈ Rn and a mapping F : X → Rn, a
variational inequality problem, denoted by VI(X,F ), is to determine a point
x∗ ∈ X satisfying [6]
(x− x∗)TF (x∗) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X (D.4)
To see the connection between a VI problem and a traditional convex
optimization problem that seeks a minimum of a convex function f(x) over a
convex set X, let us assume that the optimal solution is x∗, then the feasible
region must not lie in the half space where f(x) decreases; geometrically,
the line segment connecting any x ∈ X with x∗ must form an acute angle
with the gradient of f at x∗, which can be mathematically described as
(x− x∗)T∇f(x∗) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X. This condition can be concisely expressed by
VI(X,∇f) [7].
However, when the Jacobian matrix of F is not symmetric, F cannot be
written as the gradient of another scalar function, and hence the variational
inequality problem encompasses broader classes of problems than traditional
mathematical programs. For example, when X = Rn, problem (D.4) degen-
erates into a system of equations F (x∗) = 0; when X = Rn+, problem (D.4)
comes down to an NCP 0 ≤ x∗⊥F (x∗) ≥ 0.
To see the later case, x∗ ≥ 0 because it belongs to X; if any element of
F (x∗) is negative, say the first element [F (x∗)]1 < 0, we let x1 = x∗1 + 1,
and xi = x
∗
i , i = 2, · · · , then (x − x∗)TF (x∗) = [F (x∗)]1 < 0, which is
contradictive to (D.4). Hence F (x∗) ≥ 0 must hold. Let x = 0 in (D.4),
we have (x∗)TF (x∗) ≤ 0. Because x∗ ≥ 0 and F (x∗) ≥ 0, there must be
(x∗)TF (x∗) = 0, resulting in the target NCP.
The monotonicity of F plays a central role in the theoretical analysis of
VI problems, just like the role of convexity in mathematical programming. It
has a close relationship with the Jacobian matrix ∇F [5, 8]:
F (x) is monotone on X ⇔ ∇F (x)  0, ∀x ∈ X
F (x) is strictly monotone on X ⇐ ∇F (x)  0, ∀x ∈ X
F (x) is strongly monotone on X ⇔ ∇F (x)− cmI  0, ∀x ∈ X
where cm is a strictly positive constant. As a correspondence to convexity, a
differentiable function f is convex (strictly convex, strongly convex) on X if
and only if ∇f is monotone (strictly monotone, strongly monotone) on X.
Conceptually, monotonicity (convexity) is the weakest, since the matrix
∇F (x) can have zero eigenvalues; strict monotonicity (strict convexity) is
stronger, as all eigenvalues of matrix ∇F (x) are strictly positive; strong
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monotonicity (strong convexity) is the strongest, because the smallest eigen-
value of matrix ∇F (x) should be greater than a given positive number. In-
tuitively, a strong convex function must be more convex than a given con-
vex quadratic function; for example, f(x) = x2 is strongly convex on R;
f(x) = 1/x is convex on R++ and strongly convex on (0, 1].
To formulate an NEP as a VI problem and establish the existence and
uniqueness result of Nash equilibria, we list some assumptions on the con-
vexity and smoothness of each player’s problem.
Assumption D.1 [5]
1) The strategy set Xi is non-empty, closed and convex;
2) Function fi(xi, x−i) is convex in xi ∈ Xi for fixed x−i ∈ X−i;
3) Function fi(xi, x−i) is continuously differentiable in xi ∈ Xi for fixed
x−i ∈ X−i;
4) Function fi(xi, x−i) is twice continuously differentiable in x ∈ X with
bounded second derivatives.
Proposition D.1. [5] In a standard NEP NE(X, f), where f = (f1, · · · , fn),
if conditions 1)-3) in Assumption D.1 are met, then the game is equivalent
to a variational inequality problem VI(X,F ) with
X = X1 × · · · ×Xn
and
F (x) = (∇x1f1(x), · · · ,∇xnfn(x))
In the VI problem corresponding to a traditional mathematical program,
the Jacobian matrix ∇F is symmetric, because it is the Hessian matrix of
a scalar function. However, in Proposition D.1, the Jacobian matrix ∇F for
an NEP is generally non-symmetric. Building upon the VI reformulation, the
standard results on solution properties of VI problems [6] can be extended
to standard NEPs.
Proposition D.2. Given an NEP NE(X, f), all conditions in Assumption
D.1 are met, then we have the following statements:
1) If F (x) is strictly monotone, then the game has at most one Nash
equilibrium.
2) If F (x) is strongly monotone, then the game has a unique Nash equi-
librium.
Some sufficient guarantees for F (x) to be (strictly, strongly) monotone are
given in [5]. It should be pointed out that the equilibrium concept in the
sense of Proposition D.2 is termed the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, so as
to distinguish it from the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium which will appear
later on.
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D.1.3 Best Response Algorithms
A major benefit of the VI reformulation is that it leads to easily imple-
mentable solution algorithms. Here we list two of them. Readers who are
interested in the proofs on their performances can consult [5].
1. Algorithms for strongly convex cases
The first algorithm is a totally asynchronous-iterative one, in which players
may update their strategies with different frequencies. Let T = {0, 1, 2, · · · }
be the indices of iteration steps, and Ti ⊆ T be the set of steps in which
player i updates his own strategy xi. The notation x
k
i implies that at step
k /∈ Ti, xki remains unchanged. Let tij(k) be the latest step at which the
strategy of player j is received by player i at step k. Therefore, if player i
updates his strategy at step k, he uses the following strategy profile offered
by other players:
x
ti(k)
−i =
(
x
ti1(k)
1 , · · · , x
tii−1(k)
i−1 , x
tii+1(k)
i+1 , · · · , xt
i
n(k)
n
)
(D.5)
Using above definitions, the totally asynchronous-iterative algorithm is
summarized in Algorithm D.1. Some technique conditions for which the
schedules Ti and t
i
j(k) should satisfy in order to be implementable in practice
are discussed in [9, 10], which are assumed to be satisfied without particular
mention.
Algorithm D.1 : Asynchronous best-response algorithm
1: Choose a convergence tolerance ε > 0 and a feasible initial point x0 ∈ X;
the iteration index is k = 0;
2: For player i = 1, · · · , n, update the strategy xk+1i as
xk+1i =
{
x∗i ∈ arg minxi
{
fi
(
xi, x
ti(k)
−i
) ∣∣∣ xi ∈ Xi} if k ∈ Ti
xni otherwise
(D.6)
3: If ‖xk+1− xk‖2 ≤ ε, terminate and report xk+1 as the Nash equilibrium;
otherwise, update k ← k + 1, and go to step 2.
A sufficient condition which guarantees the convergence of Algorithm D.1
is provided in [5]. Roughly speaking, Algorithm D.1 would converge if fi(x)
is strongly convex in xi. However, this is a strong assumption, which cannot
be satisfied even if there is only one point where the partial Hessian matrix
∇2xifi(x) of player i is singular.
Algorithm D.1 reduces to some classic algorithms by enforcing a special
updating procedure, i.e., a particular selection of Ti and t
i
j(k). For example, if
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players update their strategies simultaneously (sequentially), Algorithm D.1
becomes the Jacobi (Gauss-Seidel) type iterative scheme. Interestingly, the
asynchronous best-response algorithm is robust against data missing or delay,
and is guaranteed to find the unique Nash equilibrium. This feature greatly
relaxes the requirement on data synchronization and simplifies the design of
communication systems, and makes this class of algorithm very appealing in
distributed system operations.
2. Algorithms for convex cases
To relax the strong monotonicity assumption on F (x), the second algo-
rithm has been proposed in [5], which only uses the monotonicity property
and is summarized below. Algorithm D.2 converges to a Nash equilibrium, if
each player’s optimization problem is convex (or F (x) is monotone), which
significantly improves its applicability.
Algorithm D.2 : Proximal Decomposition Algorithm
1: Given {ρn}∞n=0, ε > 0, and τ > 0, choose a feasible initial point x0 ∈ X;
2: Find an equilibrium z0 of the following NEP using Algorithm D.1
min
xi
fi(xi, x−i) + τ‖xi − x0i ‖22
s.t. xi ∈ Xi
}
, i = 1, · · · , n (D.7)
3: If ‖z0 − x0‖2 ≤ ε, terminate and report x0 as the Nash equilibrium;
otherwise, update x0 ← (1− ρn)x0 + ρnz0, and go to step 2.
Algorithm D.2 is a double-loop method: the inner loop identifies a Nash
equilibrium of the regularized game (D.7) with x0 being a parameter, which
is updated in each iteration, and the outer loop updates x0 by selecting a
new point along the line connecting x0 and z0. Notice that in step 2, as long
as τ is large enough, the Hessian matrix ∇2xifi(x) + 2τI must be positive
definite, and thus the best-response algorithm applied to (D.7) is guaranteed
to converge to the unique Nash equilibrium. See [5] for more details about
parameter selection.
The penalty term τ‖xi−x0i ‖2 limits the change of optimal strategies in two
consecutive iterations, and can be interpreted as a damping factor that at-
tenuates possible oscillations during the computation. It is worth mentioning
that the penalty parameter τ significantly impacts the convergence rate of
Algorithm D.2 and should be carefully selected. If it is too small, the damp-
ing effect of the penalty term is limited, and the oscillation may still take
place; if it is too large, the increment of x in each step is very small, and
Algorithm D.2 may suffer from a slow convergence rate. The optimal value
of τ is problem-dependent. There is not a universal way to determine its best
value.
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Recently, single-loop distributed algorithms for monotone Nash games are
proposed in [11], which authors believe to be promising in practical applica-
tions. In these two schemes, the regularization parameter is updated at once
after each iteration is completed, rather than when the regularized problem is
approximately solved, and players can select their parameter independently.
D.1.4 Nash Equilibrium of Matrix Games
As explained before, not all Nash games have an equilibrium, especially when
the strategy set and the payoff function are non-convex or discrete. To widen
the equilibrium notion and reveal deeper insights on the behaviors of players
in such instances, it is instructive to revisit some simple games, called the
matrix game, which is the primary research object of game theorists.
The bimatrix game refers to a matrix game involving two players P1 and
P2. The numbers of possible strategies of P1 and P2 are m and n, respectively.
A = {aij} ∈Mm×n is the payoff matrix of P1: when P1 chooses strategy i and
P2 selects strategy j, the payoff of P1 is aij . The payoff matrix B ∈Mm×n of
P2 can be defined in the same way. In a matrix game, each player is interested
to determine a probability distribution of his actions, such that his expected
payoff is minimized. Let xi (yj) be the probability that P1 (P2) will use
strategy i (j), vectors x = [x1, · · · , xm]T and y = [y1, · · · , yn]T are called
mixed strategies, clearly,
x ≥ 0,
m∑
i=1
xi = 1 or x ∈ ∆m
y ≥ 0,
n∑
j=1
yj = 1 or y ∈ ∆n
(D.8)
where ∆m and ∆n are simplex slices in Rm and Rn.
1. Two-person zero-sum games
The zero-sum game represents a totally competitive situation: P1’s gain
is P2’s loss, so the sum of their payoff matrices is A + B = 0, as its name
suggests. Such type of game has been well studied in vast literature since
von Neumann found the famous Minimax Theorem in 1928. The game is
revisited from a mathematical programming perspective in [12]. The proposed
linear programming method is especially powerful for instances with a high-
dimensional payoff matrix. Next, we briefly introduce this method.
Let us begin with a payoff matrix A = {aij}, aij > 0, ∀i, j with strictly
positive entries (otherwise, we can add a constant to every entry, such that
the smallest entry becomes positive, and the equilibrium strategy remains
the same). The expected payoff of P1 is given by
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VA =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
xiaijyj = x
TAy (D.9)
which must be positive because of the element-wise positivity assumption on
A.
Since B = −A and minimizing −xTAy is equivalent to maximizing xTAy,
the two-person zero-sum game has a min-max form as
min
x∈∆m
max
y∈∆n
xTAy (D.10)
or
max
y∈∆n
min
x∈∆m
xTAy (D.11)
The solution to the two-person zero-sum matrix game (D.10) or (D.11) is
called a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, or the saddle point of a min-max
problem. It satisfies
(x∗)TAy∗ ≤ xTAy∗, ∀x ∈ ∆m
(x∗)TAy∗ ≥ yTAx∗, ∀y ∈ ∆n
To solve this game, consider (D.10) in the following format
min
x
{v1(x) | x ∈ ∆m} (D.12)
where v1(x) is the optimal value function of the problem faced by P2 with
the fixed strategy x of P1
v1(x) = max
y
{
xTAy
∣∣ y ∈ ∆n}
In view of the feasible region defined in (D.8), v1(x) is equal to the maximal
element of vector xTA, which is strictly positive, and the inequality
ATx ≤ 1nv1(x)
holds. Furthermore, introducing a normalized vector x¯ = x/v1(x), we have
x¯ ≥ 0, AT x¯ ≤ 1n
v1(x) = (x¯
T1m)−1
Taking these relations into account, problem (D.12) becomes
min
x¯
(x¯T1m)−1
s.t. AT x¯ ≤ 1n
x¯ ≥ 0
(D.13)
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Because the objective is strictly positive and monotonic, the optimal so-
lution of (D.13) keeps unchanged if we choose to maximize x¯T1m under the
same constraints, giving rise to the following LP
max
x¯
x¯T1m
s.t. AT x¯ ≤ 1n
x¯ ≥ 0
(D.14)
Let x¯∗ and v¯∗1 be the optimal solution and optimal value of LP (D.14). Accord-
ing to the analysis of variable transformation, the optimal expected payoff v∗1
and the optimal mixed strategy x∗ of P1 in this game are given by
v∗1 = 1/v¯
∗
1 , x
∗ = x¯∗/v¯∗1 (D.15)
Consider (D.11) in the same way, we obtain the following LP for P2:
min
y¯
y¯T1n
s.t. Ay¯ ≥ 1m
y¯ ≥ 0
(D.16)
Denote by y¯∗ and v¯∗2 the optimal solution and optimal value of LP (D.16),
and then the optimal expected payoff v∗2 and the optimal mixed strategy y
∗
of P2 in this game can be posed as
v∗2 = 1/v¯
∗
2 , y
∗ = y¯∗/v¯∗2 (D.17)
In summary, the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of two-person zero-sum
matrix game (D.10) is (x∗, y∗), and the payoff of P1 is v∗1 . Interestingly,
we notice that problems (D.14) and (D.16) constitute a pair of dual LPs,
implying that their optimal values are equal, and the optimal solution y∗
in (D.17) also solves the inner LP of (D.10). This observation leads to two
important conclusions:
1) The Nash equilibrium of a two-person zero-sum matrix game, or the
saddle point, can be computed by solving a pair of dual LPs. In fact, if one
player’s strategy, say x∗, have been obtained from (D.14) and (D.15), the
rival’s strategy can be retrieved by solving (D.10) with x = x∗.
2) The decision sequence of a two-person zero-sum game is interchangeable
without influencing the saddle point.
2. General bimatrix games
In more general two-person matrix games, the sum of payoff matrices
is not equal to zero, and each player wishes to minimize its own expected
payoff taking the other player’s strategy as given. In the setting of mixed
strategies, players are selecting the probability distribution among available
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strategies rather than a single action (the pure strategy), and the respective
optimization problems are as follows
min
x
xTAy
s.t. xT1m = 1 : λ
x ≥ 0
(D.18)
min
y
xTBy
s.t. yT1n = 1 : γ
y ≥ 0
(D.19)
The pair of probability distributions (x∗, y∗) is called a mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium if
(x∗)TAy∗ ≤ xTAy∗, ∀x ∈ ∆m
(x∗)TBy∗ ≤ (x∗)TBy, ∀y ∈ ∆n
Unlike the zero-sum case, there is not an equivalent LP that can extract
the Nash equilibrium. Performing the KKT system approach, we write out
the KKT condition for (D.18)
Ay − λ1m − µ = 0
0 ≤ µ⊥x ≥ 0
xT1m = 1
where µ is the dual variable associated with the non-negative constraint, and
can be eliminated from the first equality. Concentrating the KKT conditions
of LPs (D.18) and (D.19) gives
0 ≤ Ay − λ1m⊥x ≥ 0, xT1m = 1
0 ≤ BTx− γ1n⊥y ≥ 0, yT1n = 1 (D.20)
Complementarity condition (D.20) can be solved by setting λ = γ = 1 and
omitting equality constraints, and recovering them at a later normalization
step, i.e., we first solve
0 ≤ Ay − 1m⊥x ≥ 0
0 ≤ BTx− 1n⊥y ≥ 0 (D.21)
Suppose that the solution is (x¯, y¯), then the Nash equilibrium is
x∗ = x¯/x¯T1m
y∗ = y¯/y¯T1n
(D.22)
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and the corresponding multipliers are derived from (D.20) as
λ∗ = (x∗)TAy∗
γ∗ = (x∗)TBy∗
(D.23)
On the other hand, if (x∗, y∗) is a Nash equilibrium and solves (D.20)
with multipliers (λ∗, γ∗), we can observe that (x∗/γ∗, y∗/λ∗) solves (D.21),
therefore
x¯ =
x∗
(x∗)TBy∗
y¯ =
y∗
(x∗)TAy∗
(D.24)
Now we can see that identifying the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of a
bimatrix game entails solving KKT system (D.20) or (D.21), which is called
a linear complementarity problem (LCP). A classical algorithm for LCP is
the Lemke’s method [13, 14]. Another systematic way to solve an LCP is to
reformulate it as an MILP using the method described in Appendix B.3.5.
Nonetheless, there are more tailored MILP models for LCPs, which will be
detailed in Sect. D.4.2.
Unlike the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, whose existence relies on some
assumptions on convexity, the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for matrix
games, which is the discrete probability distribution among available actions,
always exists [2]. If a game with two players has no pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium, and each player can choose actions from a finite strategy set, we
can then calculate the payoff matrices as well as the mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium, which informs the likelihood that the player will adopt each
corresponding pure strategy.
D.1.5 Potential Games
Despite that a direct certification of the existence and uniqueness of a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium for a general game model is non-trivial, when
the game possesses some special structures, such a certification becomes ax-
iomatic. One of these guarantees is the existence of an exact potential func-
tion, and the associated problem is known as the potential game [15]. Four
types of potential games are listed in [15], categorized by the type of the
potential function. Other extensions of the potential game have been studied
as well. For a complete introduction, we recommend [16].
Definition D.2. (Exact potential game) A game is an exact potential game
if there is a potential function U(x) such that:
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fi(xi, x−i)− fi(yi, x−i) = U(xi, x−i)− U(yi, x−i)
∀xi, yi ∈ Xi, ∀x−i ∈ X−i, i = 1, · · · , n
(D.25)
In an exact potential game, the change in the utility/payoff of any single
player due to the unilateral strategy deviation leads to the same amount of
change in the potential function. Among various variations of potential games
which are defined by relaxing the strict equality (D.25), the exact potential
game is the most fundamental one and has attracted the majority of research
interests. Throughout this section, the term potential game means the exact
one without particular mention.
The condition for a game being a potential game and the method for
constructing the potential function are given in the following proposition.
Proposition D.3. [15] Suppose the payoff functions fi, i = 1, · · · , n in a
game are twice continuously differentiable, then a potential function exists if
and only if
∂2fi
∂xi∂xj
=
∂2fj
∂xi∂xj
, ∀i, j = 1, · · · , n (D.26)
and the potential function can be constructed as
U(v)− U(z) =
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
(x′i(t))
T ∂fi
∂xi
(x(t))dt (D.27)
where x(t) : [0, 1]→ X is a continuously differentiable path in X connecting
strategy profile v and a fixed strategy profile z, such that x(0) = z, x(1) = v.
To obtain (D.27), first, a direct consequence of (D.25) is
∂fi
∂xi
=
∂U
∂xi
, i = 1, · · · , n (D.28)
For any smooth curve C(t) : [0, 1] → X and any function U with a con-
tinuous gradient ∇U , the gradient theorem in calculus tells us
U(Cend)− U(Cstart) =
∫
C
∇U(s)ds
where vector s represents points along the integral trajectory C parameter-
ized in a scalar variable. Introducing s = x(t): when t = 0, s = Cstart = z;
when t = 1, s = Cend = v. By the chain rule, ds = x
′(t)dt, and hence we get
U(v)− U(z) =
∫ 1
0
(x′(t))T∇U(x(t))dt
=
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
(x′i(t))
T ∂U
∂xi
(x(t))dt
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Then, if U is a potential function, substituting (D.28) into above equation
gives equation (D.27).
In summary, for a standard NEP with continuous payoff functions, we
can check whether it is a potential game, and further construct its potential
function, if the right-hand side of (D.27) has a closed form expression. Nev-
ertheless, in some particular cases, the potential function can be observed
without calculating an integral.
1. The payoff functions of the game can be decomposed as
fi(xi, x−i) = pi(xi) +Q(x), ∀i = 1, · · · , n
where the first term only depends on xi, and the second term that couples all
players’ strategies and appears in every utility function is identical. In such
circumstance, the potential function is instantly posed as
U(x) = Q(x) +
n∑
i=1
pi(xi)
which can be verified through its definition in (D.25).
2. The payoff functions of the game can be decomposed as
fi(xi, x−i) = pi(x−i) +Q(x), ∀i = 1, · · · , n
where the first term only depends on the joint actions of opponents x−i, and
the second term is common and identical to all players. In such circumstance,
the potential function is Q(x). This is easy to understand because x−i is
constant in the decision-making problem of player i and thus the first term
pi(x−i) can be omitted from the objective function.
3. The payoff function of each player has a form of
f(xi, x−i) =
a+ b n∑
j=1
xj
xi + ci(xi), i = 1, · · · , n
Obviously,
∂2fi
∂xi∂xj
=
∂2fj
∂xi∂xj
= b
therefore, a potential function exists and is given by
U(x) = a
n∑
i=1
xi +
b
2
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
xixj + b
n∑
i=1
x2i +
n∑
i=1
ci(xi)
The potential function provides a convenient way to analyze the Nash
equilibria of potential games, since the function coincides with incentives of
all players.
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Proposition D.4. [16] If game G1 is a potential game with potential func-
tion U(x); G2 is another game with the same number of players and their
payoff functions are F1(x1, x−1) = · · · = Fn(xn, x−n) = U(x). Then G1 and
G2 have the same set of Nash equilibria.
This is easy to understand because an equilibrium of G1 satisfies
fi(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≤ fi(xi, x∗−i),∀xi ∈ Xi, i = 1, · · · , n
By the definition of potential function (D.25), this gives
U(x∗i , x
∗
−i) ≤ U(xi, x∗−i),∀xi ∈ Xi, i = 1, · · · , n (D.29)
So any equilibrium of G1 is an equilibrium of G2. Similarly, the reverse holds,
too.
In Proposition D.4, the identical interest game G2 is actually an optimiza-
tion problem. The potential function builds a bridge between an NEP and a
mathematical programming problem. Let X = X1 × · · · ×Xn, (D.29) can be
written as
U(x∗) ≤ U(x),∀x ∈ X (D.30)
On this account, we have
Proposition D.5. [15] Every minimizer of the potential function U(x) in X
is a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium of the potential game.
Proposition D.5 is very useful. It reveals the fact that computing a Nash
equilibrium of a potential game is equivalent to solving a traditional math-
ematical program. Meanwhile, the existence and uniqueness results of Nash
equilibrium for potential games can be understood from the solution property
of NLPs.
Proposition D.6. [16] Every potential game with a continuous potential
function U(x) and a compact strategy space X has at least one (pure-strategy)
Nash equilibrium. If U(x) is strictly convex, then the Nash equilibrium is
unique.
Propositions D.5-D.6 make no reference on the convexity of individual pay-
off functions of players. Moreover, if the potential function U(x) is non-convex
and has multiple local minimums, then each local optimizer corresponds to a
local Nash equilibrium where Xi in (D.29) is replaced with the intersection
of Xi with a neighborhood region of x
∗
i .
D.2 Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem
In above developments for standard NEPs, we have assumed that the strategy
sets are decoupled: the available strategies of each player do not depend
190 D Equilibrium Problems
on other players’ choices. However, there are indeed many practical cases
where the strategy sets are interactive. For example, when players consume
a common resource, the total consumption should not exceed the inventory
quantity. The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP), invented in
[17], relaxes the strategy independence assumption in classic NEPs and allows
the feasible set of each player’s actions to depend on the rivals’ strategies.
For a comprehensive review, we recommend [18].
D.2.1 Formulation and Optimality Condition
Denote by Xi(x−i) the strategy set of player i when others select x−i. In
a GNEP, given the value of x−i, each player i determines a strategy xi ∈
Xi(x−i) which minimizes a payoff function fi(xi, x−i). In this regard, a GNEP
with n players is the joint solution of n coupled optimization problems
min
xi
fi(xi, x−i)
s.t. xi ∈ Xi(x−i)
}
, i = 1, · · · , n (D.31)
In (D.31), correlation takes place not only in the objective function, but
also in the constraints.
Definition D.3. A generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE), or the solution of
a GNEP, is a feasible point x∗ such that
f(x∗i , x
∗
−i) ≤ f(xi, x∗−i), ∀xi ∈ Xi(x−i) (D.32)
holds for all players.
In its full generality, the GNEP is much more difficult than an NEP due to
the variability of strategy sets. In this section, we restrict our attention to a
particular class of GNEP: the so-called GNEP with shared convex constraints.
In such a problem, the strategy sets can be expressed as
Xi(x−i) = {xi | xi ∈ Qi, g(xi, x−i) ≤ 0} , i = 1, · · · , n (D.33)
where Qi is a closed and convex set which involves only xi; g(xi, x−i) ≤ 0
represents the shared constraints. They consist of a set of convex inequalities
coupling all players’ strategies and are identical in Xi(x−i), i = 1, · · · , n.
Sometimes, Qi and g(xi, x−i) ≤ 0 are also mentioned as local and global
constraints, respectively.
In the absence of shared constraints, the GNEP reduces to a standard
NEP. Define the feasible set of strategy profile x = (x1, · · · , xn) in a GNEP
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X =
{
x
∣∣∣∣∣ x ∈
n∏
i=1
Qi, g(x) ≤ 0
}
(D.34)
It is easy to see that Xi(x−i) is a slice of X. A geometric interpretation of
(D.33) is illustrated in Fig. D.1. It is seen that the choice of x1 influences the
feasible interval X2(x1) of Player 2.
 1 2,e ex x
 1 2,X x x
2
x
1
x
 1 2eX x
 2 1eX x
Fig. D.1 Relations of X and the individual strategy sets.
We make some assumptions on the smoothness and convexity for a GNEP
with shared constraints.
Assumption D.2
1) Strategy set Qi of each player is nonempty, closed, and convex.
2) Payoff function fi(xi, x−i) of each player is twice continuously differ-
entiable in x and convex in xi for every fixed x−i.
3) Functions g(x) = (g1(x), · · · , gm(x)) are differentiable and convex in x.
In analogy with the NEP, concatenating the KKT optimality condition
of each optimization problem in (D.31) gives us what is called the KKT
condition of the GNEP. For notation brevity, we omit local constraints (Qi =
Rni) and assume that Xi(x−i) contains only global constraints. Write out the
KKT condition of GNEP (D.31)
∇xifi(xi, x−i) + λTi ∇xig(x) = 0
λi ≥ 0, g(x) ≤ 0, λTi g(x) = 0
}
i = 1, · · · , n (D.35)
where λi is the Lagrange multiplier vector associated with the global con-
straints in the i-th player’s problem.
Proposition D.7. [18]
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1) Let x¯ = (x¯1, · · · , x¯n) be the equilibrium of a GNEP, then a multiplier
vector λ¯ = (λ¯1, · · · , λ¯n) exists, such that the pair (x¯, λ¯) solves KKT system
(D.35).
2) If (x¯, λ¯) solves KKT system (D.35), and Assumption D.2 holds, then x¯
is an equilibrium of GNEP (D.31) with shared convex constraints.
However, in contrast to an NEP, the solutions of an GNEP may be non-
isolated and constitute a low dimensional manifold, because g(x) is a common
constraint shared by all, and the Jacobian of the KKT system may appear to
be singular. A meticulous explanation is provided in [18]. We give a graphic
interpretation for this phenomenon.
Consider a GNEP with two players:
Player 1:
{
max
x1
x1
s.t. x1 ∈ X1(x2)
Player 2:
{
max
x2
x2
s.t. x2 ∈ X2(x1)
where
X1(x2) = {x1 | x1 ≥ 0, g(x1, x2) ≤ 0}
X2(x1) = {x2 | x2 ≥ 0, g(x1, x2) ≤ 0}
and the global constraint set is{
x
∣∣∣∣∣ g1 = 2x1 + x2 ≤ 0g2 = x1 + 2x2 ≤ 0
}
The feasible set X of the strategy profile is plotted in Fig. D.2. It can be
verified that any point on the line segments
L1 =
{
(x1, x2)
∣∣∣∣ 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 23 , 23 ≤ x2 ≤ 1, x1 + 2x2 = 2
}
and
L2 =
{
(x1, x2)
∣∣∣∣ 23 ≤ x1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 23 , 2x1 + x2 = 2
}
is an equilibrium point that satisfies Definition D.3.
To refine a meaningful equilibrium from the infinitely many candidates,
it is proposed to impose additional conditions on the Lagrange multipliers
associated with shared constraints [19]. The outcome is called a restricted
Nash equilibrium. Two special cases are discussed here.
1. Normalized Nash equilibrium
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Fig. D.2 Illustration of the equilibria of a simple GNEP.
The normalized Nash equilibrium is firstly introduced in [20]. It incorpo-
rates a cone constraint on the dual multipliers
λi = βiλ0, βi > 0, i = 1, · · · , n (D.36)
where λ0 ∈ Rm+ . Solving KKT system (D.35) with constraint (D.36) gives an
equilibrium solution. It is shown that for any given β ∈ Rn++, a normalized
Nash equilibrium exists as long as the game is feasible. Moreover, if the
mapping
F (β) : Rn → Rn =

1
β1
∇x1f1(x1, x−1)
...
1
βn
∇xnfn(xn, x−n)

parameterized in β is strictly monotone (by assuming convexity of payoff
functions), then the normalized Nash equilibrium is unique.
The relation given in (D.36) indicates that the dual variables λi associated
with the shared constraints are a constant vector scaled by different scalars.
From an economic perspective, this means that the shadow prices of common
resources at any normalized Nash equilibrium are proportional among each
player.
2. Variational equilibrium
Recall the variational inequality formulation for the NEP in Proposition
D.1, a GNEP with shared convex constraints can be treated in the same
way: Let F (x) = (∇x1f1(x), · · · ,∇xnfn(x)) be a mapping, and the feasible
region X is defined in (D.34), then every solution of variational inequality
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problem VI(X,F ) gives an equilibrium solution of the GNEP, which is called
the variational equilibrium (VE).
However, unlike an NEP and its associated VI problem which have the
same solutions, not all equilibria of the GNEP are preserved when it is passed
to a corresponding VI problem; see [21, 22] for examples and further details.
In fact, a solution x∗ of a GNEP is a VE if and only if it solves KKT system
(D.35) with the following constraints on the Lagrange dual multipliers [5, 18,
21]:
λ1 = · · · = λn = λ0 ∈ Rm+ (D.37)
implying that all players perceive the same shadow prices of common resource
at a VE. The VI approach has two important implications. First, it allows
us analyze a GNEP using well-developed VI theory, such as conditions which
could guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium point; sec-
ond, condition (D.37) gives an interesting economic interpretation of the VE,
and inspires pricing-based distributed algorithms to compute an equilibrium
solution, which will be discussed in the next section.
The concept of potential game for NEPs directly applies to GNEPs. If a
GNEP with shared convex constraints possesses a potential function U(x)
which satisfies (D.25), an equilibrium can be retrieved from a mathematical
program which minimizes the potential function over the feasible set X de-
fined in (D.34). To reveal the connection of the optimal solution and the VE,
we omit constraints in the local strategy sets Qi, i = 1, · · · , n for notation
simplicity, and write out the mathematical program as follows
min
x
U(x)
s.t. g(x) ≤ 0
(D.38)
whose KKT optimality condition is given by
∇xU(x) + λT∇xg(x) = 0
λ ≥ 0, g(x) ≤ 0, λT g(x) = 0 (D.39)
The first equality can be decomposed into n sub-equations
∇xiU(x) + λT∇xig(x) = 0, i = 1, · · · , n (D.40)
Recall (D.28), ∇xiU(x) = ∇xifi(xi, x−i), substituting it into (D.39) we have
∇xifi(xi, x−i) + λT∇xig(x) = 0, i = 1, · · · , n
λ ≥ 0, g(x) ≤ 0, λT g(x) = 0
which is exactly KKT system (D.35) with identical shadow price constraint
(D.37). In this regard, we can see
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Proposition D.8. Optimizing the potential function of a GNEP with shared
convex constraints gives a variational equilibrium.
Consider the example shown in Fig. D.2 again, (2/3, 2/3) is the unique VE
of the GNEP, which is plotted in Fig. D.3. The corresponding dual variables
of global constraints g1 ≤ 0 and g2 ≤ 0 are (1/3, 1/3).
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Fig. D.3 Illustration of the variational equilibrium.
D.2.2 Best-Response Algorithm
The presence of shared constraints wrecks the Cartesian structure of
∏n
i=1Qi
in a standard Nash game, and prevents a direct application of the best re-
sponse methods presented in Appendix D.1.3 to solve an NEP. Moreover,
even if an equilibrium can be found, it may depend on the initial point as
well as the optimization sequence, because solutions of a GNEP are non-
isolated. To illustrate this pitfall, take Fig. D.3 for an example. Suppose we
pick up an arbitrary point x0 ∈ X as the initial value. If we first maximize x1
(x2), the point moves to B (A), and then in the second step, x2 (x1) does not
change, because it is already an equilibrium solution in the sense of Definition
D.3. In view of this, fixed-point iteration may give any outcome on the line
segments connecting (2/3, 2/3) and (0, 1)/(1, 0), depending on the initiation.
This section introduces the distributed algorithms proposed in [5] which
identify a VE of GNEP (D.31) with shared convex constraints. Motivated
by the Lagrange decomposition framework, we can rewrite problem (D.31)
in a more convenient form. Consider finding a pair (x, λ), where x is the
equilibrium of the following standard NEP G(λ) with a given vector λ of
Lagrange multipliers
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G(λ) :
{
min
xi
fi(xi, x−i) + λT g(x)
s.t. xi ∈ Qi
}
, i = 1, · · · , n (D.41)
and furthermore, a complementarity constraint
0 ≤ λ⊥− g(x) ≥ 0 (D.42)
Problem (D.41)-(D.42) has a clear economic interpretation: suppose the
shared constraints represent the availability of some common resources, vec-
tor λ can be viewed as the prices paid by players for consuming these re-
sources. Actually, when a resource is adequate, the inequality constraint is
not binding and the Lagrange dual multiplier is zero; the dual multiplier or
shadow price is positive only if a resource becomes scarce, indicated by a
binding inequality constraint. This relation has been imposed in constraint
(D.42).
The KKT conditions of G(λ) (D.41) in conjunction with condition (D.42)
turn out to be the VE condition of GNEP (D.31). In view of this connection,
a VE can be found by solving (D.41)-(D.42) in a distributed manner based
on previous algorithms developed for NEPs. Likewise, we discuss strongly
convex cases and convex cases separately, due to their different convergence
guarantees.
1. Algorithms for strongly convex cases
Suppose that the game G(λ) in (D.41) is strongly convex and has a unique
Nash equilibrium x(λ) for any given λ ≥ 0. This uniqueness condition allows
defining the map
Φ(λ) : λ→ −g(x(λ)) (D.43)
which quantifies the negative violation of the shared constraints at x(λ).
Based on (D.41)-(D.42), the distributed algorithm is provided as follows.
Algorithm D.3
1: Choose an initial price vector λ0 ≥ 0. The iteration index is k = 0.
2: Given λk, find the unique equilibrium x(λk) of G(λk) using Algorithm
D.1.
3: If 0 ≤ λk⊥Φ(λk) ≥ 0 is satisfied, terminate and report x(λk) as the VE;
otherwise, choose τk > 0, and update the price vector according to
λk+1 =
[
λk − τkΦ(λk)
]+
set k ← k + 1, and go to step 2.
Algorithm D.3 is a double-loop method. The range of parameter τn and
convergence proof have been thoroughly discussed in [5] based on the mono-
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tonicity of the mapping F +∇g(x)λ, where F = (∇xifi)ni=1, and ∇g(x) is a
matrix whose i-th column is equal to ∇gi.
2. Algorithms for convex cases
Now we consider the case in which the VI associated with problem (D.41)-
(D.42) is merely monotone (at least one problem in (D.41) is not strongly
convex). In such circumstance, the convergence of Algorithm D.3 is no longer
guaranteed. This is not only because Algorithm D.1 for the inner loop game
G(λ) may not converge, but also because the outer loop has to be complicated.
To circumvent this difficulty, we try to convexify the game using regulariza-
tion terms as what has been done in Algorithm D.2. To this end, we have
to explore an optimization reformulation for the complementarity constraint
(D.42), which is given by
λ ∈ arg min
λ¯
{−λ¯T g(x) ∣∣ λ¯ ≥ 0}
Then, consider the following ordinary NEP with n + 1 players in which
the last player controls the price vector λ:
min
xi
{
fi(xi, x−i) + λT g(x)
∣∣ xi ∈ Qi} , i = 1, · · · , n
min
λ
{−λT g(x) ∣∣ λ ≥ 0} (D.44)
where the last player solves an LP in variable λ parameterized in x. At
the equilibrium, g(x) ≤ 0 is implicitly satisfied. To see this, because Qi is
bounded, problems of the first n players must have a finite optimum for
arbitrary λ. If g(x)  0, the last problem has an infinite optimum, imposing
a large penalty on the constraint that is violated, and thus the first n players
will alter their strategies accordingly. Whenever g(x) ≤ 0 is met, the last LP
must have a zero minimum, which satisfies (D.42). In summary, this extended
game (D.44) has the same equilibria as problem (D.41)-(D.42). Since the
strategy sets of (D.44) have a Cartesian structure, Algorithm D.2 can be
applied to find an equilibrium.
The convergence of Algorithm D.4 is guaranteed under a sufficiently large
τ . More quantitative discussions on parameter selection and convergence con-
ditions can be found in [5]. In practice, the value of τ should be carefully
chosen to achieve satisfactory computational performances.
In NEPs and GNEPs, players make simultaneous decisions. In real-life de-
cision making problems, there are many situations in which players can move
sequentially. In the rest of this chapter, we consider three kinds of bilevel
games, in which the upper-level (lower-level) players are called leaders (fol-
lowers), and leaders make decisions prior to followers. The simplest one is
the Stackelberg game, or the single-leader-single-follower game, or just the
bilevel program; Stackelberg game can be generalized by incorporating mul-
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Algorithm D.4
1: Given {ρn}∞n=0, ε > 0, and τ > 0, choose a feasible initial point x0 ∈ X
and an initial price vector λ0; the iteration index is k = 0.
2: Given zk = (xk, λk), find a Nash equilibrium zk+1 = (xk+1, λk+1) of the
following regularized NEP using Algorithm D.1
min
xi
{
fi(xi, x−i) + λT g(x) + τ
∥∥xi − xki ∥∥22 ∣∣∣ xi ∈ Qi} , i = 1, · · · , n
min
λ
{
−λT g(x) + τ ∥∥λ− λk∥∥2
2
∣∣∣ λ ≥ 0}
3: If ‖zk+1 − zk‖2 ≤ ε, terminate and report xk+1 as the variational equi-
librium; otherwise, update k ← k + 1, zk ← (1− ρk)zk−1 + ρkzk, and go
to step 2.
tiple players in the upper and lower levels. Players at the same level make
decisions simultaneously, whereas followers’ actions are subject to leaders’
movements, forming an NEP parameterized in the leaders’ decisions. When
there is only one leader, the problem is called a mathematical program with
equilibrium constraints (MPEC); when there are multiple leaders, the prob-
lem is referred to as an equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints
(EPEC). It is essentially a bilevel GNEP among the leaders.
D.3 Bilevel Programs
Bilevel program is a special mathematical program with another optimization
problems nested in the constraints. The main problem is called the upper-level
problem, and the decision maker is the leader; the one nested in constraints
is called the lower-level problem, and the decision maker is the follower. In
game theory, a bilevel program is usually referred to as the Stackelberg game,
which arises in many economic and engineering design problems.
D.3.1 Bilevel Programs with a Convex Lower Level
1. Mathematic model and single-level equivalence
A bilevel program is the most basic instance of bilevel games. The leader
moves first and chooses a decision x; then the follower selects its strategy y
solving the lower-level problem parameterized in x
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min
y
f(x, y)
s.t. g(x, y) ≤ 0 : λ
h(x, y) = 0 : µ
(D.45)
where λ and µ following the colon are dual variables associated with inequal-
ity and equality constraints, respectively. We assume that problem (D.45)
is convex and the KKT condition is necessary and sufficient for a global
optimum
Cons-KKT =
{
(x, y, λ, µ)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∇yf(x, y) + λT∇yg(x, y) + µT∇yh(x, y) = 00 ≤ λ⊥− g(x, y) ≥ 0, h(x, y) = 0
}
(D.46)
The set of optimal solutions of problem (D.45) is denoted by S(x). If (D.45)
is strictly convex, the optimal solution is unique, and S(x) reduces to a sin-
gleton.
When the leader minimizes its payoff function F (x, y), the best response
y(x) ∈ S(x) is taken into account. The leader’s problem is formally described
as
min
x,y¯
F (x, y¯)
s.t. x ∈ X
y¯ ∈ S(x)
(D.47)
Notice that although y¯ acts as a decision variable of the leader, it is actually
controlled by the follower through the best response mapping S(x). When
the leader makes decisions, it will take the response from the follower into
account. When S(x) is a singleton, qualifier ∈ reduces to =; otherwise, if
S(x) contains more than one elements, (D.47) assumes that the follower will
choose the one which is preferred by the leader. Therefore, (D.47) is called an
optimistic equivalence. On the contrary, the pessimistic equivalence assumes
that the follower will choose the one which is unfavorable for the leader, which
is more difficult to solve. As for the optimistic case, replacing y¯ ∈ S(x) with
KKT condition (D.46) leads to the NLP formulation of the bilevel program,
or more exactly, a mathematical program with complementarity constraints
(MPCC)
min
x,y¯,λ,µ
F (x, y¯)
s.t. x ∈ X, (x, y¯, λ, µ) ∈ Cons-KKT
(D.48)
Although the lower-level problem (D.45) is convex, the best reaction map
of the follower characterized by Cons-KKT is non-convex, so a bilevel program
is intrinsically non-convex and generally difficult to solve.
2. Why bilevel programs are difficult to solve?
Two difficulties prevent an MPCC from being solved reliably and effi-
ciently.
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1) The feasible region of (D.47) is non-convex: even if objective functions
and constraints of the leader and the follower are linear, the complementarity
and slackness condition in (D.46) is still non-convex. An NLP solver only finds
a local solution for non-convex problems, if succeeds, and global optimality
can hardly be guaranteed.
2) Despite of its non-convexity, the failure to meet ordinary constraint
qualifications creates another barrier for solving an MPCC. NLP algorithms
generally stop when a stationary point of the KKT conditions is found; how-
ever, due to the presence of the complementarity and slackness condition, the
dual multipliers may not be well-defined because of the violation of standard
constraint qualifications. Therefore, NLP solvers may fail to find a local op-
timum without particular treatment on the complementarity constraints. To
see how constraint qualifications are violated, consider the following simplest
linear complementarity constraint
x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, xT y = 0, x ∈ R5, y ∈ R5
The Jacobian matrix of the active constraints at point (x¯, y¯) is
J =
 ex¯0
y¯
0
ey¯
x¯

where ex¯ and ey¯ are zero-one matrices corresponding to the active constraints
xi = 0, i ∈ I, yj = 0, j ∈ J , where I
⋃
J = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and I⋂ J is not
necessarily empty. Suppose that I = {1, 2, 4} and J = {3, 5}, then
J =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
y¯1 y¯2 y¯3 y¯4 y¯5 x¯1 x¯2 x¯3 x¯4 x¯5

Since x¯1 = x¯2 = x¯4 = 0 and y¯3 = y¯5 = 0, it is apparent that the row vectors
of J are linearly dependent at point (x¯, y¯). The same applies to any (x¯, y¯)
regardless of the indices I and J of active constraints, because whenever yj >
0, complementarity will enforce xi = 0, i = j, creating a binding inequality
in x ≥ 0 and a row in matrix J whose i-th element is 1; whenever xi > 0,
complementarity will enforce yj = 0, j = i, creating a binding inequality in
y ≥ 0 and a row in matrix J whose (i + 5)-th element is 1. Therefore, the
last row of J can be represented by a linear combination of the other rows.
Above discussion and conclusion on linear complementarity constraints
also apply to the nonlinear case, because the Jacobian matrix J has the
same structure. In this regard, above difficulty is an intrinsic phenomenon in
MPCCs.
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Proposition D.9. Complementarity and slackness conditions violate the lin-
ear independent constraint qualification at any feasible solution.
From a geometric perspective, the feasible region of complementarity con-
straints consists of slices like xi = 0, yj = 0; there is no strictly feasible point
and the Slater’s condition does not hold. In conclusion, general purpose NLP
solvers are not numerically reliable for solving MPCCs, although they were
once used to carry out such tasks.
3. Methods for solving MPCCs
In view of the limitations of standard NLP algorithms, new constraint
qualifications are proposed to define stationary solutions so as to solve
MPCCs through conventional NLP methods, such as the Bouligand-, Clarke-
, Mordukhovich-, weakly-, and Strongly-stationary constraint qualifications.
See [23, 24, 25, 26] for further information. Through some proper transfor-
mation, MPCCs can be solved via standard NLP algorithms as well. Several
approaches are available for this task.
a. Regularization method [28, 29, 30]
In this approach, the non-negativity and complementarity requirements
x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, xy = 0 (D.49)
are approximated by
x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, xy ≤ ε (D.50)
Please note that xy ≥ 0 is a natural result of non-negativity requirements
on x and y. When ε = 0, (D.50) is equivalent to (D.49); when ε > 0, (D.50)
defines a larger feasible region than (D.49), so this approach is sometimes
called a relaxation method. The smaller ε is, the closer any feasible point
(x, y) is to achieve complementarity. if x and y are vectors with non-negative
elements, xT y = 0 is the same as xiyi = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · . The same procedure
can be applied if x and y are replaced by nonlinear functions.
Since Slater’s condition holds for the feasible set defined by (D.50) with
 > 0, NLP solvers can be used to solve related optimization problem. In
a regularization procedure for solving an MPCC, the relaxation (D.50) is
applied with gradually decreased value of ε for implementation issues. If the
initial value of ε is too small, the solver may be numerically unstable and fail
to find a feasible solution.
b. Penalization method [31, 32, 33]
In this approach, the complementarity condition xy = 0 is removed from
the set of constraints; instead, an associated penalty term xy/ε is added to
the objective function to create an extra cost whenever complementarity is
not satisfied. Since x and y are non-negative, as indicated by (D.49), the
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penalty term would never take a negative value. In this way, the feasible
region becomes much simpler.
In a penalization procedure for solving an MPCC, a sequence of NLPs are
solved iteratively with gradually decreased value of ε, and the violation of
complementarity condition gradually approaches to 0 as iterations proceed.
If ε is initiated too small, the penalty coefficient 1/ε is very large which may
cause an ill-conditioned problem and numeric instability. One advantage of
this iterative procedure is that the optimal solution in iteration k can be used
as the initial guess in iteration k+1, since the feasible region does not change,
and the solution in every iteration is feasible in the next one. A downside of
this approach is that the NLP solver generally identifies a local optimum.
In consequence, a smaller  may not necessarily lead to a solution that gets
closer to the feasible region.
c. Smoothing method [34, 35]
This approach employs the perturbed Fischer-Burmeister function
φ(x, y, ε) = x+ y −
√
x2 + y2 + ε (D.51)
which is firstly introduced in [36] for LCPs, and shown particularly useful in
SQP methods for solving MPCCs in [37]. Clearly, when ε = 0, the function
φ reduces to the standard Fischer-Burmeister function
φ(x, y, 0) = 0 ⇐⇒ x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, xy = 0 (D.52)
φ(x, y, 0) is not smooth at the origin (0, 0). When ε > 0, the function φ
satisfies
φ(x, y, ε) = 0 ⇐⇒ x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, xy = ε/2 (D.53)
and is smooth in x and y.
In view of this, complementarity and slackness condition (D.49) can be
replaced by φ(x, y, ε) = 0 and further embedded in NLP models. When ε
tends to 0, (D.49) is enforced approximately.
d. Sequential quadratic programming (SQP) [36, 37, 38]
SQP is a general purpose NLP method. In each iteration of SQP, the
quadratic functions in complementarity constraints are approximated by a
linear one, and the nonlinear objective function is replaced with their second-
order Taylor series, constituting a quadratic program with linear constraints
(maybe in conjunction with trust region bounds). At the optimal solution,
nonlinear constraints are linearized, the objective function is approximated
again, and then the SQP algorithm proceeds to the next iteration.
When applied to an MPCC, the SQP method is often capable of finding
a local optimal solution, without a sequence of user-specified εk approaching
to 0, probably because the SQP solver itself is endowed with some softening
ability, e.g., when a quadratic program encounters numeric issues, the SQP
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solver SNOPT automatically relaxes some hard constraints and penalizes
violations in the objective function.
The aforementioned classical methods are discussed in [27], and numeric
experiences are reported in [39].
e. MINLP methods
Due to the wide applications in various engineering disciplines, solution
methods of MPCCs continue to be an active research area. Recall that the
complementarity constraints in form of g(x) ≥ 0, h(x) ≥ 0, g(x)h(x) = 0 is
equivalent to
0 ≤ g(x) ≤Mz, 0 ≤ h(x) ≤M(1− z)
where z is a binary variable, M is a sufficiently large constant. Therefore,
an MPCC can be converted to a mixed integer nonlinear program (MINLP).
MINLP removes the numeric difficulty in MPCC; however, the computation
complexity remains. If all functions in (D.48) are linear, or there are only a
few complementarity constraints, the resulting MILP or MINLP model may
be solved within reasonable time; otherwise, the branch-and-bound algorithm
could offer upper and lower bounds on the optimal value.
f. Convex relaxation/approximation methods
If all functions in MPCC (D.48) are linear, it is a non-convex QCQP in
which non-convexity originates from the complementarity constraints. When
the problem scale is large, the MILP method may be time-consuming. In-
spired by the success of convex relaxation methods in non-convex QCQPs,
there have been increasing interests for developing convex relaxation methods
for MPCCs. An SDP relaxation method is proposed in [40], which is embed-
ded in a branch-and-bound algorithm to solve the MPCC. For the MPCC
derived from a bilevel polynomial program, it is proposed to solve a sequence
of SDPs with increasing problem sizes, so as to solve the original problem
globally [41, 42]. Convex relaxation methods have been applied to power
market problems in [43, 44]. Numerical experiments show that the combina-
tion of MILP and SDP relaxation can greatly reduce the computation time.
Nonetheless, please bear in mind that in the SDP relaxation model, the deci-
sion variable is a matrix with a dimension of n×n, so solving the SDP model
may still be a challenging task, although it is convex.
Recently, a DC programming approach is proposed in [45] to solve LPCC
in the penalized version. In this approach, the quadratic penalty term is
decomposed into the difference of two convex quadratic functions, and the
concave part is then linearized. Computational performances reported in [45]
are very promising.
204 D Equilibrium Problems
D.3.2 Special Bilevel Programs
Although general bilevel programs are difficult, there are special cases which
can be solved relatively easily. One of such classes of programs is the linear
bilevel program, in which objective functions are linear and constraints are
polyhedra. The linear max-min problem is a special case of the linear bilevel
program, in which the leader and the follower have completely opposite tar-
gets. Furthermore, two special market models are studied.
1. Linear bilevel program
A linear bilevel program can be written as
max
x
cTx+ dT y(x)
s.t. Cx ≤ d
y(x) ∈ arg min
y
fT y
s.t. By ≤ b−Ax
(D.54)
In problem (D.54), the follower makes a decision y after the leader deploys its
action x, which influences the feasible region of y. Meanwhile, the leader can
predict the follower’s optimal response y(x), and choose a strategy that finally
optimizes cTx+dT y(x). Other matrices and vectors are constant coefficients.
Given the upper level decision x, the follower is facing an LP, whose KKT
optimality condition is given by
BTu = f
0 ≥ u ⊥ Ax+By − b ≤ 0
The last constraint is equivalent to the following linear constraints
−M(1− z) ≤ u ≤ 0
−Mz ≤ Ax+By − b ≤ 0
where z is a vector consisting of binary variables, and M is a large enough
constant.
In problem (D.54), replacing follower’s LP with its KKT condition gives
rise to an MILP
max
x,y,u,z
cTx+ dT y
s.t. Cx ≤ d, BTu = f
−M(1− z) ≤ u ≤ 0
−Mz ≤ Ax+By − b ≤ 0
(D.55)
If the number of complementarity constraints is moderate, MILP (D.55) can
be often solved efficiently, despite of its NP-hard complexity in the worst-case.
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Since MILP solvers and computation hardware keep improving nowadays, it
is always worthy of bearing this technique in mind. Please also be aware
that the big-M parameter notably impacts the performance of solving MILP
(D.55). A heuristic method to determine such a parameter in linear bilevel
programs is proposed in [46]. This method firstly solves two LPs and generates
a feasible solution of the equivalent MPCC; then solves a regularized version
of the MPCC model using NLP solvers and identifies a local optimal solution
near the obtained feasible point; finally, the big-M parameter and the binary
variables are initiated according to the local optimal solution. In this way,
no manually-supplied parameter is needed, and the MILP model is properly
strengthened.
Another optimality certification of follower’s LP is the following primal-
dual optimality condition
BTu = f, u ≤ 0, Ax+By ≤ b
uT (b−Ax) = fT y
The first line summarizes feasible regions of the primal and dual variables.
The last equation enforces equal values on the optimums of the primal and
the dual problems, which is known as the strong duality condition.
Replacing follower’s LP with the primal-dual optimality condition gives
an NLP:
max
x,y,u
cTx+ dT y
s.t. Cx ≤ d, Ax+By ≤ b
u ≤ 0, BTu = f
uT (b−Ax) = fT y
(D.56)
The following discussion are divided in two categories based on the type of
variable x.
a. x is continuous. In such a general situation, there is no effective way
to solve problem (D.56), due to the last bilinear equality. Notice the fact
that fT y ≥ uT (b − Ax) always holds on the feasible region because of the
weak duality, the last constraint can be relaxed and penalized in the objective
function, resulting in a bilinear program over a polyhedron [47, 48, 49]
max
x,y,u
cTx+ dT y − σ[fT y − uT (b−Ax)]
s.t. Cx ≤ d, Ax+By ≤ b
u ≤ 0, BTu = f
(D.57)
where σ > 0 is a penalty parameter. In problem (D.57), the constraints on
u and (x, y) are decoupled, so this problem can be solved by Algorithm C.1
(mountain climbing) in Appendix C.2.3, if global optimality is not mandatory.
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In some problems, the upper-level decision influences the lower-level cost
function, and has no impact on the feasible region in the lower level. For ex-
ample, the tax rate design or a retail market pricing belongs to such category.
The same procedure can be performed to solve this kind of bilevel problem.
We recommend the MILP model, because in the penalized model, both fT y
and uTAx are non-convex. A tailored retail market model will be introduced
later.
b. x is binary. In such circumstance, the bilinear term uTAx =
∑
ij Aijuixj
can be linearized by replacing uixj with a new continuous variable vij to-
gether with auxiliary linear inequalities enforcing vij = uixj . In this way, the
last inequality translates into
uT b−
∑
ij
Aijvij = f
T y
ulixj ≤ vij ≤ 0, uli(1− xj) ≤ ui − vij ≤ 0, ∀i, j
where uli is a proper bound that does not discard the original optimal solution.
As we can see, a bilevel linear program with binary upper-level variables is
not necessarily harder than all continuous instances. This formulation is very
useful to model interdiction problems in which x mimics attack strategy.
c. x can be discretized. Even if x is continuous, we can approximate it
via binary expansion
xi = x
l
i + ∆i
K∑
k=0
2kzik, zik ∈ {0, 1}
where xli (x
m
i ) is the lower (upper) bound of xi, and ∆i = (x
m
i − xli)/2K+1
is the step size. With this transformation, the bilinear term uTAx becomes
∑
ij
Aijuix
l
i +
∑
ij
Aijui∆j
K∑
k=0
2kzjk
The first term is linear, and uizjk in the second term can be linearized in
a similar way. However, this entails introducing continuous variable with re-
spect to indices i, k and k. A low-complexity linearization method is suggested
in [50]. It re-orders the summations in the second term as
∑
j
K∑
k=0
∆j2
kzjk
∑
i
Aijui
which can be linearized through defining an auxiliary continuous variable
vjk = zjk
∑
iAijui and stipulating
−Mzjk ≤ vjk ≤Mzjk, −M(1− zjk) ≤
∑
i
Aijui − vjk ≤M(1− zjk)
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where M is a large enough constant.
The core idea behind this trick is to treat uTA as a whole vector which
has the same dimension as x, because for bilinear form xT v =
∑
i xivi, the
dimension of summation is one, while for xTQv =
∑
ij Qijxivj , the dimen-
sion of summation is two. This observation inspires us to conform vector
dimensions while deploying such linearization.
2. Linear max-min problem
A linear max-min problem is a special case of the linear bilevel program,
which can be written as
max
x
cTx+ dT y(x)
s.t. x ∈ X
y(x) ∈ arg min
y
cTx+ dT y
s.t. y ∈ Y, By ≤ b−Ax
(D.58)
In problem (D.58), the follower seeks an objective that is completely opposite
to that of the leader. This kind of problem frequently arises in robust opti-
mization and has been discussed in Appendix C.2.3 from the computational
perspective. Here we revisit it from a game theoretical point of view.
Problem (D.58) can be expressed as a two-person zero-sum game
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
{
cTx+ dT y
∣∣ Ax+By ≤ b} (D.59)
However, the coupled constraints make it different from a saddle point
problem in the sense of a Nash game or a matrix game. Indeed, it is a Stack-
elberg game. Let us investigate the interchangeability of the max and min
operators (decision sequence). We have already shown in Appendix D.1.4
that swapping the order of max and min operators in a two-person zero-sum
matrix game does not influence the equilibrium. However, this is not the case
of (D.59) [51], because
208 D Equilibrium Problems
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
{cTx+ dT y | Ax+By ≤ b}
= max
x∈X
{
cTx+ min
y∈Y
{dT y | By ≤ b−Ax}
}
≥max
x∈X
{
cTx+ min
y∈Y
dT y
}
= max
x∈X
cTx+ min
y∈Y
dT y
= min
y∈Y
{
dT y + max
x∈X
cTx
}
≥min
y∈Y
{
dT y + max
x∈X
{cTx | Ax ≤ b−By}
}
= min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
{cTx+ dT y | Ax+By ≤ b}
In fact, strict inequality usually holds in the third and sixth line. This result
implies that owing to the presence of strategy coupling, the leader rests in
a superior status, which is different from the Nash game in which players
possess the same positions.
To solve linear max-min problem (D.59), there is no doubt that the afore-
mentioned MILP transformation for general linear bilevel programs gives a
possible mean for this task. Nevertheless, the special structure of (D.59) al-
lows several alternatives which are more dedicated and effective. To this end,
we will transform it into an equivalent optimization problem using LP duality
theory. For the ease of notation, we merge polytope Y into the coupled con-
straint, and the dual of lower-level LP in (D.58) (or the inner LP in (D.59))
reads
max
u
{uT (b−Ax) | u ∈ U}
where U = {u | BTu = d, u ≤ 0} is the feasible region of dual variable u. As
strong duality always holds for LPs, we have dT y = uT (b−Ax). Substituting
it into (D.58) we obtain
max cTx+ uT b− uTAx
s.t. x ∈ X, u ∈ U (D.60)
Problem (D.60) is a bilinear program due to the product term uTAx in vari-
ables u and x. Several methods for solving such a problem locally or globally
have been set forth in Appendix C.2.3, as a fundamental methodology in
robust optimization. Although variable y of the follower does not appear in
(D.60), it can be easily recovered from the lower level of (D.58) with the
obtained leader’s strategy x.
3. A retail market problem
D.3 Bilevel Programs 209
In a retail market, a retailer releases the prices of some goods; according
to the retail prices, the customer decides on the optimal purchasing strategy
subject to the demands on each goods as well as production constraints;
finally, the retailer produces or trades with a higher level market to manage
the inventory, and delivers the goods to customers. This retail market can be
modeled through a bilevel program. In the upper level
max
x,z
xTDCy(x)− pTDMz (D.61a)
s.t. Ax ≤ a (D.61b)
B1y(x) +B2z ≤ b (D.61c)
(D.61a)-(D.61c) form retailer’s problem, where vector x denotes the prices of
goods released by the retailor; vector y(x) stands for the amounts of goods
purchased by the customer, which is determined from an optimal production
planning problem; p is the production cost or the price in the higher level
market; z represents the production/purchase strategy of the retailer. Other
matrices and vectors are constant coefficients. The first term in objective
function (D.61a) is the income paid by the customer, and the second term
is the payoff of the retailer. The objective function is the total profit to be
maximized. Because there is no competition and the retailer has full market
power, to avoid unfair retail prices, we assume that both sides have reached
certain agreements on the pricing policy, which is modeled through constraint
(D.61b). It includes simple lower and upper bounds as well as other bilateral
contract, such as the restriction on the average price over a certain period
or the price correlation among multiple goods. The inventory dynamics and
other technique constraints are depicted by constraint (D.61c).
Given the retail prices, customers solve the optimal production planning
problem in the lower level
min
y
xTDCy
s.t. Fy ≥ f
(D.62)
and determine the optimal purchasing strategy. The objective function in
(D.62) is the total cost of customers, where the price vector x is constant
coefficient; constraints capture the demands and all other technique require-
ments in the production process.
Bilevel program (D.61)-(D.62) are not linear, although (D.62) is indeed
an LP, because of the bilinear term xTDCy in (D.61a), where both x and
y are variables (the retailer controls y indirectly through prices). The KKT
condition of LP (D.62) reads
DTCx = F
Tu
0 ≤ u⊥Fy − f ≥ 0
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where u is the dual variable. The complementarity constraints can be lin-
earized via binary variables, which has been clarified in Appendix B.3.5.
Furthermore, strong duality gives
xTDCy = f
Tu
The right-hand side is linear in u. Therefore, problem (D.61)-(D.62) and the
following MILP
max
x,y,u,v,z
fTu− pTDMz
s.t. Ax ≤ a, B1y +B2z ≤ b
v ∈ BNf , DTCx = FTu
0 ≤ u ≤M(1− v)
0 ≤ Fy − f ≤Mv
(D.63)
have the same optimal solution in primal variables, where Nf is the dimension
of f .
We can learn from this example that when the problem exhibits a certain
structure, the non-convexity can be eliminated without introducing addi-
tional dimensions of complexity. In problem (D.61), the price is a primal
variable quoted by a decision maker, and is equal to the knock-down price.
This scheme is called pay-as-bid. Next, we give an example of a marginal pric-
ing market where the price is determined by the dual variables of a market
clearing problem.
4. A wholesale market problem
In a wholesale market, a provider bids its offering prices to a market or-
ganizer. The organizer collects information on available resources and the
bidding of the provider, and then clears the market by scheduling the pro-
duction in the most economic way. The provider is paid at the marginal cost.
This problem can be modeled by a bilevel program
max
β
λ(β)T p(β)− f(p(β)) (D.64)
where β is the offering price vector of the provider, p(β) is the quantity of
goods ordered by the market organizer, function f(p) =
∑
i fi(pi), where
fi(pi) is a univariate convex function representing the production cost, and
λ(β) is the marginal prices of each kind of goods. Both of them depend on
the value of β, and are determined from the market clearing problem in the
lower level
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min
p,u
βT p+ cTu (D.65a)
s.t. pn ≤ p ≤ pm : ηn, ηm (D.65b)
p+ Fu = d : λ (D.65c)
Au ≤ a : ξ (D.65d)
where u includes all other variables, such as the amount of each kind of
goods collected from other providers or produced locally, the system operat-
ing variable, and so on; c is the coefficient including prices of goods offered
by other providers, and the production cost if the organizer wishes to pro-
duce the goods by itself. Objective function (D.65a) represents the total cost
in the market to be minimized. Constraint (D.65b) defines offering limits of
the upper-level provider; constraint (D.65c) is the system-wide production-
demand balancing condition of each goods, the dual variable λ at the optimal
solution gives the marginal cost of each goods; (D.65d) imposes constraints
which the system operation must obey, such as network flow and inventory
dynamics.
In the provider’s problem (D.64), the offering price β is not restricted
by finite upper bounds pricing policies (but such a policy can certainly be
modeled), because the competition appears in the lower level: if β is not
reasonable, the market organizer would resort to other providers or count on
its own production capability.
Compared with the situation in a retail market, problems (D.64)-(D.65)
are even more complicated: the dual variable λ appears in the objective func-
tion of the provider, and the term λT p is non-convex. In the following, we
reveal that it can be exactly expressed as a linear function in the primal and
dual variables via (somehow tricky) algebraic transformations.
KKT conditions of the market clearing LP (D.65) are summarized as fol-
lows
β = λ+ ηn + ηm (D.66a)
ηTn (p− pn) = 0 (D.66b)
ηTm(pm − p) = 0 (D.66c)
c = AT ξ + FTλ (D.66d)
ξT (Au− a) = 0 (D.66e)
ηn ≥ 0, ηm ≤ 0, ξ ≤ 0 (D.66f)
(D.65b)− (D.65d) (D.66g)
According to (D.66a),
βT p = λT p+ ηTn p+ η
T
mp (D.67a)
From (D.66b) and (D.66c) we have
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ηTn p = η
T
n pn, η
T
mp = η
T
mpm, (D.67b)
Substituting (D.67b) in (D.67a) renders
λT p = βT p− ηTn pn − ηTmpm (D.67c)
Furthermore, strong duality of LP implies the following equality
βT p+ cTu = ηTn pn + η
T
mpm + d
Tλ+ aT ξ
or
βT p− ηTn pn − ηTmpm = dTλ+ aT ξ − cTu (D.67d)
Substituting (D.67d) in (D.67c) results in
λT p = dTλ+ aT ξ − cTu (D.67e)
The right-hand side is a linear expression for λT p in primal variable u and
dual variables λ and ξ.
Combining the KKT condition (D.66) and (D.67e) gives an MPCC which
is equivalent to the bilevel wholesale market problem (D.64)-(D.65)
max dTλ+ aT ξ − cTu− f(p(β))
s.t. (D.66a)− (D.66g) (D.68)
Because complementarity conditions (D.66b), (D.66c), (D.66e) can be lin-
earized, and convex function f(p) can be approximated by PWL functions,
MPCC (D.68) can be recast as an MILP.
D.3.3 Bilevel Mixed-integer Program
Although LP can tackle many economic problems and market activities in
real life, there are indeed even more decision-making problems which are be-
yond the reach of LP, for example, power market clearing considering unit
commitment [52]. KKT optimality condition or strong duality from LP the-
ory do not apply to discrete optimization problems due to their intrinsic non-
convexity. Furthermore, this is no computationally viable approach to express
the optimality condition of a general discrete program in closed form, mak-
ing a bilevel mixed-integer programs much more challenging to solve than a
bilevel linear program. Some traditional algorithms either rely on enumer-
ative branch-and-bound strategies based on a weak relaxation or depends
on complicated operations that are problem-specific. To our knowledge, the
reformulation and decomposition algorithm proposed in [53] is the first ap-
proach that can solve general bilevel mixed-integer programs in a systematic
way, and will be introduced in this section.
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The bilevel mixed-integer program has the following form
min fTx+ gT y + hT z
s.t. Ax ≤ b, x ∈ Rmc × Bmd
(y, z) ∈ arg max wT y + vT z
s.t. Py +Nz ≤ r −Kx
y ∈ Rnc , z ∈ Bnd
(D.69)
where x is the upper-level decision variable and appears in constraints of the
lower-level problem; y and z represent lower-level continuous decision variable
and discrete decision variable, respectively. We do not distinguish upper-level
continuous variable and discrete variable because they have little impact on
the exposition of the algorithm, unlike the ones appeared in the lower level. If
the lower-level has multiple solutions, the follower chooses the one in favor of
the leader. In the current form, the upper-level constraints are independent
of lower-level variables. Nevertheless, coupling constraints in the upper level
can be easily incorporated [54].
In this section, we assume that the relatively complete recourse property
in [53] holds, i.e., for any feasible pair (x, z), the feasible set for lower-level
continuous variable y is non-empty. Under this premise, the optimal solution
exists. This assumption is mild because we can add slack variables in the
lower-level constraints and penalize constraint violation in the lower-level
objective function. For instances in which the relatively complete recourse
property is missing, please refer to the remedy in [54].
To eliminate ∈ qualifier in (D.69), we duplicate decision variables and
constraints of the lower-level problem and set up an equivalent formulation:
min fTx+ gT y0 + hT z0
s.t. Ax ≤ b, x ∈ Rmc × Bmd
Kx+ Py0 +Nz0 ≤ r
wT y0 + vT z0 ≥ max wT y + vT z
s.t. Py +Nz ≤ r −Kx
y ∈ Rnc , z ∈ Bnd
(D.70)
In this formulation, the leader controls its original variable x as well as repli-
cated variables y0 and z0. Conceptually, the leader will use (y0, z0) to an-
ticipate the response of follower and its impact on his objective function.
Clearly, if the lower-level problem has a unique optimal solution, it must be
equal to (y0, z0). It is worth mentioning that although more variables and
constraints are incorporated in (D.70), this formulation is actually an infor-
mative and convenient expression for algorithm development, as ≥ would be
more friendly to general purpose mathematical programming solvers.
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Up to now, the obstacle of solving (D.70) remains: discrete variable z in
the lower level, which prevents the use of optimality condition of LP. To
overcome this difficulty, we treat y and z separately and restructure the
lower-level problem as:
wT y0 + vT z0 ≥ max
z∈Z
vT z + max
y
{wT y|Py ≤ r −Kx−Nz} (D.71)
where Z represents the set consisting of all possible values of z. Despite the
large cardinality of Z, the second optimization is a pure LP, and can be
replaced with its KKT condition, resulting in:
wT y0 + vT z0 ≥ max
z∈Z
vT z + wT y
s.t. PTpi = w
0 ≤ pi⊥r −Kx−Nz − Py ≥ 0
(D.72)
The complementarity constraints can be linearized via the method in Sect.
B.3.5. Then, by enumerating zj over Z with associated variables (yj , pij), we
arrive at an MPCC that is equivalent to problem (D.70)
min fTx+ gT y0 + hT z0
s.t. Ax ≤ b, x ∈ Rmc × Bmd
Kx+ Py0 +Nz0 ≤ r, PTpij = w, ∀j
0 ≤ pij⊥r −Kx−Nzj − Pyj ≥ 0, ∀j
wT y0 + vT z0 ≥ wT yj + vT zj , ∀j
(D.73)
Without particular mention, (D.73) is compatible with MILP solvers.
Except for the KKT optimality condition, another popular approach en-
tails applying primal-dual condition for the LP regarding the lower-level con-
tinuous variable y. Following this line, rewrite this LP in (D.71) by strong
duality, we obtain
wT y0 + vT z0 ≥ max
z∈Z
vT z + min piT (r −Kx−Nz)
s.t. PTpi = w, pi ≥ 0
(D.74)
In (D.74), if all variables in x are binary, the bilinear terms piTKx and piTNz
from the leader’s point of view can be linearized via the method in Sect.
B.2.2. The min operator in the right-hand side can be omitted because the
upper-level objective function is to be minimized, giving rise to
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min fTx+ gT y0 + hT z0
s.t. Ax ≤ b, x ∈ Rmc × Bmd
Kx+ Py0 +Nz0 ≤ r
wT y0 + vT z0 ≥ vT zj + (r −Kx−Nz)Tpij , ∀j
PTpij = w, pij ≥ 0, ∀j
(D.75)
Clearly, (D.75) has fewer constraints compared to (D.73). Nevertheless, when-
ever x contains continuous variables, linearizing piTKx would incur more
binary variables.
One may think that it is hopeless to solve above enumeration forms (D.73)
and (D.75) due to the large cardinality of Z. In a way similar to the CCG
algorithm for solving robust optimization, we can start with a subset of Z
and solve relaxed version of problem (D.73), until the lower bound and upper
bound of optimal value converge. The flowchart is shown in Algorithm D.5
Because Z has finite elements, Algorithm D.5 must terminate in a finite
number of iterations, which is bounded by the cardinality of Z. When it
converges, LB equals to UB without a positive gap.
To see this, suppose that in iteration l1, (x
∗, y0∗, z0∗) is obtained in step 2
with LB < UB, and z∗ is produced in step 4. Particularly, we assume that z∗
was previously derived in some iteration l0 < l1. Then, in step 5, new variables
and cuts associated with z∗ = zl1+1 will be generated and augmented with
the master problem. As those variables and constraints already exist after
iteration l0, the augmentation is essentially redundant, and the optimal value
of master problem in iteration l1 + 1 remains the same as that in iteration
l1, so does LB. Consequently, in iteration l1 + 1
LB = fTx∗ + gT y0∗ + hT z0∗
= fTx∗ + min gT y0 + hT z0
s.t. Py0 +Nz0 ≤ r −Kx∗, PTpij = w, ∀j ≤ l1 + 1
0 ≤ pij⊥r −Kx∗ −Nzj − Pyj ≥ 0, ∀j ≤ l1 + 1
wT y0 + vT z0 ≥ wT yj + vT zj , ∀j ≤ l1 + 1
≥ fTx∗ + min gT y0 + hT z0
s.t. Py0 +Nz0 ≤ r −Kx∗, PTpij = w, j = l1 + 1
0 ≤ pij⊥r −Kx∗ −Nzj − Pyj ≥ 0, j = l1 + 1
wT y0 + vT z0 ≥ wT yj + vT zj , j = l1 + 1
≥ fTx∗ + min gT y0 + hT z0
s.t. Py0 +Nz0 ≤ r −Kx∗
wT y0 + vT z0 ≥ θ(x∗)
= fTx∗ + Θ(x∗)
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Algorithm D.5 : CCG algorithm for bilevel MILP
1: Set LB = −∞, UB = +∞, and l = 0;
2: Solve the following master problem
min fTx+ gT y0 + hT z0
s.t. Ax ≤ b, x ∈ Rmc × Bmd
Kx+ Py0 +Nz0 ≤ r, PTpij = w, ∀j ≤ l
0 ≤ pij⊥r −Kx−Nzj − Pyj ≥ 0, ∀j ≤ l
wT y0 + vT z0 ≥ wT yj + vT zj , ∀j ≤ l
(D.76)
The optimal solution is (x∗, y0∗, z0∗, y1∗, · · · , yl∗, pi1∗, · · · , pil∗), and the
optimal value is v∗. Update lower bound LB = v∗.
3: Solve the following lower-level MILP with obtained x∗
θ(x∗) = max wT y + vT z
s.t. Py +Nz ≤ r −Kx∗
y ∈ Rnc , z ∈ Bnd
(D.77)
The optimal value is θ(x∗).
4: Solve an additional MILP to refine a solution that is favor of the leader
Θ(x∗) = min gT y + hT z
s.t. wT y + vT z ≥ θ(x∗)
Py +Nz ≤ r −Kx∗
y ∈ Rnc , z ∈ Bnd
(D.78)
The optimal solution is (y∗, z∗), and the optimal value is Θ(x∗). Update
upper bound UB = min{UB, fTx∗ + Θ(x∗)}.
5: If UB − LB = 0, terminate and report optimal solution; otherwise, set
zl+1 = z∗, create new variables (yl+1, pil+1), adding the following cuts to
master problem
wT y0 + vT z0 ≥ wT yl+1 + vT zl+1
0 ≤ pil+1⊥r −Kx−Nzl+1 − Pyl+1 ≥ 0, PTpil+1 = w
Update l← l + 1, and go to step 2.
The second ≥ follows from the fact that zl1+1 is the optimal solution to
problem (D.77) and KKT condition in constraints warrants that vT zl1+1 +
wT yl1+1 = θ(x∗). In the next iteration, the algorithm terminates since LB ≥
UB.
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It should be pointed out that although a large amount of variables and
constraints are generated in step 5, in practice, Algorithm D.5 often con-
verges to an optimal solution within a small number of iterations that could
be drastically smaller than the cardinality of Z, because the most critical
scenarios in Z can be discovered from problem (D.77).
It is suggested in [53] that the master problem could be tightened by
introducing variables (yˆ, pˆi) representing the primal and dual variables of
lower-level problem corresponding to (x, z0) and augmenting the following
constraints
wT y0 + vT z0 ≥ wT yˆ + vT z0
0 ≤ pˆi⊥r −Kx−Nz0 − P yˆ ≥ 0, PT pˆi = w
It is believed that such constraints includes some useful information that is
parametric not only to x but also to z0, and is not available from any fixed
samples z1, · · · , zl. It is also pointed out that for instance with pure integer
variables in the lower-level problem, this strategy is generally ineffective.
D.4 Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium
Constraints
A mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) is an exten-
sion of the bilevel program by incorporating multiple followers competing
with each other, resulting in a GNEP in the lower level. In this regard, an
MPEC is a single-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg game. In a broader sense,
MPEC is an optimization problem with variational inequalities. MPECs are
difficult to solve because of the complementarity constraints.
D.4.1 Mathematical Formulation
In an MPEC, the leader deploys its action x prior to the followers; then each
follower selects its optimal decision yj taking the decision of the leader x and
rivals’ strategies y−j as given. The MPEC can be formulated in two levels:
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Leader:

min
x,y¯,λ¯,µ¯
F (x, y¯, λ¯, µ¯)
s.t. G(x, y¯) ≤ 0
(y¯, λ¯, µ¯) ∈ S(x)
(D.79a)
Followers:

min
yj ,λj ,µj
fj(x, yj , y−j)
s.t. gj(x, yj) ≤ 0 : µj
h(x, y) ≤ 0 : λj
 , ∀j (D.79b)
In (D.79a), the leader minimizes its payoff function F which depends on
the choice of its own x, the decisions of the followers y, and the dual variables
λ and µ from the lower level, because these dual variables may represent the
prices of goods determined by the lower-level market clearing model. Con-
straints include inequalities and equalities (as a pair of opposite inequalities),
as well as the optimality condition of the lower-level problem. In (D.79b), x
is treated as a parameter, and the competition among followers comes down
to a GNEP with shared convex constraints: the payoff function fj(x, yj , y−j)
of follower j is assumed to be convex in yj ; inequality gj(x, yj) ≤ 0 defines a
local constraint of follower j which is convex in yj and does not involve y−j ;
inequality h(x, y) ≤ 0 is the shared constraint which is convex in y. Since
each follower’s problem is convex, the KKT condition is both necessary and
sufficient for optimality. We assume that the set of GNEPs S(x) is always
non-empty.
The GNEP encompasses several special cases in the lower level. If the
global constraint is absent, it degenerates into an NEP; moreover, if the
objective functions of followers are also decoupled, the lower level reduces to
independent convex optimization programs.
By replacing the lower-level GNEP with its KKT condition (D.35), the
MPEC (D.79) becomes an MPCC, which can be solved by some suitable
methods explained before. As the lower level GNEP usually possesses in-
finitely many equilibria, the outcome found by the MPCC reformulation is
the favourite one from the leader’s perspective. We can also require the La-
grange multipliers for the shared constraints should be equal, so as to restrict
the GNEP to VEs. If the followers’ problems are linear, the primal-dual op-
timality condition is an alternative choice in addition to the KKT condition,
as it often involves fewer constraints. Nevertheless, the strong duality may in-
troduce products involving primal and dual variables, such as those in (D.56)
and (D.57), which remain non-convex and require special treatments.
D.4.2 Linear Complementarity Problem
A linear complementarity problem (LCP) requires finding a feasible solution
subject to the following constraints
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0 ≤ x⊥Px+ q ≥ 0 (D.80)
where P is a square matrix; q is a vector. Their dimensions are compatible
with x.
LCP is a special case of MPCC without an objective function. This type of
problem frequently arises in various disciplines including market equilibrium
analysis, computational mechanics, game theory, and mathematical program-
ming. The theory of LCPs is a well-developed field. Detailed discussions can
be found in [55]. In general, an LCP is NP-hard, although it is polynomially
solvable for some special cases. One situation is when the matrix P is posi-
tive semidefinite. In such circumstance, problem (D.80) can be solved via the
following convex quadratic program
min xTPx+ qTx
s.t. x ≥ 0, Px+ q ≥ 0 (D.81)
(D.81) is a CQP which is readily solvable. Its optimum must be non-negative
according to the constraints. If the optimal value of (D.81) is 0, then its
optimal solution also solves LCP (D.80); otherwise, if the optimal value is
strictly positive, LCP (D.80) is infeasible. In fact, this conclusion holds no
matter whether P is positive semidefinite or not. However, if P is indefinite,
identifying the global optimum of a non-convex QP (D.81) is also NP-hard,
and thus does not facilitate solving the LCP.
There is a large body of literature discussing algorithms for solving LCPs.
One of the most representative ones is the Lemke’s pivoting method developed
in [56], and another emblematic one is the interior-point method proposed
in [57]. One drawback of the former method is its exponentially growing
worst-case complexity, which makes it less efficient for large problems. The
latter approach runs in polynomial time, but it requires the positive semidef-
initeness of P , which is a strong assumption and limits its application. In
this section, we will not present comprehensive reviews on the algorithms for
LCP. We will introduce MILP formulations for problem (D.80) devised in
[58, 59]. They make no reference on any special structure of matrix P . More
importantly, they offer an option to access the solutions of practical problems
in a systematic way.
Recall the MILP formulation techniques presented in Appendix B.3.5, it
is easy to see that problem (D.80) can be equivalently expressed as linear
constraints with additional binary variable z as follows
0 ≤ x ≤Mz, 0 ≤ Px+ q ≤M(1− z) (D.82)
Integrality of z maintains the element-wise complementarity of x and Px+q:
at most one of xi and (Px+ q)i can be strictly positive. Formulation (D.82)
entails a manually specified parameter M , which is not instantly available at
hand. On the one hand, it must be big enough to preserve all extreme points
of (D.80). On the other hand, it is expected to be as small as possible from
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a computational perspective, otherwise, the continuous relaxation of (D.82)
would be very loose. In this regard, (D.82) is too cursory, although it might
work well.
To circumvent above difficulty, it is proposed in [58] to solve a bilinear
program without a big-M parameter
min
x,z
zT (Px+ q) + (1− z)Tx
s.t. x ≥ 0, Px+ q ≥ 0, z binary
(D.83)
If (D.80) has a solution x∗, the optimal value of (D.83) is 0: for x∗i > 0,
we have z∗i = 1 and (Px
∗ + q)i = 0; for (Px∗ + q)i > 0, we have z∗i = 0
and x∗i = 0. The optimal solution is consistent with the feasible solution
of (D.82). The objective can be linearized by introducing auxiliary variables
wij = zixj , ∀i, j. However, applying normal integer formulation techniques in
Appendix B.2.2 on variable wij again needs the upper bound of xi, another
interpretation of the big-M parameter.
A parameter-free MILP formulation is suggested in [58]. To understand the
basic idea, recall the fact that (1 − zi)xi = 0; if we impose xi = wii = xizi,
i = 1, 2, · · · in the constraint, (1 − z)Tx in the objective can be omitted.
Furthermore, multiplying both sides of
∑
j Pkjxj + qk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, · · · with
zi gives
∑
j Pkjwij + qkzi ≥ 0, ∀i, k. Since zi ∈ {0, 1},
∑
j Pkjxj + qk ≥∑
j Pkjwij + qkzi, ∀i, k and 0 ≤ wij ≤ xj , ∀i, j naturally hold. Collecting up
these valid inequalities, we obtain an MILP
min
x,z,w
qT z +
∑
i
∑
j
Pijwij
s.t.
∑
j
Pkjxj + qk ≥
∑
j
Pkjwij + qkzi ≥ 0, ∀i, k
0 ≤ wij ≤ xj , ∀i, j, wjj = xj , ∀j, z binary
(D.84)
Instead of enforcing every
∑
j Pkjwij + qkzi being at 0, we relax them as
inequalities and minimize their summation. More valid inequalities can be
added in (D.84) by exploiting linear cuts of z. It is proved in [58] that relation
wij = zixj , ∀i, j is implicitly guaranteed at the optimal solution of (D.84).
In view of this, MILP (D.84) is equivalent to LCP (D.80) in the following
sense: (D.80) has a solution if and only if (D.84) has an optimal value equal
to zero, and the optimal solution to (D.84) incurring a zero objective value
is a solution of LCP (D.80). MILP (D.84) is superior compared with (D.82)
and big-M linearization based MILP formulation of MINLP (D.83) because
it is parameter-free and gives tighter continuous relaxation. Nevertheless, the
number of constraints in (D.84) is significantly larger than that in formulation
(D.82). This method has been further analyzed in [59] and extended to binary-
constrained mixed LCPs.
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Another parameter-free MILP formulation is suggested in [60], which takes
the form of
max
α,y,z
α
s.t. 0 ≤ (Py)i + qiα ≤ 1− zi, ∀i
0 ≤ yi ≤ zi, zi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i
0 ≤ α ≤ 1
(D.85)
Since α = 0, y = 0, z = 0 is always feasible, MILP (D.85) is feasible and
has an optimum no greater than 1. By observing the constraints, we can
conclude that if MILP (D.85) has a feasible solution with α¯ > 0, then x =
y/α¯ solves problem (D.80). If the optimal solution α¯ = 0, then problem
(D.80) has no solution; otherwise, suppose x¯ solves (D.80), and let α¯−1 =
max{x¯i, (Px¯)i + qi, i = 1, · · · }, then for any 0 < α ≤ α¯, y¯ = αx¯ is feasible
in (D.85). As a result, the optimal solution should be no less than α¯, rather
than 0. Compared with formulation (D.82), the big-M parameter is adaptively
scaled by optimizing α.
Because (D.85) works with an intermediate variable y, when LCP (D.80)
should be jointly solved with other conditions on x, formulation (D.85) is not
advantageous, because non-convex variable transformation x = y/α must be
appended to link both parts.
Robust solutions of LCPs with uncertain P and q are discussed in [61].
It is found that when P  0, robust solutions can be extracted from an
SOCP under some mild assumptions on the uncertainty set; otherwise, the
more general problem with uncertainty can be reduced to a deterministic
non-convex QCQP. This technique is particularly useful in uncertain traf-
fic equilibrium problems and uncertain Nash-Cournot games. Uncertain VI
problems and MPCCs can be tackled in the similar vein after some proper
transformations.
It is shown in [62] that a linear bilevel program or its equivalent MPEC
can be globally solved via a sequential LCP method. A hybrid enumerative
method is suggested which substantially reduces the effort for searching a
solution of the LCP or certifying that the LCP has no solution. When the
LCP is easy to solve, this approach is attractive.
Several extensions of LCP, including the discretely-constrained mixed
LCP, discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot game, discretely-constrained MPEC,
and logic constrained equilibrium problem as well as their applications in
energy markets and traffic system equilibrium have been investigated in
[63, 64, 65, 66]. In a word, due to its wide applications, LCP is still an active
research field, and MILP remains an appealing method for solving LCPs for
practical problems.
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D.4.3 Linear Programs with Complementarity
Constraints
A linear program with complementarity constraints (LPCC) entails solving
a linear optimization problem with linear complementarity constraints. It
is a special case of MPCC if all functions in the problem are linear, and a
generalization of LCP by incorporating an objective function to be optimized.
An LPCC has the following form
max
x,y
cTx+ dT y
s.t. Ax+By ≥ f
0 ≤ y⊥q +Nx+My ≥ 0
(D.86)
A standard approach for solving (D.86) is to linearize the complementarity
constraint by introducing a binary vector z and solve the following MILP
max
x,y,z
cTx+ dT y
s.t. Ax+By ≥ f
0 ≤ q +Nx+My ≤Mz
0 ≤ y ≤M(1− z)
z ∈ {0, 1}m
(D.87)
If both of x and y are bounded variables, we can readily derive the proper
value of M in each inequality; otherwise, finding high quality bounds is non-
trivial even if they do exist. The method in [46] can be used to determine
proper bounds of M , if the NLP solver can successfully find local solutions
of the bounding problems.
Using a arbitrarily large value may solve the problem correctly. Never-
theless, parameter-free method is still of great theoretical interests. A smart
Benders decomposition algorithm is proposed in [67] to solve (D.87) with-
out requiring the value of M . The completely positive programming method
developed in [68] can also be used to solve (D.87). For more theory and algo-
rithm for LPCC, please see [45], [69]-[75] and references therein. Interesting
connections among conic QPCCs, QCQPs, and completely positive programs
are revealed in [76].
D.5 Equilibrium Programs with Equilibrium
Constraints
An equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) is the most
general extension of the bilevel program. It incorporates multiple leaders and
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multiple followers competing with each other in the upper level and the lower
level, respectively, resulting in two GNEPs in both levels. In this regard, an
EPEC is a multi-leader-follower Stackelberg game.
D.5.1 Mathematical model
In an EPEC, each leader i deploys an action xi prior to the followers while
taking movements of other leaders x−i into account and anticipating the
best responses y(x) from the followers; then each follower selects its optimal
decision yj by taking the strategies of leaders x and rivals’ actions y−j as
given. The EPEC can be formulated in two levels
Leaders:

min
xi,y¯,λ¯,µ¯
Fi(xi, x−i, y¯, λ¯, µ¯)
s.t. Gi(xi) ≤ 0
(y¯, λ¯, µ¯) ∈ S(xi, x−i)
 , ∀i (D.88a)
Followers:

min
yj
fj(x, yj , y−j)
s.t. gj(x, yj) ≤ 0 : µj
h(x, y) ≤ 0 : λj
 , ∀j (D.88b)
In (D.88a), each leader minimizes its payoff function Fi which depends on
its own choice xi, the decisions of followers y, dual variables λ and µ are
parameterized in competitors’ strategies x−i. Tuple (y¯, λ¯, µ¯) in the upper level
is restricted by the optimality condition of the lower-level problem. Although
the inequality constraints of leaders are decoupled, and we do not explicitly
consider global constraints in the upper-level GNEP, the leaders’ strategy sets
as well as their payoff functions are still correlated through the best reaction
map S(xi, x−i), and hence (D.88a) itself is a GNEP, which is non-convex.
The followers’ problem (D.88b) is a GNEP with shared constraints, which is
the same as the situation in an MPEC. The same convexity assumptions are
made in (D.88b). The structure of EPEC (D.88) is depicted in Fig. D.4. The
equilibrium solution of EPEC (D.88) is defined as the GNE among leaders’
MPECs. It is common knowledge that EPECs often have no pure strategy
equilibrium due to the intrinsic non-convexity of MPECs.
D.5.2 Methods for Solving an EPEC
An EPEC can be viewed as a set of coupled MPEC problems: leader i is
facing an MPEC composed of problem i in (D.88a) together with all followers’
problems in (D.88b), which is parameterized in x−i. By replacing lower-level
224 D Equilibrium Problems
x
1
Follower 1
y
1
Follower n
x
m
y
n
y
1
y
n
ĂĂ
ĂĂ
S
tack
elb
erg
 G
am
e
Generalized Nash Game
Leader 1 Leader m
ĂĂ
ĂĂ
x
1
x
m
Generalized Nash Game
x
m
y
1
x
1
y
n
Fig. D.4 The structure of an EPEC.
GNEP with its KKT optimality conditions, it can be imaged that the GNEP
among leaders have non-convex constraints which inherit the tough properties
of complementarity constraints. Thus, solving an EPEC is usually extremely
challenging. To our knowledge, systematic algorithms of EPEC are firstly
developed in dissertations [77, 78, 79]. The primary application of such an
equilibrium model is found in energy market problems, see [80] for an excellent
introduction.
Unlike the NEP and GNEP discussed in Sect. D.1 and Sect. D.2, where
the strategy sets are convex or jointly convex, because the lower-level prob-
lems are replaced with KKT optimality conditions and the MPEC for the
leader is intrinsically non-convex, provable existence and uniqueness guaran-
tees for the solution to EPECs are non-trivial. There is sustainable attempt
on the analysis of EPEC solution properties. For example, the existence of a
unique equilibrium for certain EPEC instances are discussed in [81, 82], and
in [83] for a nodal price based power market model. However, the existence
and uniqueness of solution are only guaranteed under restrictive conditions.
Counterexamples have been given in [84] to demonstrate that there is no gen-
eral result for the existence of solutions to EPECs due to their non-convexity.
The non-uniqueness issue is studied in [78, 85]. It is shown that even in the
simplest instances, local uniqueness of the EPEC equilibrium solution may
not be guaranteed, and a manifold of equilibria may exist. This can be under-
stood because EPEC is a generalization of GNEP, whose solution property
is illustrated in Sect. D.2.1. When the payoff functions possess special struc-
tures, say, a potential function exists, then the existence of a global equilib-
rium can be investigated using the theory of potential games [86, 87, 88]. In
summary, the theory of EPEC solutions are much more complicated than the
single-level NEP and GNEP.
This section reviews several representative algorithms which are widely
used in literature. The former two are generic and seen in [77, 78]; the third
one is motivated by the convenience brought by the property of potential
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games, and reported in [88]; at last, a pricing game in a competitive market,
which appears to be non-convex at first sight, is presented to show the hidden
convexity in such a special equilibrium model.
1. Best response algorithm
Since the equilibrium of an EPEC is a GNEP among leaders’ MPEC prob-
lems, the most intuitive strategy for identifying an equilibrium solution is the
best response algorithm. In some literature, it is also called diagonalization
method or sequential MPEC method. This approach can be further cate-
gorized into Jacobian type and Gauss-Seidel type method, according to the
information used when players update their strategies.
To explain the algorithmic details, denote by MPEC(i) the problem of
leader i: the upper level is problem i in (D.88a), and the lower level is the
GNEP described in (D.88b) given all leaders’ strategies. Let xki be the strat-
egy of leader i in iteration k, and xk = (xk1 , · · · , xkm) the strategy profile of
leaders. The Gauss-Seidel type algorithm proceeds as follows [89]:
Algorithm D.6 : Best-response (Diagonalization) algorithm for
EPEC
1: Choose an initial strategy profile x0 for leaders, set convergence tolerance
ε > 0, an allowed number of iterations K, and the iteration index k = 0;
2: Let xk+1 = xk. Loop for players i = 1, · · · ,m:
a. Solve MPEC(i) for leader i given xk+1−i .
b. Replace xk+1i with the optimal strategy of leader i just obtained.
3: If ‖xk+1 − xk‖2 ≤ ε, the upper level converges; solve lower-level GNEP
(D.88b) with x∗ = xk+1 using the algorithms elaborated in Sect. D.2.2,
and the equilibrium among followers is y∗. Report (x∗, y∗) and terminate.
4: If k = K, report failure of convergence and quit.
5: Update k ← k + 1, and go to step 2.
Without an executable criterion to judge the existence and uniqueness of
solution, possible outcomes of Algorithm D.6 are discussed in three situations.
1. There is no equilibrium. Algorithm D.6 does not converge. In such
circumstance, one may turn to seeking a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium,
which always exists. Examples are given in [89]: if there are two leaders, we
can list possible strategy combinations and solve the lower-level GNEP among
followers, then compute respective payoffs of the two leaders, and then build
a bimatrix game, whose mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium can be calculated
from solving an LCP, as explained in Sect. D.1.4.
2. There is a unique equilibrium, or there are multiple equilibria. Algorithm
D.6 may converge or not, and which equilibrium will be found (if it converges)
depends on the initial strategy profile offered in step 1.
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3. Algorithm D.6 may converge to a local equilibrium in the sense of [83],
if each MPEC is solved by a local NLP method which does not guarantee
global optimality. The true equilibrium can be found only if each leader’s
MPEC can be globally solved. The MILP reformulation (if possible) offers
one plausible way for this task.
2. KKT system method
To tackle the divergence issue in the best response algorithm, it is proposed
to apply the KKT condition to each leader’s MPEC and solve the resulting
KKT systems simultaneously [79, 90]. The solution turns out to be a strong
stationary equilibrium point of EPEC (D.88). There is no convergence issue
in this approach, since no iteration is deployed. However, special attention
should be paid to some potential problems mentioned below.
1. Since the EPEC is essentially a GNEP among leaders, the concentrated
KKT system may have non-isolated solutions. To refine a meaningful out-
come, we can manually specify a secondary objective function, which is op-
timized subject to the KKT system.
2. The embedded (twice) application of KKT condition for the lower-
level problems and upper-level problems inevitably introduces extensive of
complementarity and slackness conditions, which greatly challenges solving
the concentrated KKT system. In this regard, scalability may be a main
bottleneck for this approach. If the lower-level GNEP is linear, it may be
better to use primal-dual optimality condition first for followers, and then
KKT condition for leaders.
3. Because each leader’s MPEC is non-convex, a stationary point of the
KKT condition is not necessarily an optimal solution of the leader; as a result,
the solution of the concentrated KKT system may not be an equilibrium of
the EPEC. To validate the result, one can conduct the best-response method
initiated at the candidate solution with a slight perturbation.
3. Potential MPEC method
When the upper-level problems among leaders admit a potential function
satisfying (D.25), the EPEC can be reformulated as an MPEC, and the rela-
tions of their solutions are revealed by comparing the KKT condition of the
normalized Nash stationary points of the EPEC and the KKT condition of
the associated MPEC [88].
For example, if the leaders’ objectives are given by
Fi(xi, x−i, y) = FSi (xi) +H(x, y)
or in other words, the payoff function Fi(xi, x−i, y) can be decomposed as the
sum of two parts: the first one FSi (xi) only depends on the local variable xi,
and the second one H(x, y) is common to all leaders. In such circumstance,
the potential function can be expressed as
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U(x, y) = H(x, y) +
m∑
i=1
FSi (xi)
Please see Sect. D.1.5 for the condition under which a potential function
exists and special instances in which a potential function can be easily found.
Suppose that leaders’ local constraints are given by xi ∈ Xi which is
independent of x−i and y, and the best reaction map of followers with fixed
x is given by (y¯, λ¯, µ¯) ∈ S(x). Clearly, the solution of MPEC
min
x,y¯,λ¯,µ¯
U(x, y¯)
s.t. xi ∈ Xi, i = 1, · · · ,m
(y¯, λ¯, µ¯) ∈ S(x)
must be an equilibrium solution of the original EPEC.
This approach leverages the property of potential games and is superior
over the previous two methods (if a potential function exists): KKT condition
is applied only once to the lower level problems, and the equilibrium can be
retrieved by solving MPEC only once.
4. A pricing game in a competitive market
We consider an EPEC taken from the examples in [91], which models a
strategic pricing game in a competitive market. The hidden convexity in this
EPEC is revealed. For ease of exposition, we study the case with two leaders
and one follower. The results can be extended to the situation where more
than two leaders exist. The pricing game with two leaders can be formulated
by the following EPEC
Leader 1: max
x1
{
yT (x1, x2)A1x1
∣∣ B1x1 ≤ b1} (D.89a)
Leader 2: max
x2
{
yT (x1, x2)A2x2
∣∣ B2x2 ≤ b2} (D.89b)
Follower: max
y
{
f(y)− yTA1x1 − yTA2x2
∣∣ Cy = d} (D.89c)
In (D.89a) and (D.89b), two leaders announce their offering prices x1 and
x2, respectively, subject to some certain pricing policy described in their
corresponding constraints. The follower then decides how many goods should
be purchased from each leader, according to the optimal solution of problem
(D.89c), where the profit of the follower
f(y) = −1
2
yTQy + cT y
is a strongly concave quadratic function, i.e. Q  0, and matrix C has full
rank in its rows. Each player in the market wishes to maximize his own profit.
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The utilities of leaders are the payments from trading with the follower; the
profit of follower is the revenue minus the purchasing cost.
At first sight, EPEC (D.89) is non-convex, not only because the leaders’
objective functions are bilinear, but also because the best response mapping is
generally non-convex. In light of the strong convexity of (D.89c), the following
KKT condition:
c−Qy −A1x1 −A2x2 − CTλ = 0
Cy − d = 0
is necessary and sufficient for a global optimum. Because constraints in
(D.89c) are all equalities, there is no complementarity and slackness con-
dition. Solve this set of linear equations, we can obtain the optimal solution
y in a closed form. To this end, substituting
y = Q−1(c−A1x1 −A2x2 − CTλ)
into the second equation, we have
λ = M [N(c−A1x1 −A2x2)− d]
where
M =
[
CQ−1CT
]−1
, N = CQ−1
Moreover, eliminating λ in the expression of y gives the best reaction map
y = r +D1x1 +D2x2 (D.90)
where
r = Q−1c+NTMd−NTMNc
D1 = N
TMNA1 −Q−1A1
D2 = N
TMNA2 −Q−1A2
Substituting (D.90) into the objective functions of leaders, EPEC (D.89)
reduces to a standard Nash game
Leader 1: max
x1
{θ1(x1, x2) | B1x1 ≤ b1}
Leader 2: max
x2
{θ2(x1, x2) | B2x2 ≤ b2}
where
θ1(x1, x2) = r
TA1x1 + x
T
1 D
T
1 A1x1 + x
T
2 D
T
2 A1x1
θ2(x1, x2) = r
TA2x2 + x
T
2 D
T
2 A2x2 + x
T
1 D
T
1 A2x2
The partial Hessian matrix of θ1(x1, x2) can be calculated as
∇2x1θ1(x1, x2) = 2AT1 (NTMN −Q−1)A1
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As Q  0, its inverse matrix Q−1  0; denote by Q−1/2 the square root of
Q−1, and
PJ = I −Q−1/2CT (CQ−1CT )−1CQ−1/2
It is easy to check that PJ is a projection matrix, which is symmetric and
idempotent, i.e., PJ = P
2
J = P
3
J = · · · . Moreover, it can be verified that the
Hessian matrix ∇2x1θ1(x1, x2) can be expressed via
∇2x1θ1(x1, x2) = 2AT1 (NTMN −Q−1)A1 = −2AT1 Q−1/2PJQ−1/2A1
For any vector z with a proper dimension,
zT∇2x1θ1(x1, x2)z = − 2zT
(
AT1 Q
−1/2PJQ−1/2A1
)
z
= − 2zTAT1 Q−1/2PTJ PJQ−1/2A1z
= − 2(PJQ−1/2A1z)T (PJQ−1/2A1z) ≤ 0
We can see that ∇2x1θ1(x1, x2)  0. The similar analysis also applies to∇2x2θ2(x1, x2). Therefore, the problems of leaders are actually convex pro-
grams, and a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
D.6 Conclusions and Further Reading
Equilibrium problems entail solving interactive optimization problems simul-
taneously, and serve as the foundation for modeling competitive behaviors
among strategic decision makers, and analyzing the stable outcome of a game.
This chapter provides an overview on two kinds of equilibrium problems that
frequently arise in various economic and engineering applications.
One-level equilibrium problems, including the NEP and GNEP, are intro-
duced first. The existence of equilibrium can be ensured under some convex-
ity and monotonicity assumptions. Distributed methods for solving one-level
games are presented. When each player solves a strictly convex optimization
problem, distributed algorithms converge with provable guarantee, and thus
are preferred, whereas the KKT system renders nonlinear equations and is rel-
atively difficult to solve. To address incomplete information and uncertainty
in player’s decision making, a robust optimization based game model is pro-
posed in [92], which is distribution-free and relaxes Harsanyi’s assumptions
on Bayesian games. Particularly, the robust Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix
game with uncertain payoffs can be characterized via the solution of a second-
order cone complementarity problem [93], and more general cases involving
n players and continuous payoffs are discussed in [94]. Distributional uncer-
tainty is tackled in [95], in which the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of
a distributionally robust chance-constrained game is studied. A generalized
Nash game arises when the strategy sets of players are coupled. Due to prac-
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tical interests from a variety of engineering disciplines, the solution method
for GNEPs is still an active research area. The volume of articles is growing
quickly in recent years, say, [96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104], to name
just a few. GNEPs with uncertainties are studied in [105, 106].
Bilevel equilibrium problems, including the bilevel program, MPEC, and
EPEC, are investigated. These problems are intrinsically hard to solve, due to
the non-convexity induced by the best reaction map of followers, and solution
properties have been revealed for specific instances under restrictive assump-
tions. We recommend [89, 107, 108] for theoretical foundations and energy
market applications of bilevel equilibrium models, and [109] for an up-to-date
survey. The theories on bilevel programs and MPEC are relatively mature.
Recent research efforts have been spent on new constraint qualifications and
optimality conditions, for example, the work in [110, 111, 112, 113]. The
MILP reformulation is preferred by most power system applications, because
the ability of MILP solvers keep improving, and a global optimal solution can
be found. Stochastic MPEC is proposed in [114] to model uncertainty using
probability distributions. Algorithms are developed in [115, 116, 117, 118],
and a literature review can be found in [119]. Owing to the inherent hard-
ness, discussions on EPEC models are limited to special cases, such as those
with shared P-matrix linear complementarity constraints [120], power mar-
ket models [120, 121, 122], those with convex quadratic objectives and linear
constraints [120], and Markov game models [123]. Methods for solving EPEC
are based on relaxing or regularizing complementarity constraints [123, 124],
as well as evolutionary algorithms [125]. Robust equilibria of EPEC are dis-
cussed in [126]. An interesting connection between the bilevel program and
the GNEP has been revealed in [127], establishing a new look on these game
models.
We believe that the equilibrium programming models will become an im-
perative tool for designing and analyzing interconnected energy systems and
related markets, in view of the physical interdependence of heterogenous en-
ergy flows and strategic interactions among different network operators.
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